Rise of China and India:
Implications for Building an "Asian Community"

By Vishakha N. Desai
President, Asia Society

Tuesday, August 28, 2007
Little Theatre, NCPA, Mumbai
Co-hosted with the India China Institute

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As President of Asia Society and as someone with a background in arts and culture, I am struck by the fact that when I go to a gathering that deals with international relations by and large, nobody talks about culture and history. Similarly when I go for programmes that deal with art history and other such cultural gatherings, most people refer to geo-politics and economics in passing. There is never an attempt to combine both those pieces together. So that's partly why I want to talk to you today about the 'Rise of China and India' and what that means for the larger community of Asia. The second reason is very personal and has to do with the fact that for the longest time, I was an 'Asianist,' as it were. I was not just focusing on Indian art but I was interested in the broader issues of Asia. I had many friends with whom I would have endless discussions about the construct of "Asia"—whether it was a construct of the West or of the colonial powers? The aim of this conversation is also to discuss the notion of the 'Asianist'—has it existed in the past? And whether and how the past can be of any service to the present. Finally I want to speak on this issue today in order to highlight the role of culture in policy formation for India and China.

A tectonic shift is currently underway in the geo-political and geo-economic world order. By the year 2050 more than 50% of the world's population will come from India and China. If we include Japan, then by 2050 these three together would account for more than 50% of the world's GDP.

When we say 'Asian,' we often refer to growth that is being propelled by China and India but one must not forget Japan. If one adds Korea, Singapore, and Malaysia, and some other countries of Asia, you will begin to see that the global powers of the future are going to be Asian. America cannot, and will not be, the sole superpower. We know this not just from economic projections but also from perceptions. Recently the Chicago Council of Global Affairs and Asia Society had jointly studied perceptions of the United States amongst citizens of countries like China, Korea, India, and Australia and the results clearly showed that the majority felt that by the year 2050 America would not be the sole superpower in the world. Some suggested that it might even be superseded by China but interestingly a number of people felt that India, rather than China, would emerge triumphant. We know that in terms of economic reality and even in terms of perception, the centre of gravity is shifting. But what does that mean in geo-political terms? Even when it comes to military power, America may be the strongest and mightiest of them all, but the next biggest military powers are actually here—in Asia—China and India. We know from all of these facts that essentially we have to begin to think about Asia in a different way.

The third little factor that has to be acknowledged is the phenomenal growth that intra-regional trade has seen in recent years—whether it is trade between China and India or trade between China and South East Asia. Perhaps anticipating this growth, China has made a very concerted and co-coordinated effort to ensure its presence in South East and Central Asia primarily by offering economic assistance. It is not merely a coincidence that China has the largest number of free trade agreements with countries in Asia. But this overwhelming presence was also achieved through the proliferation of Chinese language, culture, and philosophy. All of this just goes to show that China has in fact recognized the potential of Asia and therefore there is need for discussion on whether India is part of that Asia or not. In this context I think it is useful for us to think about whether there has ever been a sense of 'Asianess' and where we go from here in order to build a new future.

Author Nayan Chanda's latest book talks of globalization in the historical context and he mentioned, as have other historians, that in fact there was a great deal of interdependent trade within Asia even as early as the 16th and 17th century. Textiles made in Gujarat would find their way to the markets of Taiwan; Chinese ceramics made specifically for the Philippine common market; Vietnamese, Indonesian, and Indian goods were traveling throughout the sea trade, and so on and so forth. All of this interdependence existed because the sea links were open and was prior to the arrival of the Western powers to the region.

With the arrival of the Spanish, Portuguese, Dutch, and, eventually, English traders, the control of the sea trade and sea links got divided. The Asian continent gets divided amongst the Western powers and that essentially breaks down the trade and the economic interdependence that existed within Asia. Hence some scholars suggest that the notion of 'Asia' is a construct that exists only in a philosophical and religious sense. Even if the notion of Asianess did exist between the 15th and 16th century, it could not survive because it was not supported by geopolitical and geo-economic linkages.

The other period that I would like to flag is actually the period of the 6th to 8th century, i.e. the late or post-Gupta period in India and the Tang dynasty in China. By and large people know of this period through the writings of various Chinese travelers that were coming to the subcontinent. What we know less of is that there were Indian mathematicians, astronomers, and scientists at the Chinese port at the same time. What we also know less about is that on the one hand there were Indian connections in South East Asia which can be discerned through the presence of Hindu Buddhist monuments in Cambodia, Vietnam, and Indonesia, South Indian-style Buddha images found in Java, monuments in Myanmar and Vietnam that arrived via Sri Lanka, etc.

The suggestions that emerge in terms of the actual evidence is that connections were being established not only by China in East Asia but also by India in South East Asia. Thus one of the ways that we might analyze that period is to first recognize that there was not one single hegemonic power that was controlling the whole region but in fact two major players, two great civilizations figuring out how they connect with one another and also how they connect with smaller countries or regions in Asia. Out of this understanding emerges a kind of a web that differs from almost any other period one has analyzed with regard to Asian cultures and this should help us understand why we are where we are today.

Asia in that time was a multilateral, multicultural, and multilayered network. So can we use that model today and go beyond it? Can we re-vision the 'Asian century' that everybody talks about, that perhaps would evolve in the 21st century? If we did it before, will we do it again? and what would it take to get there? I think it is fair to say that we also have to think about the challenges and the barriers to such a re-visioning of the new world in which various Asian communities come together to make an Asian community. Many of my friends in Europe have often said that Asia is never going to be like Europe because you don't have the same kind of heritage, language, etc., and at the same time we know that if somebody would have asked in the early 20th century whether there was such a thing like Europe you might say yes, when in fact the barriers between the French and the Germans and the English were strong enough for the possibility of a European Union to never be realized. For a community to emerge, the economic, political, and cultural spheres would have to merge. In this increasingly globalized world, perhaps a nascent feeling of inter-connectivity has been planted.

I think political relationships among Asian countries would be more of a challenge and we have to recognize that. It is very clear that for any Asian community to really take hold, Japan has to play a very important role. The bilateral relationship between China and Japan is far from being ideal, to say the least. The other kind of barrier is of course the border dispute—for example between India and China, which both countries keep suggesting that they would put aside for the greater good but ultimately it is such issues that come to the forefront in bilateral dialogues. If such issues are not managed, they can actually derail the whole process.

Similarly, one also has the situation of Japan and South East Asia and the legacy of World War II, and one has to contend with these. It should be noted that history and memories die hard in this part of the world and I think part of it is because in ancient civilizations, especially in East Asia, history is very much a part of living memory so you have these tensions from the past, that have to be managed by the political leaders of today. But these need to be recognized by the political leaders of Asia first.

The third part refers to one of the problems of recent 20th century and that is the possibility of emerging from our own subcontinental history of the last 60 to 70 years. There is a danger of what I like to call 'ultra-nationalism' and especially for a countries like China or India it has to be managed very carefully as national pride can very quickly turn into ultra-nationalism in the context of globalization. It seems to me that alternatively what is really missing still is cultural interconnectivity. Our knowledge of Chinese history and culture is almost non-existent. Similarly, China's knowledge of India is almost non-existent. I can tell you that, after having gone to Chinese universities and Chinese schools, that they know more about our national heroes than we know about theirs. So how do we educate our children about China, as they educate themselves about India, are pieces that we have to put in place as we go forward.

What is required here is a kind of macro vision of how we re-vision this idea of Asianess so that we connect with one another. I do not suggest that this should be against the West—it shouldn't be against anybody—but it should be about re-connecting where we have been. So we have to go beyond our colonial legacy, especially in India, to actually say India has always looked East and West, and not only to the West, and acknowledge our rightful claim in that relationship of building a broader community. It is up to Indians to really figure out how best to go there, so I actually think we have a very historic opportunity to re-vision the world that we live in partly because I personally feel that we don't have a choice, the world is moving this way anyways, but also because this is the right time for us to begin to think about how will we create this new Asian century by building the new Asian community.

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