Arms Control Regimes and Their Ramifications on India's Nuclear Strategy: An Indian Perspective

Brigadier Vijai K. Nair, New York

October 23, 1998

President Clinton, in a speech at the University of Connecticut, October 1995 remarked, "The road to tyranny, we must never forget, begins with the destruction of the truth."

In support of this statement one can add that the concept of global non-proliferation - vital as it is to American interests - is being torn apart because all significant parties have predicated their participation on a self serving deception resulting in a tyranny that threatens to demolish the entire structure.

The May 11 nuclear tests at Pokhran are but another event born as a consequence of this debilitating propensity - an inability to address the concept of non-proliferation with the sincerity and integrity that is essential to make it work. The path is strewn with irrefutable evidence as is illustrated by:

1. The nuclear weapon states' unyielding attitude towards their commitment to nuclear disarmament, culminating in their collective rejection of the disarmament agenda at the recent NPT Prep Com;
2. The capitulation of the non-nuclear weapon states, to an indefinite extension of the NPT in spite of their reservations and subsequent failure to arrive at an honest review of the Treaty's performance;
3. Outright violation of Articles 1 & 2 of the NPT by nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states parties to the Treaty;
4. The non-acceptance of the menace of proliferation of nuclear weapons, both vertical and horizontal, with nuclear weapon states or their clients, fuelling imperatives in others to exercise the nuclear option to meet the compulsions of their national security interests.

Global Arms Control measures, are in my perception, engineered on a set of half truths designed to meet the national interests of the nuclear weapon states without regard to the aspirations and perceptions of a large segment of the global fraternity.

The concept of the Arms Control regime has its origins in the compulsions of the then superpowers, the US and the Soviet Union, to deter each other. This equation had to be predicated on the creation of a stable nuclear weapons environment that would not impinge on acceptable 'balance of power' in the recognized dynamics of the Cold War development of deterrent capabilities.

It suggested a regime that would:

1. Allow the superpowers freedom for vertical proliferation to cope with each other's emerging technological and doctrinal capacities.
2. Freeze horizontal proliferation - especially in those States that had the technological competencies to proliferate and unhinge the recognized balance of nuclear power.
3. And impose bilateral checks and balances between superpowers in areas where developments threatened to become unmanageable

Based on this concept the Arms Control Regime came into being - moved through 4 distinct phases.

Phase I - Bilateral Arms Control Measures

In the first Phase the superpowers imposed specific, threat oriented, regulatory mechanisms through bilateral arrangements such as the PTBT, the ABM Treaty and so on. These instruments were directed to providing stability to the super power nuclear equation.

However with growing competencies in the former Axis Power - Japan, Germany and Italy - and some of the other European States it soon became obvious that the carefully developed nuclear equation between the US and the Soviet Union was about to collapse. Policy analysts perceived a state of unmanageable nuclear anarchy, which needed to be contained.

Simultaneously a growing number of States (NAM) were beginning to feel that the only means of ensuring their security lay in reversing the nuclear genie and put it back into the bottle.

Phase II - NPT

These perceptions led to a seeming convergence of interests - the concept of nuclear non-proliferation was born and became a part of the nuclear weapon states' agenda. However, with the exceptional military capabilities of their nuclear arsenals and the political clout by virtue of their P-5 Status, it impelled the five nuclear weapon states to engineer the NPT to strengthen their national interests. This was not feasible without making compromises with those States that were on the nuclear weapon threshold themselves - Europe and Japan - especially Germany that lay between the two super powers.

The NPT was, therefore, designed to accommodate these states - an accommodation that required the super powers to create structures and mechanisms that would extend assured nuclear deterrence to these States in exchange for their agreeing to renounce nuclear weapons.

The final compromises were:

1. Instruments of the mechanisms of implementation that provided scope for vertical proliferation.
2. An illusory promise to move towards nuclear disarmament that was cleverly linked with an unattainable general disarmament.
3. An agreement between the super powers to turn a Nelson's Eye on the deployment of their nuclear arsenals on allied territories and territorial waters, thereby giving a reasonable degree of credibility to the "assured deterrence" that they were to extend in exchange for abstinence.

The NPT came into existence as a discriminatory arms control regime wherein the first casualty was the truth. Initially it was boycotted by a number of states including France and China - the two nuclear weapon states that did not have the incentive or the means to upset the carefully engineered balance.

Phase III - Selective Technology Control Arrangements

The much sought for stability in the nuclear environment soon proved to be illusory. The growing nuclear weapons competencies amongst states not party to the NPT began to undermine the efficacy of the NPT regime. A break out amongst these States added to the reservations of those States Party to the NPT -

1. European powers and US allies became restive about their having forsaken the option to acquire nuclear weapons of their own.
2. Other non-nuclear weapon states party to the NPT began to realize that a self-imposed abstinence left them out in the cold in a world where their adversaries had or were creating nuclear weapons arsenals.

One or both superpowers were in the know that a number of states continued with their research, and acquisition of materials, to make nuclear weapons - albeit without crossing the nuclear Rubicon - except for India who tested a nuclear device even before a majority of significant States acceded to the NPT.

The Nuclear Weapon States and their surrogates, recognizing the threat to their singular position, advanced the arms control measures to the next Phase - that of introducing a number of technology denial arrangements, independent of the NPT but geared to safeguard their special status in that regime. They hoped to foreclose further development of nuclear weapons through exclusivity and we saw the birth of the London Club, Nuclear Suppliers Group, Cocom, MTCR, Wassanar, Australia Club and so on.

To the developing countries the selectivity in this attempt at exclusivity soon became quite apparent. Especially as these initiatives did not close the doors to nuclear weapons development in non-nuclear weapon states from the developed world or even from States not party to the NPT.

A rash of worrisome developments that undermined the efficacy of the NPT and technology denial regimes soon became evident.

1. Israel secretly acquired an operational nuclear weapons arsenal. To make matters worse, it soon became apparent that these developments were in the knowledge of the Chief Executive of the U.S.
2. Switzerland, a non-nuclear Weapon State party to the NPT had an ongoing nuclear weapons program as late as 1988.
3. South Africa developed and produced a small nuclear weapons arsenal. In spite of US denials, a strong sense of South Africa and Israel having tested their nuclear weapons in 1979 continues to pervade the perceptions of other States.
4. Iraq and North Korea, both non-nuclear weapon states party to the NPT had reached an advanced stage in the development of nuclear weapons.
5. If leaked US intelligence reports are to be believed Iran had also made a start at developing nuclear weapons.
6. India and Pakistan were reportedly threshold States with a nuclear weapons capability under shroud of ambiguity. The truth of the matter is that they had both limited nuclear arsenals without validating this through visible nuclear tests.
7. Taiwan and South Korean nuclear weapons programs had been closed by US persuasion through deals, when these were in very advanced stages.
8. Reports soon began to surface of collusion by nuclear weapon states, directly or indirectly, by omission or by commission, with non-nuclear weapon states.

It was now quite evident that the concept of exclusivity, while having the affect of slowing down technology acquisition in the developing world, was not a foolproof barrier.

The augmentation of technological competencies in the developing countries was matched by more than commensurate increments in technology available to the US by virtue of the phenomenal data bank provided by over 1000 nuclear tests, and to a lesser degree, other nuclear weapon states.

Phase IV - Secondary Arrangements CTBT & FMCT

This impelled the Nuclear Weapon states to the next stage in the evolving concept of the Arms Control regime. The US came to the conclusion that while the NPT could not plug the loopholes of technology competencies, there was a need to freeze nuclear weapons capabilities on a learning curve by disallowing nuclear testing and limiting arsenals by cutting off availability of fissile materials with the non-nuclear weapon States.

Therefore it became essential to supplement the NPT regime by a CTBT and an FMCT. In doing so it was necessary that:

1. The US should retain its capacities to develop, or modify nuclear weapons to ensure the efficacy of its nuclear deterrent for all times. This has been achieved by development of alternate technology and materials to sustain the nuclear arsenal at peak level. Its fissile material stocks are sufficient to see it through the next millennium and the SS&MP is designed to ensure fabrication and design of new nuclear warheads.
2. Ensure that the other nuclear weapon State accept this concept by confidence that they can maintain their nuclear weapons capability at the current levels of effectiveness. This requires violation of Article 1 of the NPT in a greater flow of technological know-how between the nuclear weapon states. This too has already been put in place.
3. Aspirants for nuclear weapon status should not acquire competencies beyond the first generation weapon systems as these cannot be married to the 'state of art' and futuristic delivery systems necessary for assured penetration and high hit probabilities in a futuristic air defense environment.
4. And limit the size of nuclear arsenals of the developing countries to current level of stocks of fissile material.

The end product of the CTBT is ample evidence of this strategy as it:

1. Does not define a 'nuclear explosion';
2. Has no enforceable linkage with nuclear disarmament;
3. Allows what the nuclear weapons caucus refers to as "permissible activities" for vertical proliferation without a nuclear test.
4. Freezes non-nuclear weapon states, not favored with technological accessibility, to a learning curve at the bottom of the nuclear weapons technology ladder.
5. Legitimizes espionage through National Technological Means.

Phase V - The Future

Where to from here? That is the question uppermost in the minds of policy makers and analysts in States such as India where a nuclear weapons capability is considered essential to cater for the national security interests in the current and unfolding nuclear weapons ambience affecting the national well being.

The linkages of the current phase of nuclear arms control arrangements would lie in incremental initiatives by the nuclear weapon states in the future, and require that all future contingencies are identified, appreciated and interpolated with development of current nuclear strategy. Failure to do this would result in commitments today that may effectively disadvantage India in the future.

While one cannot say with any degree of certainty what shape the next phase of nuclear arms control regime will take, telling signs exist which suggest a much deeper examination. In so far as the US is concerned one can discern two possibilities:

1. Counterproliferation. Take unilateral action to destroy the nuclear weapons capability of selected proliferate State - the entire cycle including materials, research facilities, fuel cycle infrastructure and the nuclear arsenal. The phenomenal funding effort to develop doctrines, create hardware and train the military is indicative of a threat in being that all proliferate states cannot but take seriously. However, there are serious political and military problems in the actual implementation of such a policy. Especially as it would have to be agreed to by all the other nuclear weapon states.
2. Press for the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons. If the existing data bank, advanced computational capabilities and the National Ignition Facility can provide the next generation of 'pure fusion weapons' then the U.S. can happily reverse its position on the question of 'elimination of nuclear weapons' without compromising its position of being the premier military state and thereby guaranteeing the American security. In one fell stroke they would have generated a substantial reduction in the threat of an attach by nuclear weapons, eliminated development of nuclear technology and weapons and created an unbridgeable gap between prevailing technology and infrastructure and 'pure fusion weapons' and nuclear weapons.

At this point of time these are theoretical forays. Are they feasible considering a substantial effort and funding already flows in this direction? States sensitive to their sovereign right to cater for their own well being must consider all options carefully - no matter how far fetched they may appear.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion I would like to suggest that when policy makers and analysts in the US study the actions and reactions of India to the prevailing Arms Control Regime, they would do well to analyze the subject through the prism from which Indian policy makers see these developments. Unfortunately, most of the research on the subject emanating from the American continent appears to be bound to the singular US national interest and fails to take into account the concerns of the Target State.

I must concede that in the recent past intellectuals in US have begun to recognize India's true concerns. But by limiting this exercise to identifying India's concerns without an honest appraisal of what policy makers in India could and would do to address those concerns in the perspective of India's national interests, leaves us at square one - talking at each other and not with each other.

Finally - if the Arms Control Regime is threatened by anarchy - the authors of the regime must accept that neither the objective nor the means can stand the test of integrity.

Brigadier Vijai K. Nair served in the Indian Army for thirty years. He was Deputy Director for General Strategic Planning at the Directorate of Perspective Planning (Army Headquarters), analyzing threat levels, and formulating military strategies for future weapon systems.

He is currently the Executive Director and Life Trustee of the Forum for Strategic & Security Studies. He also edits the Forum’s journal, AGNI, and is a Consulting Editor for Defence & Security Affairs for the Observer Group of Publications (Delhi).

Brigadier Nair specialises in nuclear strategy formulation and nuclear arms control negotiations. He has considerable experience on issues related to NPT, CTBT and FMCT. Brigadier Nair is currently revising the nuclear strategy for India-in keeping with nuclear transience-suggested in his book Nuclear India.