Political Trends and Priorities of the Megawati Government

By Dwight Y. King
Professor of Political Science, Northern Illinois University

Washington, D.C., October 18, 2001

[Prepared for Conference on Sizing-up Indonesia's New Leadership sponsored jointly by the by the Asia Society and the United States-Indonesia Society.]

Formidable Challenges

As noted a month ago by Edward Masters, former Ambassador to Indonesia and co-chairman of the United States-Indonesia Society,



The new [Indonesian] president and her fledgling government face formidable challenges. Indonesia was hit harder than any other nation by the 1997 Asian financial crisis,and it has made the poorest recovery. Economic stagnation, massive unemployment, a nonfunctioning banking system, a national debt equal to the nation's Gross Domestic Product and one of the world's weakest currencies have discouraged foreign investment and the return of flight capital. Other pressing problems include serious independence movements in two key provinces, endemic violence among religious and ethnic groups resulting in up to a million displaced persons, an uncertain role for the highly politicized military establishment, a poorly implemented plan to decentralize power to the regions, and one of the most ineffective and corrupt legal systems in the region. Overriding all else has been erratic national leadership and all too frequent personnel changes in the three years since collapse of the authoritarian Suharto regime. Given this, Megawati and her colleagues face one of the toughest jobs of any government in recent years.

Masters, writing in late August about one month after the installation of the new government, argued that President Megawati Sukarnoputri had confounded her critics and was off to a good start. So the question for us today, now three months into the Megawati government, is whether and how far the new government has risen to the challenges. What actions have been taken and what initiatives are underway? Do they seem to be having the intended effects? Since economic reforms and decentralization are topics for the next session, here I will briefly discuss four of the major political issues: terrorism, separatism, repositioning the military, and constitutional reform.

Terrorism

The U.S.-led air strikes in Afghanistan accompanied by inevitable civilian casualties have outraged even mainstream Muslim opinion in Indonesia, presenting Megawati's government with a huge dilemma. On the one hand, the government does not want to prejudice its economic relationship with the U.S. and Britain, but on the other, it cannot afford to ignore the sentiments of most of its population. In a statement shortly after the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, the Indonesian government warned that the U.S. response should be proportional, limited in time, have precise targets, minimize casualties among those who are innocent and avoid creating a new human tragedy. It also called on the United Nations (UN) to adopt a collective response to the crisis. Then at a meeting with U.S. President George W. Bush during her visit to the United States Megawati pledged her cooperation in the U.S. war on terrorism. After the U.S.-led air strikes began, she was criticized for remaining silent for over a week while daily protests erupted in several Indonesian cities and radical groups had made threats against Americans, Britons and Japanese in Indonesia.

After meeting with leaders of the Indonesian House of Representatives last Friday (Oct. 12), however, Megawati promised that the government would review its "soft" stance on the attacks. Then this past Sunday she finally broke her silence during commemoration of the Ascension Day of Prophet Muhammad at the Grand Mosque in Jakarta. She was quoted as follows: "Whoever commits terror must be punished...[It] is unacceptable that someone, a group or even a government - arguing that they are hunting down perpetrators of the terror - attack people or another country for whatever reason." Even though she did not mention any specific countries in her speech, the message was clearly directed toward America.

Her tough remarks seem to have placated many Muslim groups, both moderate and extremist, for the time being, although several groups are urging follow-up with concrete action such as diplomatic initiatives. Moreover, the Vice President, Hamzah Haz came out publicly and explicitly against the military campaign in Afghanistan, arguing that the attacks aimed not only at military targets but also at mosques and other civilian targets. He contended that his opposition against the U.S. campaign is his prerogative as chairman of the Muslim-based Development Unity Party (PPP), and therefore, it should not be contrasted with the government's statement. "Please don't make it an antagonism. The statement from PPP will have special value for the President in running the country."

The government is naturally concerned that conflict in Afghanistan could boost domestic support for Islamic extremists. In recent years Indonesia has experienced an increasing number of terrorist attacks, particularly bombings, some of which have been linked to Muslim extremists. Also, Muslim vigilante groups have often taken the law into their own hands by attacking night-clubs, gambling centers and brothels. It is estimated that around 5000 people have been killed in Muslim-Christian conflict in the Maluku Islands in the last two years. Hundreds have been killed in continuing Muslim-Christian violence in Central Sulawesi. The separatist guerrillas of the Aceh Freedom Movement (GAM) are Muslims fighting government forces in Aceh.

Overall, however, Islamic extremism is still quite weak and the goal of its proponent of turning Indonesia into a state based on Islam is far from achievement. Nevertheless, Indonesia's democratic transition is being accompanied by a crisis of lawlessness that has allowed many groups - including Muslim extremists - to flaunt the law by engaging in violent behavior with impunity.

Separatism

The new government has followed a two pronged approach toward separatism in both Aceh and Irian Jaya. On the one hand it has used a stick, cracking down on Acehnese and Papuan political activity using principally military power, closing in the political space that had developed after the fall of President Suharto. Simultaneously with the crackdown, the government has been offering carrots by promoting a policy of Special Autonomy for each province. The objective of special autonomy is to persuade Acehnese and Papuans that their preferred future should be as citizens of Indonesia - an Indonesia in which they can manage their own political development and enjoy the produce of the land and its resources. But experience has made them highly skeptical of the government's intention and, unfortunately, there seems to be little coordination between the political solution that is being offered and the current military strategy.

Permit me to elaborate on the problems in Aceh because they are exceedingly grave and resemble in some respects our experience in Vietnam. Let us first consider the efforts at a political solution, President Megawati in July approved the House of Representatives' (DPR) proposal on the provision of special regional autonomy for Aceh. Jakarta's perceived exploitation of Aceh's vast oil and gas reserves - which currently earn the central government more than 100 million dollars a month - has been a major factor in winning sympathy for GAM's push for independence. A prime feature of the Nangroe (state) Aceh Darussalam Law is the return of about half of the province's oil and gas revenues to Acehnese authorities for eight years, after which the amount is subject to review. The law also allows Aceh to set up an Islamic court and introduces direct elections for the provincial governor. The national police chief's choice of senior police officer for the province will also have to be approved by the governor. In a further effort to defuse the conflict, Megawati traveled to Aceh in early September. The Acehnese hoped for opportunity at serious dialogue with the Indonesian leader. But representatives of GAM were excluded and she had nothing new to offer. The Acehnese hoped for justice following years of human rights violations by the military. Reportedly she was also pressured by her party, the Indonesian Democratic Party-Struggle (PDI-P) to highlight the military's involvement in atrocities there. But she would not risk alienating the military.

Since these political efforts, the violence seems to have intensified. In three days last week, eighteen people were killed. The circle of violence has no boundaries with both GAM and military forces sustaining casualties, while innocent civilians also suffer. The government's tough line toward the slightest sign of independence remains unrelenting with the military continuing its tour of duty to stamp out separatists in the province. Less then a fortnight ago it was revealed that 20,000 troops had been deployed to Aceh, while the Navy stationed five warships in Aceh waters to help prevent weapons smuggling. The Navy has admitted that after a month of reinforced security in Acehnese waters, they had still not foiled a single weapons-smuggling attempt. The government's position on eliminating separatist rebels, is emphasized by the extension by four months of Presidential Instruction No. 4/2001 on the restoration of law and order in Aceh. A much detested Instruction dating from the previous government of President Wahid (May), it provides for military operations in Aceh to combat the GAM guerrillas. Acehnese leaders and human rights activists have urged that the Instruction be revoked, saying that it had amplified the violence over the past four months. National Commission of Human Rights member Albert Hasibuan has urged the government to revise the presidential instruction to reduce rights abuses in the province. But House of Representatives Speaker Akbar Tandjung remarked that there was little recourse for the government in facing separatist rebels other than a repressive approach. GAM accuses the government of being inconsistent in dealing with the Aceh conflict. On the one hand government officials say that the Aceh problems must be resolved through negotiation. On the other hand, soldiers and policemen still arrest people randomly and commit extra-judicial killings of unarmed civilians. Abusive behavior by GAM does not justify excesses by TNI and the Police.

There are reports circulating that differences have emerged between President Megawati and civilian politicians, especially those in her party (PDI-P), on the one hand and the military on the other over how to resolve the bloody conflict in Aceh. According to these reports, the palace has attempted to put the brakes on a 'quick solution' by pursuing dialogue rather than troop deployments. If this is the case, it has had little effect. Rather it appears that the military has an autonomous status outside the control of the civilian government, at least as far as Aceh is concerned.

Debate in the House over a similar special autonomy bill for Irian Jaya came to deadlock over an important symbol, the name for the province. Eventually the government gave in allowing the province to be renamed Papua bowing to the aspirations of the Papuans. With this stumbling block out of the way, the bill is likely to be adopted (if not already).

Repositioning the military

The military has exacerbated and prolonged conflicts in order to promote its commercial interests, and to justify its powerful political role. Military influence is institutionalized from parliament to village level. The armed forces are heavily involved in legal and illegal businesses, including smuggling, drugs, weapons sales and extortion, putting millions of dollars in the pockets of individual generals. Megawati is not a militarist, but associates the military with nationalism, preserving national unity. She drew the analogy with our own civil war in her speech here in Washington a month ago. It is worth pointing out that the military men closest to her are not those with the strongest followings within the military. Hendropriyono (named as Chief of Intelligence) is independent-minded and does not have a large following. Yudhoyono (Coordinating Minister of Political and Security Affairs) has not held troop commands nor does he have a strong network within the military. Agum Gumelar, considered close to her, has the strongest military links. Yet she did not name him as the coordinating minister for political and security affairs.

At the national level, the Megawati government includes a civilian Minister of Defense, following a pattern pioneered by former President Wahid. Megawati has given at least tacit approval to representatives of her party in the House who are calling for a reconsideration of the future of the reserved domain (appointed seats) in the Assembly after 2004. (A Constitutional amendment passed in 2000 provides for a reserved domain through 2009.)

As part of its "repositioning" the military announced recently that it is planning to turn over its territorial role in the provinces to the local authority. This has been welcomed by some observers as another step forward toward reducing military involvement in civilian affairs. In the past, everything was dealt with by the military - from maintaining the prices of food to dealing with labor strikes. In announcing the plan, Lt. Gen. Agus Widjojo, Chief of Staff for Territorial Affairs, told a press conference that the central government would henceforth concern itself only with defense matters as a whole, leaving the management and mobilization of the defense potential in the provinces to the local governments. In the future, he said, the military would no longer have the authority to deal directly with the civilian population. The existing command structure will be maintained only down to the district (Korem) level solely for defense purposes without any non-military role.

Some observers are skeptical, pointing out that whatever the changes to the military's ideology about shifting away from a guerilla type organization, any transition away from the military's participation in local politics and business affairs will be a long time coming. In the words of one observer, "These guys have weapons, authority, allies, and tradition." Morever, given heightened civil conflict and communal violence, there may be insufficient support among the majority of voters. A survey conducted by Gadjah Mada University at the behest of the military last September indicated strong public support for the maintenance of the territorial commands in the provinces. The survey showed 76 percent of the respondents were in favor of the retention of regional commands (Kodam), 74 percent for district commands (Korem) and 58 percent for village level military units (Babinsa). Results of the survey contrasted sharply with the opposition of students, NGOs and intellectuals to any role of the military in civilian affairs.

The International Crisis Group (ICG) has warned that with the lack of clear government policy and the continuing military distrust of civilians, the military has been attempting to control the military reform agenda. The ICG called on the government to retake the initiative in reforming the nation's defense sector and warned of time bombs that could justify TNI's (Indonesian Armed Forces) political role or limit government options, unless the civilian government seized the initiative in defense legislation from the hands of the military. For example, the military has so far been unwilling to commit itself to a definite schedule for dismantling its controversial territorial structure through which it exercises most of its political powers. And while the military has changed its education system to incorporate human rights training and new rules of engagement, it has not yet imposed penalties for violations of these rules. Finally, the ICG called on the government to review the ground rules for the country's intelligence services and to revamp the way the military is financed.

Most recently, President Megawati used her address at the ceremony to mark the 56th anniversary of the founding of the Armed Forces to urge the military to stop meddling in politics. "The [armed forces] should leave politics and concentrate on the defense of the country...Internal security is the responsibility of the police...You have to avoid all violations of human rights," she told about 7,000 soldiers, marines, sailors and airmen. "I call on all commanders to understand international law. Every military operation has to guarantee the rights of civilians and other noncombatants," she said. I think it is fair to conclude that some signs of civilian control are evident on the national level, but on the regional and local level the military continues to control weapons, to exercise political authority, creating their own fiefdoms in many areas, Aceh being a case in point. The decision by the military to reposition itself in the provinces should be seen as a compromise - a middle way amid the conflicting views over the military role in Indonesia. And the changes will be years in coming. The new president and the military leaders share a common conservatism and suspicion of radical change. Megawati is unlikely to embark on a far-reaching program of reform, including reform in the military field. Officers accused of perpetrating human rights abuses in the course of carrying out their military duties - whether in East Timor, Aceh or Jakarta - are not likely to be tried. The army's current military offensive in Aceh and repressive measures against supporters of independence for Irian Jaya will not be halted by Megawati. And, most importantly for the military, its business interests are not likely to be disturbed. But this hardly amounts to return of the armed forces to a dominant role in the national government.

Constitutional Reform

Indonesia is among the very few countries that dismissed their dictator and installed democracy without adopting a new constitution. The current one is a poor foundation for democracy because it lacks specificity, grants a wide range of powers to the executive branch and establishes a confusing presidential system with parliamentary characteristics. In 1999 and again in 2000 the Assembly (MPR) made changes piecemeal, which collectively are known as the First and Second Amendments, respectively. These changes focused on strengthening the legislative and judiciary branches vis-á-vis the executive and on clarifying the separation of powers and checks and balances among the three branches of government. On both occasions, but particularly in 2000, the Assembly was able to act only on a minor part of its agenda and observers accused it of making only those changes that served the short-term political interests of the parties represented in the Assembly.

Between its annual sessions, a special Ad Hoc Working Body of the Assembly has worked steadily trying to reach consensus on changes to be brought to the full Assembly for ratification. However, they often come to deadlock, resulting in a growing pressure from outside the Assembly for the establishment of a Constitutional Commission to write a new constitution. Megawati and her party, the Indonesia Democracy Party of Struggle, have generally taken a conservative or status quo position on issues that have come before the Working Body, including calls for a Constitutional Commission. But in her Independence Day speech last August 17, Megawati surprised many observers by reversing herself, departing from the official position of her party and coming out in support of a Constitutional Commission. It should be noted, however, that her proposal is not as radical as it sounds because she stipulated that the Commission should report to the General Session of the Assembly in 2004. This, of course, would squelch any changes until well after the next election.

Conclusion: Political Trends

The optimism that welcomed the new government of President Megawati Sukarnoputri both at home and abroad nearly three months ago has - since September 11 - come to an end. It has been replaced by new concerns about unjust law enforcement, the government's slow and contradictory response to Muslim extremists, its inability to rekindle economic growth, and to formulate and implement the political reforms needed to overcome the multi-dimensional crisis facing the country. The weakening of the Rupiah, fall in the Jakarta stock index, and continued disinvestment all point to the declining confidence of the international business community. At home, national leaders, including the President, Vice President, the Speakers of the Sovereign People's Assembly and the Speaker of the House of Representatives - each one of whom continues to serve as chairperson of a different political party - are being accused of placing a higher priority on campaigning for the 2004 election than on moving national agendas forward, especially reviving the economy. In short, the new government is facing its first political crisis.

At the same time, paradoxically, the democratic institutions installed over the past three years do not seem to be seriously threatened. The President seems firmly committed to the rule of law, although she is arguably less liberal in her political values than her predecessor. She also appears to have learned from his mistakes. For example, she takes the legislature seriously. With the strength of her own PDI-P party, which won a plurality of seats, she is in a position to form a coalition with Golkar to control 57 percent of the votes in the House (DPR), or with the military-police faction and the Islamic PPP party to control 52 percent. Megawati enjoys a stronger political position than her predecessor did. These attributes, perhaps assisted by gridlock fatigue among the legislators, should enable her to serve out her term until 2004.