Rapporteur, Satu Limaye

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SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Many Americans regard nuclear proliferation and the Kashmir dispute as the most critical security issues facing the subcontinent. Though these issues warrant U.S. engagement, the most compelling security challenges facing India and its neighbors stem from social and economic issues.

Without progress in alleviating poverty, limiting population growth, raising literacy, and protecting the environment, social and political unrest will likely increase. Such instability, by paving the way for demagoguery, causing uncontrolled migration, or creating violent competition for scarce resources, could exacerbate traditional security concerns emanating from nationalism and territorial disputes. Conversely, accelerated and well-distributed economic growth and social development, by opening opportunities for all South Asians, could attenuate deep regional tensions. Unfortunately, the links between domestic social and economic development and security receive scant appreciation in the region. Adherents to the notion of "comprehensive security" are few in South Asia compared to Southeast and Northeast Asia.

This failure to appreciate the connection between domestic and international harmony is due in part to history's burden on South Asian elites' thinking about security. One Indian, expressing a typical view, described the partition of India and Pakistan in 1947 as a "shift in tectonic plates which have not yet settled." The India-Pakistan dispute eclipses regional relations, and the shock waves from that unsettled disturbance still hinder prospects for South Asian cooperation. The legacies of colonialism and the cold war in the region also remain unsettled. The subcontinent's preoccupation with the past perpetuates old animosities and inhibits creative thinking about an improved future.

Some South Asians are working to moderate deep-seated suspicions and enhance intraregional cooperation. They realize that South Asia's lack of progress toward settling its disputes stands in stark contrast to positive developments in South Africa and the Middle East. And an awareness is dawning that trends in the subcontinent also run counter to increased cooperation within Southeast Asia, North America, and Europe.

An especially welcome development is the expansion of nonofficial dialogues on conflict resolution and security involving academics, former government officials, journalists, and business leaders. Many of these dialogues receive financial support from U.S. foundations and universities and, to a lesser extent, from other Western countries. Nongovernmental organizations from the five countries of the region have also begun to share their experiences in a more regular and sustained way. Finally, South Asian entrepreneurs are beginning to call for more open, pragmatic regional ties.

U. S. INTERESTS

Preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and missiles, which not only threaten regional security but also impinge upon American interests and those of U.S. allies, is an important challenge. More fundamentally, the United States seeks social and economic development that will contribute to the peace and stability of the region.

The end of the cold war offers new opportunities for security collaboration between the United States and the states of South Asia. India and Pakistan, because of their size, location, and military capabilities, continue to have potentially important roles in the arcs stretching from the Middle East through Central Asia and from the Indian Ocean to Southeast Asia, where the United States has significant interests. In the past, the South Asian countries have cooperated with the United States in providing strategic stability and opposing aggression in nearby regions. For example, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and India assisted U.S. efforts during the Persian Gulf war.

The nature and objectives of security cooperation may well differ from those of an earlier era. Under present conditions, the United States is unlikely to seek new or revived military alliances with any South Asian state. But cooperation could consist of joint peacekeeping efforts under U.N. auspices, bilateral and multilateral dialogues on strategic issues, and increased military-to-military contacts through training programs and joint exercises. Such low-key cooperation will increase mutual trust and confidence and keep open the prospects for more substantive strategic collaboration in the future.

GEOPOLITICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF SOUTH ASIA

Ironically, in South Asia the very factors that give rise to regional conflict could be the foundation for regional cooperation. At first glance, South Asia presents a picture of bewildering and daunting diversity. Schisms of every kind are apparent: of national boundaries, religion, ethnicity, and language, among others. Underlying this diversity, however, is a remarkable geographic coherence and shared past. While much in this inheritance has given rise to the present antagonisms, much of it binds the region to a common future. Recognition of this commonality is the first requirement for movement toward South Asian cooperation.

Another prominent feature of South Asia is the tension between India and the smaller states. Each country in the region shares a border with India. India's size, population, resources, and economy are many times larger than those of the other states. Moreover, each has a conflict of some sort with India. Regional peacemakers are few and far between: each smaller state is wary of offering its services to alleviate conflicts between India and another regional country lest this be regarded as seeking an advantage with regard to its own India-related grievance. Finally, India's emphasis on bilateralism is viewed by its neighbors as a policy designed to keep them isolated.

Inevitably, these perceptions and realities provoke concern among Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Nepal that they will be dominated by India, making regional conciliation difficult. Through the creation in 1985 of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, or SAARC, India's neighbors have tried to create a degree of multilateralism and a forum for collective action to manage regional conflicts. Unfortunately, SAARC remains constrained by Indian suspicions and the India-Pakistan dispute. But opportunities exist for constructive ties to be developed between India and its neighbors.

INDIA-PAKISTAN RELATIONS AND KASHMIR

The most significant dispute between India and Pakistan today is over Kashmir. In 1947 the Hindu maharajah of this Muslim-majority princely state, still undecided about its disposition, faced an onslaught of Muslim tribesmen from Pakistan. In return for Indian military aid in repelling the invasion, he opted to join the Indian Union. When the fighting stopped, Pakistan was occupying a third of Kashmir and India two-thirds, with the two segments divided by a U.N.-designated Line of Control. Indian prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru promised Kashmiris on both sides of the line a U.N.-sponsored plebiscite on their future with two choices: joining India or joining Pakistan. The plebiscite has never been implemented because of the inability of India and Pakistan to agree whether necessary preconditions were met.

In 1965 a Pakistani force entered Indian-held Kashmir in the expectation of sparking off a revolt against Indian rule. The revolt did not take place, and India retaliated by sending its armies into the Pakistani part of Punjab. India emerged as the victor of this second Kashmir war. In 1972, after India and Pakistan had fought yet another war, over Bangladesh, the two countries signed a peace treaty at Simla, committing themselves to bilateral negotiations over Kashmir. Intermittent talks since then have not produced any solutions.

A third Kashmir conflict rages today. It began in 1989 as a local revolt against Indian mismanagement and political manipulation. It has since been fueled by Pakistani arms and military training and the infiltration of Islamic warriors from Afghanistan. The insurgents are splintered into dozens of bands and parties, roughly grouped into pro-independence and pro-Pakistani factions. India has deployed several hundred thousand soldiers, paramilitary men, and police to subdue the insurgency, and human rights abuses by militants and security forces have attracted worldwide attention.

For both India and Pakistan, their claim to Kashmir validates their definition of nationhood–Pakistan's as a Muslim homeland, India's as a secular state. Pakistanis contend that India is suppressing a movement for national self-determination. Indians argue that Pakistan is aiding terrorism in Kashmir. They agree on only one thing: that Kashmir cannot be allowed to become independent.

The Indian-controlled parts of Kashmir were incorporated into the Indian state (albeit with a special constitutional arrangement, Article 370). India now claims all of Kashmir as part of Indian territory. Pakistan's position is that there has yet to be a final determination of the status of Kashmir and that either a negotiated settlement or a U.N.-sponsored plebiscite must take place.

Pakistan seizes every opportunity to invite international involvement in resolving the Kashmir question. India prefers a bilateral solution with Pakistan, as provided for under the 1972 Simla agreement.

Whatever their own views, India and Pakistan will have to take into consideration the views of Kashmiris themselves. This will be complicated, because Kashmir is a multiregional state (encompassing also Jammu, Ladakh, and the northern territories) and perspectives among Kashmiris vary considerably. The Jammuites and the Ladakhis, for example, definitely want to stay in India, as do many Hindus from the Kashmir Valley. Even some Muslims of the Valley region may wish to maintain their state as part of India. However, there are many others (such as the Mirpuris, Kashmiri Muslims who are neither from the Valley nor culturally part of its tradition) who tend to be pro-Pakistani. Still others, mostly Muslims from the Valley, want independence from both India and Pakistan.

The margin for mutual accommodation of the two countries' positions is minimal. An example of the unwillingness to yield even slightly on Kashmir is the related dispute over Siachen Glacier. The ceasefire line of this area of Kashmir was never demarcated, primarily because of the extremely cold and mountainous conditions that make it uninhabitable. However, neither India or Pakistan is willing to give up its claims to the area for fear of setting a precedent, despite the fact that more Indian and Pakistani soldiers stationed there die of climatic illnesses than from the clashes that periodically occur.

The hostility between India and Pakistan, centered on the Kashmir dispute, diverts attention and resources from more compelling needs of social and economic development. Moreover, it distorts India's and Pakistan's overall foreign relations in the direction of seeking support for their respective positions on bilateral disputes, rather than building positive economic and political ties. ASEAN member countries, for example, are wary of including India and Pakistan in their regional deliberations because they do not wish to be caught up in India-Pakistan disputes.

Despite the tensions in India-Pakistan relations, there have been efforts to achieve minimal cooperation. A positive development is the mutual acceptance of confidence-building measures (CBMs) such as agreements for advance notification of troop movements, grants of military aircraft landing rights, and the prevention of airspace violations. However, some of the CBMs between the two countries have yet to be implemented or, once implemented, have been ignored or abused during periods of crisis.

NUCLEAR AND MISSILE PROLIFERATION

While acknowledging their capability to build nuclear weapons, India and Pakistan deny having done so. India's nuclear weapons program was initiated largely in response to China's nuclear explosion in 1964. India tested its own nuclear explosive device a decade later. Pakistan's nuclear weapons development was motivated by its defeat by India in the 1971 war and India's nuclear program. Both countries possess aircraft that could be modified to deliver nuclear weapons. India and Pakistan are also developing or otherwise acquiring ballistic missiles that could potentially deliver nuclear weapons. Given past wars and unresolved disputes, there is international concern that a future conflict between the two countries could go nuclear.

Opinion on nuclear policies within India and Pakistan is not monolithic. However, certain policies have strong support in both countries. First, despite an unwillingness to abandon present nuclear weapons capabilities, India and Pakistan express an interest in avoiding the construction and deployment of weapons. Second, both countries wish to retain a degree of ambiguity about their nuclear options because this serves domestic interests. While "ambiguous deterrence" complicates strategic planning for each country and for external powers, India and Pakistan insist that the Western logic of deterrence theory is not applicable to the subcontinent. Finally, both countries strongly support global nuclear disarmament.

India and Pakistan have resisted a number of nonproliferation initiatives by the United States and other countries. India argues that it is willing to participate in a nuclear-restraint regime, but only if it is nondiscriminatory and takes into account India's security concerns vis-à-vis China. Pakistan says it is willing to take any nuclear-restraint measures, provided India takes parallel action.

Despite India's and Pakistan's objections to current nonproliferation proposals, both countries are receptive to continued discussions with the United States and other parties. India and Pakistan have already agreed not to attack each other's nuclear facilities; after lengthy delay they have exchanged lists of nuclear facilities. They are willing to discuss several other nuclear pledges: no first use, no testing, no transfer to third countries, and a freeze on production of fissile materials as part of a global agreement.

Both countries are pondering the future of their civil and military nuclear policies. India, in particular, has long debated the wisdom of going nuclear, and similar discussions have now begun in Pakistan.

WATER, RESOURCES, AND THE ENVIRONMENT

South Asia's common concerns over water, energy, resources, and the environment provide opportunities for intraregional cooperation. Although political obstacles and a narrow view of security have thus far restricted joint action on these problems, proposals for enhanced cooperation exist. We believe that they merit serious consideration.

In the present state of India-Pakistan relations, cooperative ventures may seem excessively ambitious. But discussions are actually under way on building a pipeline to bring natural gas from West Asia. Other ventures on the table include joint development and marketing of renewable energy technologies and even a jointly managed facility for long-term storage of radioactive wastes.

The greatest opportunity–and need–for intraregional cooperation lies in the vast, untapped water resources of northeastern South Asia, roughly the area comprising Nepal, the Gangetic Basin of India, and Bangladesh. This area, also called the Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna (GBM) region after its major river systems, accounts for close to 40 percent of South Asia's land area and almost half of its population. It is also one of the poorest regions in the world, with 10 percent of the world's poor, and is under rising population and environmental pressure.

Yet the GBM region is among the world's richest in the potential of its water resources for irrigation, power, and transport. The runoff of its major river systems is the third largest in the world. The origin of these rivers in the high Himalayas has created enormous hydropower generation possibilities. Adding to the snow-fed river flows are the heavy monsoon rainfall and widespread and renewable groundwater reserves.

Exploiting the water resources of the GBM area is greatly complicated by the fact that they are seasonally and geographically skewed and cut across national boundaries. The coincidence of heavy river flows and monsoon rains in the summer season results in frequent and sometimes disastrous flooding, especially in the lower riparian areas. Meager flows and diversions in the lean season are harmful to agriculture and navigation.

The solutions to these problems–water storage in the season of heavy rainfall, sharing and augmentation of flows in the lean season–require cooperation between nations. India and especially Bangladesh would like Nepal to build dams to prevent flooding and provide additional water in the summer. Nepal is reluctant to lose scarce cultivable land to dam projects, but could be compensated by river transport facilities and the sale of hydroelectric power to its neighbors. Bangladesh wants India to share Ganges river water in the dry season, while India wants Bangladesh to augment Ganges flow by permitting a link with the much less utilized Brahmaputra river across Bangladesh's territory.

Sadly, the recent record has been one more of conflict than cooperation over the shared water resources of Bangladesh, Nepal, and India, despite the enormous potential benefit to each of them and several efforts, both regional and international, to jump start a cooperative regime. The reasons for this impasse are more political than techno-economic. The lack of trust among the countries generally, and specifically with respect to the water resource issues, the fact that many of the costs of cooperation are short term while the benefits are long term, and India's insistence on dealing with these matters bilaterally have been major obstacles. A more hopeful sign is recent studies of new approaches to cooperation carried out jointly by nongovernmental organizations in the three countries. With support from the three governments and active backing by the international community, these initiatives have the potential to create a new climate for what could be a very different future.

TRADE, TRANSPORT, AND COMMUNICATIONS

The paucity of communication and contact between South Asia's peoples is remarkable. It is more difficult, for instance, to get an airplane flight from Dhaka to Delhi than from Dhaka to London. Telephone communications within the region are similarly weak. People throughout South Asia told us of problems in obtaining visas for intraregional travel. This situation presents a stark contrast to that in Southeast Asia where, despite historical, ethnic, and religious tensions, links among the countries and peoples are substantial and active.

Trade within the subcontinent is also minimal. Impediments exist to the simplest transborder transactions. Bangladeshis told us, for example, that India refuses to allow transit across 26 miles of its territory for the shipment of boulders between Nepal and Bangladesh. Bangladesh in turn refuses to provide transit for Indian goods through Chittagong port to India's remote northeastern states. Again, political factors inhibit free trade. The region's weaker economies are concerned that by trading with India (the largest market) they will develop a negative balance of trade and hence be susceptible to domination. The recent signing of the South Asian Preferential Trade Agreement (SAPTA) represents a positive step in recognizing the need for increasing intraregional trade. However, we observed little optimism that it would in fact contribute to an expansion of such trade.

SOUTH ASIA AND THE WORLD

Despite South Asia's geographical location at a crossroads between different regions, its ties to them and indeed to the wider world have been relatively weak. South Asia's preoccupation with local disputes, domestic instabilities, and inward-looking economic policies have limited external interest in the region.

The end of the cold war and the unshackling of South Asian economies promises to increase political, security, and economic links with the wider world. This process is already discernible. In the few years since the end of the cold war, India and its neighbors have made successful efforts to reach out to countries in the Middle East and Central, Southeast and East Asia. Examples include India's decision to establish diplomatic relations with Israel, and Pakistan's contributions to the formation of the Economic Cooperation Organization in Central Asia. In the future, with a continued commitment to open economies and the development of a broader vision, South Asian countries can make even further progress in overcoming their relative isolation in world affairs.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Given the wide scope of security issues in South Asia, our recommendations fall into five broad categories:

1. South Asian Regional Cooperation

To promote South Asian regional cooperation, the United States should:

• Increase financial and technical support to South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC)—initiated projects that would benefit all the countries of the region. Areas of possible attention include the environment, rural development, and public health.
• Focus attention on cooperative efforts to harness and share more fully the river resources of eastern South Asia. The United States should encourage U.S. nongovernmental organizations and foundations to support and join where appropriate the studies and discussion on "Eastern Waters" already being sponsored by South Asian groups. It should initiate and facilitate exchanges between South Asian governments, international organizations, other governments, and regional associations to draw attention to the immense potential for human benefit of cooperation in this area.
• Foster links between SAARC and other regional organizations, particularly the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), by supporting, perhaps even sponsoring, dialogues among regional organizations.
• Facilitate regional confidence-building measures and dialogue to address longstanding regional disputes. For instance, the United States might offer technical assistance in resolving the dispute between India and Pakistan over the undemarcated line of control in the Siachen Glacier area of Kashmir. The United States could monitor troop withdrawals in the area through national technical means and provide both countries with relevant information.

2. The Kashmir Dispute

On India-Pakistan relations and the Kashmir dispute, the United States should:

• Continue to express concern about the potential for a wider India-Pakistan conflict, higher casualties, further human rights violations, and additional drains on economic resources to arise from the Kashmir dispute.
• Encourage the continuation and even expansion of official and nonofficial dialogues, within and outside the region, on the Kashmir dispute.

3. Nuclear Weapons and Missile Proliferation

Regarding India's and Pakistan's nuclear weapons and missile capabilities, the United States should:

• Address India's and Pakistan's nuclear weapons capabilities in the context of a global nonproliferation effort that seeks an end to nuclear testing, a freeze on the production of nuclear weapons—grade fissionable material, and constraints on the transfer of nuclear weapons technology to non-nuclear states.
• Reexamine present policy concerning nuclear energy cooperation with India and Pakistan. Civilian nuclear energy is an important component of the energy plans of Pakistan, and especially of India. A policy review to determine whether continued denial of civilian nuclear and space technology, under suitable safeguards, serves U.S. nonproliferation goals is warranted. In fact, current U.S. policy may actually be forcing India to reprocess spent nuclear fuel and thus increase its dependence upon plutonium. Moreover, U.S. refusal to assist India's and Pakistan's civilian nuclear programs has had little or no effect on their military nuclear programs.
• Seek to engage India and Pakistan in bilateral and multilateral missile control initiatives such as the Missile Technology Control Regime and bilateral talks on preventing the deployment of missiles in South Asia.
• Continue government-to-government dialogues on nuclear and missile issues with India and Pakistan while encouraging an expansion of official and nonofficial dialogues on these issues. Other countries with important political and economic links to the subcontinent (such as Japan and Germany) should be encouraged to participate in the nonofficial dialogues.
• Assist India and Pakistan to avert accidental conventional war, if they are willing to receive such assistance, on the grounds that conventional war might, under some circumstances, escalate to nuclear confrontation. The United States could help to establish an "open skies" regime by providing satellite information that would give assurances that military maneuvers were not threatening and by offering reassurances when the United States thought that neither side wanted war.

4. U.S. South Asia Security Cooperation

To enhance the level of U.S.—South Asia security cooperation, the United States should:

• Restore or increase international military education training (IMET) funding to South Asian countries. Such funding is important to maintaining contacts between militaries and serves as a basis for training armed services personnel in the protection of human rights.
• Arrange periodic, perhaps annual, "security consultative" meetings on a bilateral basis with South Asian nations. The purpose of these meetings would be to discuss matters of mutual security interest such as joint training, safety of flight and naval vessels, logistic cooperation, the sharing of military technology, controls on weapons proliferation, and development of professional military forces designed for regional security and support of democratic institutions.

5. South Asia and the World

To promote South Asia's fuller participation in international and regional groupings, the United States should:

• Keep under serious consideration India's inclusion in an expanded permanent Security Council membership. As the international community considers expansion of the Security Council to include countries such as Japan and Germany, strong consideration should also be given to the inclusion of India.
• Support India's and Pakistan's inclusion in emerging economic and political organizations, especially the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) grouping and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations' Post-Ministerial Conference (ASEAN-PMC).