Contents

Introduction

Elections in Democratizing Korea

Party Politics in the Democratic Era

Parties and Leaders in April 2000

Pressure from Civil Society

The Electoral System

Candidate Nomination

Campaign Issues

Costly and Corrupt Campaigns

Regionalism

Conclusion

Specialists

Further Reading

Introduction

General elections for the 16th term of the Korean National Assembly are scheduled for April 13, 2000, and the public is harboring high hopes for a new breed of politicians with vision, morality, and competence. People want politics that are clean, fair, responsible, responsive to popular needs, and conducive to effective governance. Civic activism for ostracizing corrupt and incompetent established politicians from their snug habitats is on the rise.

The growing outcries for "new politics" notwithstanding, old electoral practices die hard. As in previous elections, confusing tactics abound, including parties changing their names or splintering to form new ones. Little significant change has been made to the existing undemocratic and closed process of candidate nomination. The campaign lacks debate over substantive policy issues. Instead, parties and candidates encourage regional rivalries, exchange tirades, and slander each other. As in the past, candidates’ heavy reliance on paid campaign workers and vote-gathering machines will make this election costly.

This Asian Update investigates several aspects of Korean electoral politics. It begins with an overview of the development of elections and party politics since Korea’s democratic transition. Then it depicts the players and rules of the game, and explains the nomination process, the issues raised in the campaign, regional voting patterns, and possible election results. It concludes by examining possible post-election political developments.

Elections in Democratizing Korea

In June 1987, general-turned-dictator Chun Doo Hwan conceded to Korean citizens’ demand for democratization in the face of massive pro-democracy demonstrations. President Chun’s handpicked successor, ex-general Roh Tae Woo, formally announced this concession, dubbed the June 29 Declaration, which marked the beginning of Korea’s transition to democracy. Shortly afterward, political leaders and their parties negotiated a new democratic constitution.

The Korean constitution provides for a presidential system based on the separation of powers and checks-and-balances among the branches of government. For example, the National Assembly, the country’s unicameral legislature, approves presidential actions such as nominating the prime minister, making treaties, declaring war, and granting general amnesty. Unlike its U.S. prototype, however, the constitution has tipped the power balance toward the president, who can exercise emergency powers, bypassing the National Assembly, and impose diverse constraints on the body’s operation. According to the constitution, the president has less power than his counterparts in the authoritarian era and is limited to only one term. Despite this, in political practice, executive dominance has not vanished.

A series of historic presidential elections have taken place in the democratic era. In the three-way presidential election held on December 16, 1987, Korean voters directly elected a president for the first time in 16 years. Roh Tae Woo of the ruling Democratic Justice Party (DJP) squeezed out an electoral victory with about 37 percent of the votes cast. Roh’s winning a plurality was largely due to the split opposition vote between two prominent civilian leaders, Kim Young Sam of the Reunification Democratic Party (RDP) and Kim Dae Jung of the Party for Peace and Democracy (PPD).

In early 1990, Kim Young Sam joined with President Roh to form the Democratic Liberal Party (DLP). Kim became the party’s presidential nominee and won the December 1992 presidential election by securing 42 percent of the vote. His opponent, Kim Dae Jung of the Democratic Party (DP), received 34 percent of the vote. Kim Young Sam was sworn in as the first civilian president since the military intervention in 1961.

Five years later, in December 1997, Kim Dae Jung of the National Congress for New Politics (NCNP) was elected in his fourth presidential bid. Kim narrowly defeated Lee Hoi Chang of the Grand National Party (GNP) by 40.3 percent to 38.7 percent of the vote. Kim’s victory accomplished the first peaceful transfer of presidential power to the opposition.

Throughout the history of the Korean Republic, there have been 15 general elections for the National Assembly: 12 in the pre-democratic era and three since 1987.

In the 13th Assembly election, held on April 26, 1988, the president’s party lost its majority for the first time in Korea’s legislative politics, with the national legislature split among four parties. President Roh’s DJP captured 42 percent of the legislative seats, and Kim Dae Jung’s PPD emerged as the largest opposition party with about 23 percent of the seats. Kim Young Sam’s RDP and Kim Jong Pil’s New Democratic Republican Party (NDRP) won 20 percent and 12 percent of the seats, respectively.

In the 14th Assembly election held on March 24, 1992, the ruling DLP led by President Roh and Kim Young Sam again was not able to obtain a majority of legislative seats, coming up one seat short of a simple majority. The main opposition DP headed by Kim Dae Jung garnered almost a third of all legislative seats. Within only two months of its formation, the Unification National Party (UNP) won 10 percent of the seats, sufficient to remain a significant force within the National Assembly. In brief, the stage was set for a three-party competition.

The 15th Assembly election produced a similar pattern. President Kim Young Sam’s New Korea Party (NKP) won a seat share of 46 percent, still short of a legislative majority. Kim Dae Jung’s NCNP obtained 26 percent of total legislative seats. Kim Jong Pil’s United Liberal Democrats (ULD) became the third-largest party, with 16 percent of the seats in the National Assembly. Another three-way competition had emerged.

Party Politics in the Democratic Era

A typical Korean political party is personality-dominated and rallies around a particular boss to maintain its vigor. As people know a chaebol conglomerate by the owner’s name, a political party is identified with its leader: the nation’s president for the ruling party, and a charismatic or popular leader for an opposition party. Although factions may exist within a party, power and influence in the party tend to gravitate toward one person. A party without a strong focal leader will become fragile and is likely to fall apart.

Such a highly centralized party hardly practices internal democracy and lacks a true base at the grassroots. Even when a party claims to have millions of members, it is never a genuinely mass party. Ordinary members do not pay dues, or participate in the party by selecting candidates, determining a platform, or any other means. People join a party not because they sympathize with its cause, but because of personal connections, tangible benefits, and so on. Therefore, the number of party members, even though massive, has nothing to do with party strength. It is no exaggeration to say that the fate of a party, including a split or the formation of a new party, hinges on decisions made by its leader.

Political parties do not diverge much in ideology or policy direction. The political parties represented in the National Assembly are all centrist or conservative, the ideological horizon of Korean politics having been substantially reduced since the partition of the Korean peninsula. A progressive party is hardly viable in politics built around existing parties and established politicians. Politicians with progressive tints gain access to the national legislature through the conduit of existing parties.

In the authoritarian era, the issue of industrialization versus democratization divided the ruling and opposing parties. In the democratic era, this issue has lost much of its vigor, but no other major ideological or policy issue has crystallized in its stead. Of course, some extant parties have developed their own images within a limited range of the ideological spectrum. For example, the public sees Kim Jong Pil’s ULD as much more conservative than the NCNP or the GNP. But no party has fully translated its ideological image into a concrete policy program. A party’s crucial electoral base is its leader’s native region. The word "regionalist" succinctly describes Korean party politics.

Personality dominance, bossism, and lack of ideological distinction all contribute to the instability of the party system. Prominent political leaders make and unmake political parties all the time. Members of the National Assembly change party affiliation according to their relationship with the leaders or political convenience. The ever-shifting parties, none of which lasts long enough for a voter to develop an attachment, confuse ordinary citizens. In fact, many people have become disillusioned with existing parties.

As described above, in the 1988 13th Assembly elections, four major parties competed: the DJP, RDP, PPD, and NDRP. Two years later the contour of party politics underwent a sudden reshaping when President Roh, Kim Young Sam, and Kim Jong Pil made a surprise announcement on January 22, 1990, to merge their three parties into the DLP. This ruling party, a motley giant, commanded over a two-thirds majority in the National Assembly. On the opposition side were two parties: Kim Dae Jung’s PPD, and the minor DP, organized by a small fraction of Kim Young Sam’s former followers. These two merged under the banner of the DP in the fall of 1991.

A third party was born just before the 14th Assembly election, when Chung Ju Yung, founder of the Hyundai business conglomerate, organized the UNP. Soon after Kim Young Sam won the 1992 presidential election, Kim Dae Jung withdrew from politics. Chung Ju Yung and his UNP were politically buried after this presidential election. Legislative members formerly affiliated with the UNP were eventually absorbed by other major parties or became independents. In 1994, a bipolar configuration emerged in party politics: the DLP versus the DP.

During the period of the 14th Assembly, numerous legislative members changed party affiliation yet again. In January 1995, Kim Jong Pil and his followers bolted from the DLP when he was put under heavy pressure to resign from the leadership position. Kim Jong Pil subsequently founded the ULD. Kim Dae Jung, allegedly retired from politics, kept a firm grip on the DP, and greatly influenced the party’s strategies for local elections held in June 1995. Encouraged by the DP’s showing in these local elections, Kim Dae Jung suddenly decided in the summer of 1995 to come back to the political stage. He organized the NCNP, drawing his loyal followers away from the DP.

Another four-party system appeared, including the DLP, NCNP, ULD, and DP. The ruling DLP changed its name to the NKP in late 1995, about four months prior to the 15th Assembly election. The DP made a poor showing in the 15th Assembly election, effectively converting a four-party competition into a three-party one. The DP later disbanded.

In the December 1997 presidential election, three major candidates competed. The ruling NKP nominated Lee Hoi Chang. In the run-up to the election, Lee’s popularity dropped because his two sons allegedly dodged military conscription. This induced Rhee In Je, the runner-up in the NKP contest for the party’s nomination, to break away from the NKP and declare his candidacy under the banner of the New Party by the People (NPP) in mid-September. By mid-November, Lee had managed to revamp his party by merging the NKP with the minor DP into the GNP. The main opposition, the NCNP, unsurprisingly nominated Kim Dae Jung as its presidential candidate. This Kim persuaded Kim Jong Pil of the ULD to withdraw in favor of an electoral coalition for Kim Dae Jung’s triumph. The coalition was called "the DJP alliance," where the acronym stood for Dae Jung and Jong Pil. (This should not be confused with the acronym for the Democratic Justice Party, which was headed by President Chun and later by President Roh.)

When Kim Dae Jung was elected president, his NCNP could not command a legislative majority, even combined with its junior coalition partner, the ULD. Over time the ruling coalition gradually recruited legislative members from the opposition GNP. Also, Rhee In Je, together with the legislative members of his NPP, was drawn into the NCNP in the fall of 1998. By co-opting legislative members from the other side of the aisle, the ruling coalition finally managed to achieve a majority in the National Assembly.

Parties and Leaders in April 2000

It should come as no surprise that Korean political parties refurbish or realign themselves before a nationwide election. In an effort to boost the ruling party’s legislative strength less than three months before the April 2000 general election, President Kim Dae Jung reinvented the NCNP by recruiting prominent civic activists and other high-visibility individuals and introducing the Millennium Democratic Party (MDP). Kim appointed Rhee In Je chief campaign manager for the MDP. Rhee is also running for the National Assembly as his native district’s representative in the Chungchong region, the ULD’s stronghold. Rhee’s decision is seen as laying the groundwork for a presidential campaign of his own in 2002. The MDP has pledged to devote itself to the so-called new politics, and it advocates democracy, a market economy, and productive welfare. The ruling party claims to represent middle-class interests. It is allegedly committed to reform in not only political but also business and public sectors.

Kim Jong Pil, the ULD leader, is also maneuvering to ensure that his party remains a significant political force after April 13. Kim Jong Pil well matches President Kim in political ingenuity and experience. He masterminded the military coup with the late President Park Chung Hee in 1961, founded the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (now the National Intelligence Service) and served as his prime minister in the early 1970s. He later held the leadership position second to President Kim Young Sam, and served again as prime minister during the first two years of the Kim Dae Jung administration.

In late February, the ULD officially severed its coalition ties with the ruling MDP, in hopes of securing firmer support in its regional base. The ULD leadership cited several reasons for quitting the DJP coalition. First, President Kim Dae Jung and his party have not fulfilled an agreement to introduce a parliamentary system of government. Second, President Kim allegedly conspired with civic groups in their campaign against senior conservative ULD politicians, including Kim Jong Pil. Third, Rhee In Je announced his campaign for the National Assembly on ULD turf. And last, the MDP nominated many former student activists, which is unacceptable to the ULD, a party seeking a grand alliance of conservative forces.

Under the leadership of Lee Hoi Chang, the opposition GNP denied several faction leaders its nomination for the upcoming election. In a dramatic turn against Lee, these political heavyweights blamed him for "privatizing" the party by fielding candidates personally loyal to him, and seceded from the GNP to form the Democratic People’s Party (DPP) in early March. The DPP opposes both President Kim Dae Jung and Lee Hoi Chang.

With the emergence of this splinter party from the GNP, the election is turning into a four-way race among the MDP, the ULD, the GNP, and the DPP. Several other minor parties will join the competition, but they remain largely inconspicuous.

Pressure from Civil Society

During the democratic transition of the late 1980s, civic groups mobilized popular protest and exerted heavy pressure against the authoritarian regime. In politics after democratic transition, civic groups continue to play an important role by articulating citizens’ demands for continuing political reform and pressuring the government to address socioeconomic issues such as human rights, labor conditions, economic justice, environmental protection, and so on. In the electoral process, civic groups try to ensure that parties and candidates engage in clean and fair campaign practices.

Civic groups are conducting their own campaign of pressure politics in this year’s election. Spurred by pent-up public anger at corrupt old politics, in mid-January 2000 the Citizens’ Coalition for Economic Justice released a list of politicians it deemed unfit for candidacy in the upcoming election. Criteria for disqualification varied, from corruption and embezzlement to involvement in past election irregularities, such as attempts to buy votes.

The blacklisting campaign peaked as the Citizens’ Alliance for the 2000 General Elections (Citizens’ Alliance), an umbrella organization of more than 400 civic groups, announced a list of 66 politicians considered unqualified in late January, and an additional list of 47 in early February. The major reasons cited for blocking those politicians from running in the upcoming election were corruption, breaking election laws, and destruction of the democratic and constitutional order.

In the number of politicians disqualified by the Citizens’ Alliance, the opposition GNP ranked first, above the two parties in the ruling coalition, the MDP and the ULD. In terms of incumbent legislative members, however, the hardest hit was the ULD. Moreover, these lists included Kim Jong Pil, the ULD leader, who had been an architect of the military coup in 1961. In response to the blacklisting campaign, only the MDP expressed welcome, and it was a guarded one. The GNP raised suspicions about the civic group’s link with the ruling circle, and questioned the standards applied for disqualifying its legislative members. The ULD vehemently accused the Citizens’ Alliance of conspiring with the MDP to devastate the basic legal order and ruin the status of conservatives.

Civic groups were also visible in the legislative process of revising election law. In mid-January, the three parties finally made public a political reform package that had taken them 13 months to negotiate. The contents of this package generated a startling public backlash. For one thing, the rival political parties had reneged on an earlier promise to cut the membership size of the National Assembly by about 10 percent in accordance with the economic restructuring necessitated by the IMF bailout. The reform package also lacked any plan to improve fairness of representation and districting. Moreover, the parties had agreed to increase the level of state subsidies for election campaigns by 50 percent, and to keep the extant clause prohibiting civic groups from any involvement whatsoever in election campaigns.

The media and civic groups wasted no time accusing the political parties of protecting their vested interests and of sabotaging urgent political reform. The Citizens’ Alliance organized outdoor rallies and petition drives to make political parties reconsider the controversial reform package. As a result, political parties and their leaders restarted the process. In the revision process, the National Assembly organized a districting commission that included representatives of both political parties and civic groups. The temporary panel reached a new districting plan that would reduce the number of legislative members by around 10 percent. The plan was then recommended to the National Assembly for review.

A new phase of civic mobilization for promoting democracy seems to be underway. However, it should be noted that pressure from civil society has yet to bring about significant political reform in the democratic era. Regardless of the blacklist campaign conducted by the Citizens’ Alliance, four parties fielded at least 50 candidates considered unfit by the big civic group. Even the MDP, which appears most favorable to civic group activism, nominated 10 or so politicians rejected by the Citizens’ Alliance. The revised election law, ultimately passed by the National Assembly on February 10, does not guarantee civic groups full freedom to participate in election campaigning. They are prohibited from holding outdoor rallies, distributing leaflets, or collecting signatures.

The Electoral System

The Korean National Assembly is elected by a single-member plurality system to which a nominal component of proportional representation (PR) is added. A voter casts a single ballot to elect his or her district representative. In allocating nationwide PR seats, the vote for a district candidate is counted as the vote for the candidate’s party list.

Most seats are filled by the plurality component. For example, in the elections for the 15th Assembly, 253 of 299 legislative seats were elected from single-member districts, and nationwide party lists filled the remaining 46 under the PR system. The nationwide at-large seats are divided by allocating one seat to parties that have won no district seat but received at least three and not more than five percent of the vote. The remaining seats are then divided among the parties with at least five district seats, or with five percent or more of the vote, in proportion to each party’s share of the national vote.

Under this electoral system, larger parties gain a disproportionately greater share of legislative seats. For instance, in 1996, the ruling NKP won 46 percent of the total seats with 35 percent of the vote. The fourth-largest party, the DP, suffered most under the system: it obtained only 5 percent of the total seats with a bit more than 11 percent of the vote. For the splinter party, the PR component did not much adjust the disproportion caused by the plurality component.

The electoral system discouraged the representation of not only smaller parties but also that of minorities who are not concentrated in a particular geographical area. The ratio of women to men in the National Assembly is a case in point. Female legislative members constitute on average merely 2 percent of the Assembly. Furthermore, the system discriminates against newly emerging, alternative political forces with fresh ideas.

Although the single-member plurality system is generally associated with two-party government, this hasn’t been the case in Korea. Cleavage along regional lines keeps the plurality from suppressing party fractionalization. A third or fourth party can survive as a significant political force as long as it gains a substantial number of legislative seats from regionally concentrated support. The system has neither brought about fair representation nor enabled a single party to secure a legislative majority.

Given that the single-member plurality component helped major parties reap the disproportionate benefits of sweeping legislative seats in their regional strongholds, reform-minded intellectuals and civic activists have argued for changing the single-member plurality component. Some alternatives often suggested include the German two-vote mixed system, Japan’s newly introduced two-vote parallel system, or other peculiar types of two-vote mixed systems.

At the beginning of 2000, President Kim Dae Jung and Prime Minister Kim Jong Pil, leaders of the ruling coalition, agreed to adopt a Japanese-style two-vote system. If the system is introduced, a voter will cast one ballot for the district representative and another ballot for a party list under PR. The opposition GNP initially objected to this proposal. First of all, the GNP was concerned that the system would likely induce the two parties in the ruling coalition to field a single candidate and campaign jointly for him, especially in those districts where GNP candidates are strong. Under the existing system, it was impossible for the NCNP (now the MDP) and the ULD to pursue an electoral coalition at the district level, because the votes won by the district candidates would determine the number of each party’s PR seats.

Second, the GNP believed that the introduction of a Japanese-style two-vote system would enhance the representation of minor parties in the National Assembly and hence weaken the opposition’s strength. Nevertheless, the GNP agreed in mid-January to the reform package. By that time, a collaborative election strategy became unfeasible for the ruling coalition, which looked likely to fall apart. Moreover, since the reform package intended to increase the number of district seats by five and reduce PR seats by the same number, it would not much hurt the GNP.

During the renegotiations over the revision of the election law in late January and early February, the MDP and the GNP again expressed differences over two major issues. One regarded districting and the membership size of the National Assembly. The districting commission recommended setting the lower population limit of an electoral district at 90,000 and the upper limit at 350,000, a proposal that would mean the reduction of district seats by 26. The MDP supported the idea, the GNP objected to it. The opposition party favored the existing standards for districting–75,000 for the lower limit and 300,000 for the upper limit–which would cut the number of district seats by only 10. The other issue was that of two ballots per voter versus one ballot per voter. The MDP favored the former, whereas the GNP supported the latter.

Neither of the two large parties commanded a legislative majority, and the ULD played a decisive role in the final passage of the election bill. It disagreed with the MDP over districting and the number of legislative seats. Therefore, the size of membership is now set at 273 for the 16th Assembly, 26 seats down from the 15th. Out of the total seats, 227 will be elected from a single-member district, and the remaining 46 seats under PR. On the other hand, the ULD stood by the GNP in maintaining the one-vote mixed system: each voter will again cast a single ballot for his or her district representative in the forthcoming general election. The ballots will be counted party by party nationwide for allocating at-large seats under a PR procedure.

There is one other reform measure that merits attention: to guarantee equal political opportunity for women, the new election law stipulates that parties assign 30 percent of the candidate positions under PR to women. It remains to be seen if this provision will enhance female representation in the National Assembly.

Candidate Nomination

Korean law stipulates, in vague terms, that the nomination of candidates for public office be made through a democratic procedure within a party. Reform-minded intellectuals and civic-group representatives also urge political parties to nominate candidates in a democratic and transparent way.

The reality of candidate selection and nomination, however, is far removed from the legal prescriptions. The candidate nomination process is typically top-down. A party establishes an ad hoc screening committee for candidacy at its national headquarters. The committee is usually composed of party officials loyal to the top leader or sympathetic with his cause. It reviews applications for candidacy or searches for candidates itself. A hopeful is evaluated by criteria such as public visibility, loyalty to the party, connections with the top leader, and likelihood of victory. During the review process, the committee communicates often with the top leadership. If factions exist within the party, the committee normally takes into account each group’s respective share of the candidates. The leader accepts or rejects party nominees from the committee’s list. All this happens behind closed doors, and the backroom review is vulnerable to all kinds of dirty deals.

On February 17, the ruling MDP announced its list of candidates approved by President Kim for 166 of the 227 district seats. It replaced approximately 30 percent of the incumbent district representatives with new figures. The replacement rate was lower than expected by the public and initially announced by the party. Moreover, the nomination list included several politicians rejected previously by civic groups.

The nomination publicized by the GNP on February 18 surprised many people, affiliated with the party or not. Although the GNP had dropped less than 30 percent of the party’s incumbent legislative members elected from districts, the cuts included several faction bosses and senior politicians. A remarkable replacement was made for the districts composed of the city of Taegu and surrounding North Kyongsang Province (known as the TK region) and the city of Pusan and its adjacent South Kyongsang Province (known as the PK region). The TK and PK regions together constitute the Yongnam region, the southeastern part of the Korean peninsula, which is the bastion of GNP electoral support. By purging the old guard, Lee Hoi Chang, the GNP’s leader, seemingly aimed not only to consolidate leadership of his party but also to grant the public’s wish for new politics. Lee’s bold move, however, caused fiery reactions from big-name politicians who didn’t make the list and their sympathizers. Eventually, they launched a new party, the DPP, under the "anti—Kim Dae Jung and anti—Lee Hoi Chang" banner.

In an effort to thwart a serious challenge from the DPP, Lee Hoi Chang expressed regret over the tumult caused by the nomination. He offered a post-election confidence vote on his leadership. Lee even visited former President Kim Young Sam, who remains influential in the PK region, to try to gain his support.

On the same day that the GNP made public its list of party nominees, the ULD also announced its candidates for district seats. Of those incumbent district representatives who wanted to run again for the National Assembly, no one was denied renomination. The DPP, which joined the electoral race late, rushed to recruit hopefuls for legislative office. This party’s nomination list naturally included a good number of established politicians and new political aspirants who failed to win the endorsement of not only the GNP but the MDP and the ULD as well.

Campaign Issues

Outside extraordinary times, Korean elections have lacked any major debate on substantive policy. This should come as no surprise given that a party’s identity is based on its leader’s personality, not policy. The constant flux of political parties leaves no time for a distinct policy image to develop. Either the basic nature of a party’s political regime and leadership (for example, whether it’s clean or corrupt), or overarching national objectives, such as sweeping reform to restructure the economy or politics, are what constitute campaign issues–not specific policy matters.

The December 1987 presidential competition among Roh Tae Woo and opposition leaders Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung, centered around the legitimacy of the military’s authoritarianism and political stability in the nascent democratic era. Campaigners in the 13th Assembly election held four months later focused on the moral and ethical basis of political leadership, such as bribery scandals.

The sluggish national economy emerged as a significant campaign issue in the 14th Assembly election in March 1992. Chung Ju Yung, the UNP leader, mobilized electoral support based on his success as an entrepreneur. Still, in this election, basic questions of government, such as political stability versus checks-and-balances, remained significant.

In the December 1992 presidential election, national goals concerning governance overwhelmed economic issues. Kim Young Sam of the ruling DLP promised to create a "New Korea" and to practice "reform amid stability." On the opposition side, Kim Dae Jung campaigned for an "interparty shift of power" and "grand national reconciliation." The first was a standard campaign theme for the main opposition. The second was put forward to stretch Kim Dae Jung’s support base beyond his stronghold, the Honam region (the Cholla provinces, the southwestern part of the peninsula). Chung Ju Yung’s campaign focused on the sagging economy, and he sounded as if he would fix the economic ills with a magic touch. Over time, his promises were increasingly seen as unrealistic. Chung’s UNP was not as successful in capitalizing on voters’ economic concerns in the presidential election as it had been in the 14th Assembly election held nine months before.

In the 15th Assembly election in 1996, the ruling NKP stressed stability and reform. Two opposition parties, the NCNP and the ULD, advocated effective checks on the power of the Kim Young Sam administration. The DP, the fourth party, called for an end to the era of the "Three Kims"–Kim Young Sam, Kim Dae Jung, and Kim Jong Pil–and for a generational change in leadership. As in other Assembly elections lacking national policy issues, candidates emphasized local matters such as development projects at the district level.

The national economy was in exceptionally bad shape during the December 1997 presidential election. The IMF bailout, determined only two weeks before election day, triggered mounting public criticism of the management of the national economy. Kim Dae Jung convinced voters that overcoming the economic crisis required a shift of power to the opposition.

In this upcoming general election, the ruling and opposing parties are again debating political stability versus checks-and-
balances. The ruling MDP is presenting "economic leap forward amid stability," or "reform amid stability," as its major campaign theme. The party leaders, including President Kim Dae Jung, suggest that everything will go fine if the MDP secures a legislative majority. Furthermore, they claim that the party’s inability to do so will have a negative impact on the economy, the stock market, labor issues, and inter-Korean relations. To counter the argument, the GNP is emphasizing the necessity of a strong opposition to hold the "arrogant and overbearing" government in check. The GNP tries to remind voters that it is the only effective alternative to the MDP. GNP leaders keep saying that support for another opposition party, particularly the DPP, would only help the ruling party.

The April 13 election, to be held at the midpoint of President Kim’s term, is regarded as an interim evaluation of his administration. The GNP is asking voters to pass judgment on the administration’s abuse of power and its policy failures over the past two years. The GNP is charging the Kim administration with increased national debt, a widening economic gap between haves and have-nots, and favoritism toward the Honam region in its personnel policy.

The GNP likes to cite a series of scandals that troubled President Kim in the summer and fall of 1999. In the so-called "furgate" or "boutique" scandal, a business tycoon was imprisononed on charges of smuggling huge sums of U.S. dollars abroad and embezzling company funds. In attempting to save him from criminal prosecution, the wife of the minister for affairs of national unification allegedly asked the businessman’s wife to pay for furs bought by the justice minister’s wife. This scandal led to the justice minister’s dismissal and arrest. Another scandal involved the former head of the public security department, the supreme public prosecutors’ office. He was indicted on charges of instigating a labor strike at the Korea Minting and Securities Printing Corporation in order to take credit for cracking down on the illegal strike and facilitating the corporation’s restructuring efforts. In still another case, the environment minister, who was also a famous actress, was forced to resign for accepting a cash gift from a Korean businessman residing in Russia after she had performed in Moscow while in office. To top it all off, the governor of Kyonggi, a member of the ruling party, was arrested for taking a bribe from a banker.

Despite the GNP’s strategy, the wave of scandals has already subsided and now draws little public attention. Whenever the issue of presidential performance is raised, the ruling party contends that President Kim has pulled Korea out of economic crisis in spite of the opposition’s uncooperative behavior. Survey results about President Kim’s popularity and public perceptions regarding his job performance vary according to method and wording of questions. Still, they tend to indicate that a good majority of voters see the nation’s president and his overall performance in a positive light. President Kim no longer enjoys the high rate of popularity of his honeymoon period. But no other political leader is perceived more favorably than him.

Whereas policy debate is not likely to mobilize voter support, regionalism is a significant factor in Korean elections. Regionalism prompts sentimental reaction rather than realistic reflection. There is a deep-
seated rivalry, sometimes animosity, among regions, notably between Yongnam and Honam. This cleavage has deepened in the past three or four decades due to the continued rule of the Yongnam-born political elite, regionally unbalanced socioeconomic development, regional favoritism in government jobs, and so forth.

In the current campaigning, controversies over regionalism in politics have flared up again. In his speech commemorating the March 1 Independence Movement in Taegu, President Kim Dae Jung suggested that regionalism originated in 1961’s military coup. This remark upset Kim Jong Pil, who had masterminded the military intervention. At a party rally in the Chungchong region, he retorted that Kim Dae Jung himself had sparked regional sentiment in the 1971 presidential election in order to appeal to the Honam voters. Lee Hoi Chang entered the fray by arguing that Kim Dae Jung had deepened regionalism in politics during his second presidential bid in 1987. Politicians exploit the issue of regionalism in various ways to boost electoral support based on voters’ emotional response.

Costly and Corrupt Campaigns

The 1987 presidential election and the 13th Assembly election held in 1988 were not clean or fair but tainted by campaign violence. Allegations of corruption were rampant in the 1987 presidential campaign. In the subsequent Assembly election as well, the media, the authorities, and watchdog civic groups reported that some candidates and their campaign workers had attempted to buy votes with gifts, goodies, food, spa trips, and cash.

Civic groups and the opposition also complained of election rigging and corrupt practices in the 14th Assembly election and the 1992 presidential election, but despite these deficiencies, these elections showed signs of gradual progress in the disappearance of campaign violence. The 15th Assembly election held in 1996 was on the surface largely fair. However, the election was still costly, with many candidates reportedly exceeding legal ceilings of campaign spending according to post-election media reports based on interviews with the candidates. One reason elections are expensive is that few campaign workers serve as volunteers; they are treated with meals and paid for their assistance. In 1996 even some ordinary voters still expected to be paid for their votes.

The 1997 presidential election made a significant break with the past in that the illegal campaign practices accountable for high costs dwindled drastically. The election law revised before the presidential election prohibited candidates from holding massive outdoor rallies, in which candidates had previously expended enormous financial resources to mobilize large audiences. Instead, candidates campaigned through state-
sponsored mass media. At that time nobody could afford an expensive campaign because of the deeply troubled national economy.

The overall tendency of the recent elections toward fairness notwithstanding, Korean concern about high costs and clandestine voter mobilization remains. Many election watchers believe that the upcoming general election will be no less costly than the last one. The official campaign runs from March 28 through April 12. But parties and candidates started campaigning a few months ago, in the name of normal party activities or in other more sophisticated and covert ways, such as candidates’ meeting with voters in small informal groups. The parties’ and candidates’ expenses before the official campaign period will double or triple those incurred during the official campaign period.

Why do the candidates in the legislative race spend so much money? What do they spend it on? To answer these questions, one needs to understand the character of district parties. The district party is essentially a political machine geared toward the success of a particular politician. The organization consists of patron-client ties, in which the politician provides benefits and favors in return for support. In addition to his or her district party organization, every politician maintains informal vote-gathering machines, such as friendship societies and alumni and recreation groups. Politicians perform as guardians of these informal groups, in return for funds.

Extravagance in politics peaks at election times. Candidates spend lavishly, ignoring or skillfully violating the laws regulating campaign money. Huge sums of it go to the nurturing of district parties and other vote-gathering machines, and to the provision of food, goodies, or other services for voters. New party members are often paid "gratitude fees" to reward them for their participation, and party membership swells in election seasons. Large sums are expended to encourage attendance at campaign events and party rallies. In addition to campaign workers being fed and paid, there are the usual costs of renting and running offices, conducting opinion polls, printing and distributing pamphlets and handbills, and so on. As a last resort, cash is distributed in exchange for votes.

Election law requires every candidate’s campaign manager to report the money spent during the official campaign period to the National Election Commission after the election. A winner can be disqualified for spending above the ceiling or dishonest reporting. Post-election reports always claim that the candidate stayed within legal spending limits. In theory, campaign expenses are nicely controlled in Korea. In practice, everybody knows that the official reports account for only a small portion of total expenses.

Several nominees have withdrawn from the race because of such money politics. A medical doctor at a university hospital nominated by the MDP quit the contest, saying: "I got sick and tired of money-tainted electoral politics, as people I encountered in my campaign never failed to link everything to money. After my winning the party ticket, I received streams of phone calls. Some congratulated me, but others solicited money in return for their support. I was finally convinced that politics was not the way for me to follow."

The lack of a policy contest frequently leads to personalized negative campaigning. Korean elections abound with personal attacks, mudslinging, groundless accusations, and the like. Recently, the Internet has also been used for such negative campaigning. In early March, a ULD nominee for a Seoul district was caught vilifying his opponents in cyberspace and arrested on charges of slandering his rival candidates. He had accused the ruling MDP candidate in his district of being a communist sympathizer, and portrayed his GNP rival as a candidate who sold himself for money and power.

Regionalism

Korean voters often support the candidate of the party whose leader comes from the voter’s region. In the event that no significant party in the legislative race is led by a politician from the voter’s region, the voter may still engage in regional voting, by not supporting the candidate whose party is headed by a politician from a rival region. In 1997, no major presidential candidate came from the Yongnam region, so Yongnam voters cast their ballots against Kim Dae Jung, who came from the Honam region.

Regional voting either for or against a candidate means that a candidate or party either reaps a sweeping victory in a particular region or loses dismally elsewhere. The 1997 presidential election is a case in point. Kim Dae Jung received an overwhelming percentage of the vote in the Honam region: 97.3 in Kwangju, 92.3 in North Cholla, and 94.6 in South Cholla. In contrast, Lee Hoi Chang, the runner-up, won 1.7 percent of the vote in Kwangju, 4.6 percent in North Cholla, and 3.2 percent in South Cholla. Honam natives are well-known for rallying around their favorite son, Kim Dae Jung. They have felt discriminated against under former presidents Park Chung Hee, Chun Doo Hwan, Roh Tae Woo, and Kim Young Sam, all from the Yongnam region. The citizens of Kwangju have not forgotten being brutally crushed for resisting General Chun’s military takeover in 1980. In the Yongnam region, Lee Hoi Chang collected a solid majority of the votes: 53.3 percent in Pusan, 72.7 percent in Taegu, 51.4 percent in Ulsan, 61.9 percent in North Kyongsang, and 55.1 percent in South Kyongsang. By contrast, Kim Dae Jung garnered roughly 15 percent or less of the votes cast in each of these cities and provinces.

The 13th Assembly election in 1988 also showed dramatic results. Roh Tae Woo’s DJP won all the seats in his home city of Taegu, and the party won 81 percent of the district seats in North Kyongsang. Kim Dae Jung’s PPD vividly demonstrated its regional strength by capturing 37 of the 38 districts in the Honam region. Except for the districts in the Honam region and Seoul, the PPD did not win a single district seat. Regional voting helped Kim Young Sam’s RDP to sweep his home city of Pusan. The RDP also made a strong showing in South Kyongsang, but it missed outbidding the ruling DJP. Finally, voters rallied in the wake of Kim Jong Pil’s desperate campaigning in Chungchong, which helped him survive as a political leader. The NDRP obtained 94 percent of the districts seats allocated to South Chungchong.

In April 2000’s four-way competition, the MDP and the GNP are much stronger than the other two parties, the ULD and the DPP. At this writing, most poll watchers predict that no single party will win a legislative majority of 137 seats or more of the total 273 seats. The MDP and the GNP are neck-in-neck for the largest share of legislative seats. Either party, which can secure 120 seats or so, is likely to finish first. The ULD is likely to finish a distant third, winning roughly 30 seats. Thus far, it seems that the DPP will have enormous difficulty securing at least 20 seats. This party’s post-election political fortune is precarious, because a party with less than 20 seats is not allowed by the National Assembly to form a legislative party group. The DPP has been largely confined to a spoiler role, stealing chiefly pro-opposition votes.

Each party’s electoral strength varies from one region to another. In the Honam region, the MDP is pretty much invincible except for one or two pro-MDP independents who could win. Not surprisingly, the ULD is remarkably strong in the Chungchong region, but this party seems weakened there. This is partly because the MDP with Rhee In Je at the front is invading the region. Also, the GNP remains a significant force, especially in North Chungchong. In the Yongnam region, the GNP maintains a competitive edge, though the DPP and the ULD outflank it in some districts. In each of the other regions, including Seoul, Inchon, Kyonggi Province, Kangwon Province, and Cheju Island, the parties’ chances for victory more or less resemble the nationwide electoral landscape.

Conclusion

The April 13 election will be an important test of Korean democracy. Though the Korean electoral process has steadily improved for the cleaner and fairer, it still leaves much to be desired. Regional cleavages, vividly manifest during the campaign, hinder political leaders from forming a broad, national support base. Extralegal or illegal campaign practices, together with corrupt money politics, undermine the fairness of the electoral process. Virulent personal attacks and the absence of a policy contes weaken the role of elections as an opportunity to evaluate past leadership performance and discuss the nation’s future direction. The extent to which these drawbacks can be overcome or reduced will indicate how much progress has been made in achieving genuine democratic governance and accountability. Another matter of great concern is how many fresh faces will appear in the new legislature. The forthcoming election will test the possibility of generational change in political leadership.

The election results will greatly affect what President Kim Dae Jung can achieve and how during his three remaining years of office. At this writing, according to many poll watchers, the ruling MDP could win at most 45 percent or so of the seats, making it the largest legislative party but still short of a simple majority. As in the early days of his presidency, Kim Dae Jung as a minority president will face the immediate problem of building a working majority in the National Assembly. In the event the opposition GNP finishes first, this challenge to President Kim will be much more difficult to overcome. With the GNP as the largest party, legislative deadlock would likely prevail, hampering the minority president from achieving anything significant.

The MDP would naturally try to absorb independents in order to increase its numbers. Then President Kim would most likely try to restore the DJP alliance, though it seems that would be almost impossible. Nevertheless, Kim Jong Pil may cooperate with President Kim out of political expediency.

The MDP would probably try to recruit, on an individual basis, legislative members from the small DPP or even from the GNP. As far as GNP politicians are concerned, however, they will be the last to be co-opted into the ruling MDP. After the purge of big shots during the nomination of candidates, the GNP should emerge as a more disciplined party.

The consolidation of Korean democracy hinges on whether Presdient Kim can build a working relationship with the opposition and engage in a dialogue on an issue-by-issue basis. President Kim is likely to face no easy policy challenges. Most people agree that Korea has emerged from its financial crisis. But the success of President Kim’s reforms to build a sound market economy remains to be seen. Ironically, restructuring the economy has benefited the establishment, including the chaebol, which are widely seen as the culprit in the economic crisis. Small and medium businesses and the middle and lower classes suffered in comparision. Growing income and wealth discrepancies are an increasingly important concern. The chaebol reform introduced significant measures to improve corporate governance. But except for the Daewoo group, the top chaebol conglomerates have reinforced their oligopoly in the market.

On the other hand, in the eyes of the chaebol, the government still commands and controls the corporate sector. State intervention in the economy is not unlike authoritarian practices of the past. The Kim Dae Jung administration has made great efforts to generate organized labor’s support for economic reform by establishing a tripartite commission that encompasses the government, labor, and management. Nonetheless, organized labor is ready to resume its militant and confrontational tactics if its demands go unmet.

Critics also say that President Kim has so far achieved little in reforming the public sector and, more important, inefficient and uncompromising old-fashioned politics. Regardless of politicians’ incessant lip service, the pledged political reform has not made substantive headway. President Kim blames the GNP for its uncooperative behavior in this regard. The opposition stresses that President Kim himself is part of the "Three Kims" phenomenon that symbolizes outmoded politics. The public has become increasingly disillusioned by the stalemate on the reform agenda.

The results of this upcoming legislative election will largely determine the future of presidential aspirants. If the MDP proves relatively successful, Rhee In Je, the party’s chief campaign manager’s, will have secured his position as a conspicuous leader and advance a step further toward being the MDP’s contender in the presidential election in December 2002. The GNP’s electoral showing is obviously important in fortifying its leadership position and confirming Lee Hoi Chang’s nomination in the next presidential election. As in the last presidential election, held in December 1997, Rhee and Lee have fallen into a zero-sum contention. Rhee In Je is again helping Kim Dae Jung win against Lee Hoi Chang. Nevertheless, Rhee’s relationship with President Kim may strain over time.

The constitution prohibits President Kim from serving another term. As the next presidential election approaches, a struggle for succession will emerge within the MDP. Together with Rhee, a few other presidential hopefuls will join the party’s nomination race. It remains to be seen who will receive President Kim’s blessing.

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Further Reading

Brady, David, and Jongryn Mo. "Electoral Systems and Institutional Choice: A Case Study of the 1988 Korean Elections," Comparative Political Studies 24 (1992): 405—29.

Cotton, James, ed. Politics and Policy in the New Korean State: From Roh Tae-woo to Kim Young-sam (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995).

Diamond, Larry, and Doh Chull Shin, eds. Institutional Reform and Democratic Consolidation in Korea (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1999).

Kang, Won-Tak. "The Rise of a Third Party in South Korea: The Unification National Party in the 1992 National Assembly Election," Electoral Studies 17 (1988): 95—110.

Kim, Chong Lim, ed. Political Participation in Korea: Democracy, Mobilization, and Stability (Santa Barbara: ABC-Clio Books, 1980).

Kim, Hong Nack. "The 1988 Parliamentary Elections in South Korea," Asian Survey 29 (1989): 481—95.

Kim, Ilpyong J., and Young Whan Kihl, eds. Political Change in South Korea (New York: Paragon House, 1988).

Lee, Kap-Yun. "Democratization, Party Failure, and the Emergence of the Unification National Party," Korea and World Affairs 18 (1994): 749—71.

Lee, Man-woo. The Odyssey of Korean Democracy: Korean Politics, 1987—1990 (New York: Praeger, 1990).

Lee, R. Jungja. "Democratization, Electoral Systems, and Women’s Representation: A Comparative Study of Women’s Legislative Participation in South Korea and Taiwan," Pacific Focus 7 (1997): 67—89.

Leuthold, David A. "Further Steps Toward Democracy: The 1996 National Assembly Elections," Korea Observer 28 (1997): 1—24.

Park, Chan Wook. "Legislators and Their Constituents in South Korea: The Patterns of District Representation," Asian Survey 28 (1988): 109—65.

Park, Chan Wook. "The 1988 National Assembly Election in South Korea: The Ruling Party’s Loss of Legislative Majority," Journal of Northeast Asian Studies 7 (1988): 59—76.

Park, Chan Wook. "The Fourteenth National Assembly Election in Korea: A Test for the Ruling Democratic Liberal Party," Korea Journal 33 (1993): 5—16.

Park, Chan Wook. "Korean Voters’ Candidate Choice in the 1992 Presidential Election: A Survey Data Analysis," Korea and World Affairs 17 (1993): 432—58.

Steinberg, David I. "Korea: Triumph amid Turmoil," Journal of Democracy 9 (1998): 76—90.

About the Author

Chan Wook Park is a professor of political science at Seoul National University. He chairs the Department of Political Science, SNU, and is a member of the Korean Presidential Advisory Commission on Policy Planning. He has previously taught as an assistant professor at Franklin and Marshall College, and also as a visiting professor at Duke University. His major research involves the comparative analysis of legislatures, parties, and elections. He has published numerous articles in Korean and English on Korean party, electoral, and legislative politics.

Indonesia's 1999 Elections: A Second Chance for Democracy, Edward Masters (May 1999)

Hong Kong: The Challenges of Change, Jeffrey Fischer and Hugh J. Ivory, Yi-zheng Lian, and James T. H. Tang (May 1998)

India's 12th National Elections, Ashutosh Varshney (February 1998)

The Asia Society is prepared to assist journalists by providing briefings by telephone and in person, additional background materials, and help in identifying specialists on Asia for consultation or broadcast appearances.

The opinions expressed in this publication are the author's and do not necessarily represent the views of the Asia Society.