Indonesia's 1999 Elections
A Second Chance for Democracy
Edward Masters
May 1999

Back to the Future
The New Order
The Habibie Administration
The 1999 Election Laws

The Party Law
The Electoral System
Composition of Legislative Bodies

Timetable for the Elections
The Party System
Managing the Elections
Strengths and Weaknesses of the New System

Positive Aspects
Problem Areas

The Role of the Military
Conclusions

Selected Bibliography

Appendix 1: Political Parties Approved to Contest the June Elections
Appendix 2: Two Broad, Competing, and Overlapping Political Agendas
Appendix 3: Glossary of Names
Appendix 4: Glossary of Parties

Specialists

This paper looks at the historical setting in which these dramatic developments are taking place, Indonesia's assets and liabilities in managing this time of great change, and the key players who will determine the outcome. Though there are many unknowns, it also discusses possible outcomes.

The stakes are extremely high not only for Indonesia but also for the international community. Indonesia is a major nation situated in a strategic region. It has the largest Muslim population of any country. It has a wealth of natural resources and, as the linchpin of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), plays a critical role in regional security and political issues. It is also influential and constructive in many multilateral organizations. An unstable, ultranationalist, or irresponsible Indonesia, given its size and influence, would destabilize Southeast Asia--as occurred in the 1960s during President Sukarno's military "confrontation" of Malaysia--and would adversely affect our own interest for peace, stability, and economic progress in this important region.

Back to the Future

For more than three centuries most of the area now comprising Indonesia was ruled by the Netherlands under a system designed to serve the economic needs of the metropolitan power. Unlike the British in India or the United States in the Philippines, the Dutch saw no need to bring significant numbers of Indonesians into government or to start preparing them to manage their own affairs. The 1930 census, the last before Indonesia's independence, showed there were 208,269 Dutch living in Indonesia. They ran virtually everything, including serving as postmen in the capital city of Batavia. M.C. Ricklefs in his study A History of Modern Indonesia quotes Dutch governor-general B.C. de Jonge (1931-36) as saying, "we have ruled here for 300 years with the whip and the club, and we shall still be doing it for another 300 years." Education for the local people was also not high on the Dutch agenda, with the result that there were only a few hundred Indonesian college graduates out of a total population estimated at 70 million at the time of independence. A large number of those graduates were in politically acceptable fields such as medicine and engineering. Economists, political scientists, and administrative specialists were in very short supply.

The result was that Indonesians were poorly equipped to manage their own affairs, much less to run a sophisticated democratic form of government when they achieved independence. The institutions to support a democratic system were lacking, and the Indonesians themselves had inherited from their Dutch and Japanese rulers the traditions and legal structure of a highly authoritarian system. Moreover, the bulk of the population was poor, illiterate, and used to paternalistic rule, while those who were politically informed constituted a very thin layer of urban society. Nonetheless the newly independent nation's rulers did better than expected, and the commitment to the concept of democracy by the elite resulted in the period 1950-57 being the freest and most open in Indonesia's history. It was followed by two periods of authoritarianism: Sukarno's "Guided Democracy" (1957-65) and Soeharto's "New Order" (1966-98).

Indonesia declared its independence on August 17, 1945. The following day the revolutionary leaders promulgated what is now known as the 1945 constitution. Modeled on the Chinese Organic Law of 1931, it is short (37 articles), vague, and provides for a powerful president and a very weak legislature. It departs in important ways from Western democratic concepts. With the achievement of independence in December 1949, Indonesia's leaders promulgated a new basic document--the 1950 constitution--that mandated a parliamentary system with a largely ceremonial president, guaranteed human rights, placed the military under civilian control, and provided checks and balances on the misuse of power. Drafted by the Indonesians themselves, this constitution survived until 1959 when Sukarno unilaterally abrogated it, reimposed the 1945 constitution, and formally proclaimed Guided Democracy.

The period from December 1949 until July 1955 was tumultuous with monumental administrative problems, outbreaks of dissent and violence in several parts of the archipelago, and the coming and going of five cabinets. With the opposition becoming increasingly vocal over the delay in holding national elections, it was decided that polling for an elected parliament would take place in September 1955 with elections for a Constituent Assembly to draft a new constitution that December. The ensuing election campaign further aggravated regional and intergroup frictions, and this is worth bearing in mind in case history should repeat itself.¹

Interest in the elections was high, and 91.5 percent of the eligible voters cast their ballots. A total of 28 parties gained seats, but only 4 really counted. Those 4 shared roughly equally in about 75 percent of the vote. (see Table 1)

Masyumi (Majlis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia, Consultative Council of Muslim Indonesians) was created by the Japanese in 1943 as a vehicle to control Islam, and it included most Muslim educational and social organizations. It was banned by Sukarno in 1960. Several present-day parties try to trace their lineage to Masyumi. Nahdlatul Ulama (Awakening of Religious Teachers, NU) was established in 1926 by the grandfather of the present NU leader, and the organization continues today as the largest Muslim organization in Indonesia (estimated 30 million members). It is headed by Abdurrahman Wahid, popularly known as Gus Dur, and is the patron of the present National Awakening Party (PKB). It is a conservative rural organization with particular strength in East Java. The Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI) became the political vehicle of Sukarno. In 1973 it was fused by Soeharto into the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI, a merger of the Sukarno-era PNI with several Christian and other parties) and can now said to be the political vehicle of Sukarno's daughter Megawati, leader of the present Indonesian Democracy Party-Struggle (PDI-P). The Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), at one time the third-largest communist party in the world, was eliminated following the abortive 1965 coup.

The parliamentary elections produced no solutions and only served to draw the battle lines among various groups more sharply. The December elections for a Constituent Assembly produced similar results. The assembly convened in November 1956 and was dissolved by Sukarno three years later without having drafted a constitution.

Indonesians tend to view the period 1950-57 as one of fast-changing, weak governments, divisive party politics, and administrative chaos, as power shifted among the leading parties. Some outside observers are now saying that things were not as bad as they seemed and that both Sukarno and Soeharto, for their own purposes, denigrated the period of constitutional democracy. There is undoubtedly some truth in this, but at the same time there is little doubt that the period saw a sharpening of regional and intergroup tensions and many basic economic and social problems were not addressed. Also relevant is the fact that that there were four prime ministers during 1945-49 with governments changing on the average every 10.6 months; 1950-57 was a little better with six prime ministers and an average term of 12.4 months. Although the early 1950s were a time of political openness, there is no gainsaying the fact that political instability during that time paved the way for the succeeding authoritarian governments.

In March 1957, with serious disruptions in Sumatra and elsewhere, Sukarno proclaimed martial law. This was followed on July 6, 1959, by the institution of Guided Democracy, abolition of the Constituent Assembly, and restoration of the 1945 constitution by executive decree. In March the following year the elected parliament was dissolved when it failed to pass the government's budget. Thereafter Sukarno enacted budgets by decree as the economy descended into total chaos. Indonesia's experiment with constitutional democracy had ended.

The New Order

Soeharto came to power in the wake of the 1965 coup attempt in which the top leadership of the Indonesian army was murdered. As the ranking army officer left alive, he gradually restored order, consolidated his position, and moved Sukarno off center stage. In March 1966 he was given authority to exercise the powers of the presidency and the following year he was elected acting president by the MPR. His rule was to last for 32 years, and he became increasingly oppressive with the passage of time.

At the outset of his administration, Soeharto set two priorities: achieving stability and promoting economic development. He brought into office a talented group of U.S.-trained economists and received political advice from various sources, including a Chinese-dominated think tank. Excellent progress was made in straightening out the economic mess inherited from Sukarno (inflation at 600 percent, per capita GDP of $70, and an unpayable foreign debt). Initially his administration was fairly open--certainly more so than that of Sukarno. But within a few years he became concerned that political party maneuvering, press criticism, and friction among various societal groups would interfere with the pace of economic growth. Increasingly he cracked down on dissent and circled the wagons around an ever smaller group of family members and cronies, and his New Order government stifled expression and demanded uniformity in a society that is far from uniform.

Ten parties had contested the 1971 parliamentary elections, the first held under Soeharto's New Order. This included nine opposition parties left over from the Sukarno days and a new government party called Golkar (the governing party; see discussion below under The Party System). In 1973 Soeharto forced the nine opposition parties to merge into two groups. Four Islamic-based parties were fused into the United Development Party (PPP), and five secular parties were forced into PDI. Golkar remained the government party, and it produced majorities for Soeharto over the next 25 years ranging from 60 to nearly 75 percent. But in actual fact, political parties were largely irrelevant. Even Golkar was kept on a tight leash, and the other two were only symbolic with few real differences in party platforms.

Soeharto's suppression of expression and dissent was accepted during most of the New Order in the face of impressive economic growth and improvements in living standards. But by the 1990s people were becoming disillusioned with Soeharto and tired of the state's growing oppression. Such a role by the government may have been accepted by a largely rural, poorly educated population, but after 30 years of economic growth Indonesian society was more urban, better educated, and more sophisticated. According to the 1990 census, over 50 million people lived in urban areas. The growth of an educated professional class led to demands for more "openness," and this became the buzzword in political discussion.

Indonesians became increasingly outspoken against concentration of power at the top and about the business activities of the Soeharto children, who, in the view of many, acted like members of an imperial family. And Soeharto himself gave evidence that he had changed--he no longer had his deft touch in dealing with real or imagined rivals. His brutal removal of Megawati as head of PDI in 1996 and granting one of his sons a monopoly in producing Indonesia's "national car" (a car that was actually made in South Korea) turned off many more of those who had stuck with him up to that point because he produced results on the economic front. The 1997 financial crisis, which hit Indonesia harder than any other Asian country, sealed his fate, and he was forced by student agitation, popular pressure, and defections among his senior cabinet members to resign on May 21, 1998.

The Habibie Administration

Soeharto's choice of vice president in 1998 as he stood for his seventh five-year term was B.J. Habibie, a German-trained aeronautical engineer who had served in the cabinet since 1978 as minister for research and technology. A protégé and longtime close associate of Soeharto, he was considered a poor choice by most of those Indonesians calling for more political openness. When Soeharto made his preference known in early 1998 the Indonesian rupiah, already under attack as a result of the financial crisis, reached its lowest point of 17,000 to the U.S. dollar. (In July 1997 it stood at 2,450 to the dollar.) One of the U.S.-educated economic technocrats, former cabinet member Emil Salim, announced that he would stand as a candidate against Habibie in the MPR elections. Salim knew his candidacy was doomed, but he apparently wanted to establish the precedent that the selection was not necessarily limited to Soeharto's choice. The assembly ignored Salim and voted unanimously for Soeharto and Habibie to serve from March 1998 until 2003. When Soeharto was forced to resign in May 1998, only 72 days after election to his seventh term, Habibie was sworn in as president in accordance with the constitution to serve out the remainder of Soeharto's five-year term.

Though not well equipped for the job by training or experience, Habibie has performed considerably better than most would have expected under the very difficult circumstances prevailing in Indonesia. Very early in his administration he announced that he would not attempt to serve out the rest of Soeharto's term but would move up parliamentary elections from 2002 and presidential elections from 2003 to 1999. This significantly defused charges that his presidency was not legitimate. He ended Soeharto's three-party system and opened the field, with the result that nearly 150 parties were announced. This has been narrowed to 48 by the government. He has also opened the possibility of wide-ranging autonomy or independence for East Timor, freed many political detainees, lifted restrictions on the media, and introduced some economic reforms, which, though sorely needed, have angered some elements of the public.

The MPR was called into session from November 11 to 13, 1998. In a session marred by serious violence and the death of a number of students agitating for Habibie's removal, the assembly took a number of important steps:

• Amended the MPR internal rules to, inter alia, permit elected representatives of new parties to sit in that body as well as in the parliament and separated the leadership of the two bodies (formerly it had been the same).
• Limited the president and vice president to a maximum of two five-year terms.
• Decreed that parliamentary elections should be held in May or June 1999, that all parties meeting the legal requirements would be able to compete, and that appointed military representation in legislative bodies should gradually be reduced in accordance with a law to be enacted later.
• Provided for the establishment of an independent General Election Commission (Komisi Pemilihan Umum, KPU) to oversee the elections.

Immediately after the MPR session, President Habibie instructed Minister of Home Affairs Syarwan Hamid to rewrite the nation's election laws to provide for open and fair polling. He assigned a group of academic experts (known as the Team of Seven) to assist in drafting the new laws, which were Indonesia's most important reforms since the beginning of the New Order. The Team of Seven sought input from many civic leaders and organizations and also consulted with foreign experts.

The three election laws were passed under forced draft on January 28, 1999, by the parliament. Though there are defects, the laws are a remarkably good start and show the commitment of the administration and major opposition figures to create a new system in which free and fair elections are possible. All major parties and political leaders appear willing to participate in the elections under these new ground rules. The three laws cover the requirements for forming political parties, the election system, and the composition of the national and local representative bodies.

Drafts of the three laws were submitted to the Soeharto-era parliament elected in 1997, consisting of 325 representatives from Golkar, 89 from PPP, 75 appointed military members, and 11 from PDI. It was asking a great deal for this group to in effect vote themselves out of jobs but they did it. The bills were significantly changed during the legislative process through hard bargaining. The Team of Seven worked with the parliament during this process and helped the legislators meet the January 28 deadline for passage.

Three critical issues threatened to derail the process: the political status of civil servants, the size of electoral districts (whether the province or the district), and the number of seats to be allocated to the armed forces, but compromises were reached in all three cases.

The Party Law

The 1973 party reorganization forced the existing political parties into three artificial coalitions: Golkar, PDI, and the PPP. The Habibie administration removed constraints on the formation of parties, and nearly 150 sprang up, centered mostly around ambitious individuals.

The administration and the parliament recognized that ground rules were needed to reduce the number to something more manageable. The draft bill submitted to the parliament as a result of the work of the Team of Seven provided that to contest in the 1999 elections a party must have branches in half the districts in 14 of Indonesia's 27 provinces. It should also have the signature of one million party supporters. As it emerged from the parliament the bill provided that parties must have branches in 9 of the 27 provinces and in half the districts in those provinces. No signatures are required. Once a party meets these requirements, it can run candidates anywhere in Indonesia. This nine-province rule means that a party must have representation on more than one island since no island has nine provinces (Sumatra comes closest with eight).

The government draft also provided that a party must win 5 percent of the seats in the parliament to be eligible to compete in the next elections in 2004. The percentage was cut to 2 percent by the parliament, and elected legislators whose parties meet that requirement are to be permitted to take their seats in 1999. The law is silent on what happens if, during the five-year legislative term, the party's representation falls below 2 percent through deaths, defections, or other eventualities. The law also provides that all parties should include in their articles of association a statement that Indonesia is a country based on Pancasila.² They do not have to say that the party itself is based on this ideology, but they are required to acknowledge that the party's "principles or characteristics, aspirations and programs do not contradict Pancasila." The election law bars parties from using state facilities during the campaign and provides that individual party members must be "loyal to Pancasila" and not be members of the Communist Party or any other banned organization.

The issue of whether civil servants could join or campaign on behalf of political parties threatened to disrupt the legislative process. Golkar, which relied heavily on support by civil servants at all levels in the past, argued that restrictions on this group would violate their human rights. There are an estimated 5.1 million civil servants, including about 1 million in state enterprises, and about 10,000 of these are Golkar functionaries. Many others, and probably their relatives as well, support the party from ideological conviction or concern for their jobs. Golkar risked deadlock on this issue until the very last minute by insisting that civil servants be allowed to join and lead parties. The PPP strongly opposed this view on the grounds that it would perpetuate a decided Golkar advantage, and PPP and PDI members threatened to walk out over this issue. Eventually the opposition prevailed while yielding ground on the size of voting districts. It was decided that the actual rules preventing civil servants on active duty from campaiging would be promulgated by government decree. Golkar deputy chairman Marzuki Darusman publicly complained, according to press reports, that President Habibie "somewhat left us out in the cold." He added that Golkar wants to see Habibie "consistently pursue a line of policy that is not changed because of pressure from outside or from his circle of advisors."

The Electoral System

Indonesia has two legislative bodies, but they have distinct duties and do not function as two houses of a unified legislature. The parliament (DPR) meets frequently throughout the year to discuss and pass legislation submitted by the administration. Only recently has it started to initiate legislation or seriously call government actions into question. The present parliament, a holdover from the Soeharto era, consists of 425 elected members and 75 individuals appointed to represent the armed forces. The larger body, the MPR, met every five years under Soeharto with the specific duty of electing the president and vice president and approving the Broad Guidelines of State Policy (Garis-garis Besar Haluan Negara, GBHN). The present MPR consists of 1,000 members including the entire parliament plus an additional 500 members appointed by the president to represent various groups.

During the Soeharto period, elections at all levels were carried out through proportional representation in which successful candidates were taken from national party lists in proportion to that party's percentage of the total vote. Under that system the party is supreme, and it is the party and the party leadership that decides who is elected. Those leaders also can change the party's representation in the legislative bodies at any time. Similarly, candidates' names do not appear on the ballot--only party names and symbols. This is the general system used in Germany and several other countries. The other major electoral system--used in the United States and the United Kingdom--is the single-member district or "first past the post" system in which candidates are elected directly by and accountable to their constituents. Some Asian democracies have combined the two systems not only to reward those who won in their districts but also to compensate losing parties with seats drawn from national party lists.

The draft law prepared by the Team of Seven, approved by the Ministry of Home Affairs, and submitted to the parliament adopted this mixed system and was designed specifically to weaken the hold of the parties. It contained a combination of proportional representation and single-member districts but was slanted heavily toward the latter with 84 percent of the legislators to be chosen under the district system and only 16 percent through proportional representation. This proposal, however, did not pass in the parliament. The opposition parties feared that the single-member system would favor Golkar in view of its extensive branch structure and funding. But to their surprise Golkar joined the other parties in killing the proposal with the argument that it was too complicated and that time was too short to arrange for single-member electoral districts by June 7, 1999.

As does the previous election law, the 1999 law provides basically for election to the national parliament by proportional representation by province, but the government and Golkar won a concession that each party must list its candidates at the district and municipal (kabupaten and kotamadya) levels and that winners would be determined "with consideration to the largest votes obtained by that particular political party in the districts" (Election Law, article 68). A February report by the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI), based on talks with election officials, says that under this system each party will assign its candidates to a particular district. Voters will still vote for the party rather than the candidates, and ballots will include only the party name and logo. Lists of candidates assigned by parties to a specific district will, however, be made public and posted at the polling stations. There are no provincial or district residency requirements. Once the number of seats won by each party is determined, the party's seats will be filled by candidates assigned to the districts where that party fared best. Elections will be held at the same time and under the same rules for provincial and district assemblies.

What this complex system seems to mean is that voters will continue to vote for a party, but candidates will include people known to them at least at the district level, so by voting for a particular party they will also, by extension, be "voting" for people they know.

NDI reports that this unique system respects the principle that party seats are allocated by proportional representation and that each party gains the number of seats in each province to which it is entitled, in accordance with generally recognized ways of allocating seats under proportional representation. The actual candidates to fill those seats, however, will be those who performed best at the district level. NDI believes this could cause confusion and dissent after the results are announced and urges the KPU, the government, and others to make every effort to ensure that the people understand this new system before casting their ballots.

The election law also permits each party to have a witness at each polling station. These witnesses have a right to lodge protests, and these protests "must be dealt with immediately." Nonparty domestic and foreign observers may also monitor the elections by registering with the KPU.

Composition of Legislative Bodies

Under the election law the parliament will remain at 500 seats, but the appointed military contingent will be reduced from 75 to 38. This was one of the most controversial issues considered by the parliament. Students and others outside the parliament agitated for abolition of military seats, while the PPP said it could live with 10. Golkar at one point favored 40, whereas the government's draft bill called for 55, a number that the armed forces also supported. The final compromise gave the military 38 seats, leaving 462 to be elected. There is a general understanding that these reserved military seats will be phased down and out in the future but as far as is known there is no definite timetable.

The MPR was reduced from 1,000 seats to 700. The membership will include all 500 members of parliament, an additional 135 elected at the rate of 5 by each of the 27 provincial legislatures, and 65 appointed to represent social organizations. Under the election law, the KPU will determine which groups are eligible for inclusion among these social organizations and the number of representatives to which each is entitled. The groups will then propose their own candidates who will be officially appointed by the KPU and "administratively formalized" (whatever that may mean) by the president. The selection process for these 200 appointed members will undoubtedly be hotly contested since they represent nearly 30 percent of the total membership of this important body.

Timetable for the Elections

At the end of March the KPU issued a revised timetable for the electoral process that is somewhat less precise than earlier versions, extends the time for voter and candidate registration, shortens the time to tabulate the results, and extends the period for which members are installed in office. (see Table 2)

The Party System

Since the KPU was not to be formed until the parties were qualified under the election law and party representatives had been named, the minister of home affairs appointed an eleven-member interim advisory committee (the Election Commission Formation Preparation Committee, P3KPU) to determine which of the 148 parties met the legal requirements and also to prepare guidelines and regulations for approval by the KPU when it was operational. Known as the Team of Eleven, it was composed of leaders of civil society and professionals and chaired by Nurcholish Madjid, a highly respected Islamic scholar.

The Team of Eleven's most important job was determining which parties met the criteria set by the election law. Before the team could consider their cases, however, the parties had to file applications with the Mministry of Justice to verify that certain technical and administrative requirements had been met. Their applications were then referred to the Team of Eleven to undertake "factual verification" that the parties had the required branches in nine provinces and half of the districts in each of those provinces. The team began its work in mid-February with hearings and investigations in Jakarta and at the provincial and district levels. The team completed its work on March 4 and recommended to the ministry that 48 parties be certified. This recommendation was accepted. Appendix 4 lists the 48 approved parties. At least 12 of those that failed to make the cut have filed protests.

Eight of these parties merit special attention, and it is likely that Indonesia's next government will come from alliances among several of these groups. They are discussed below in alphabetical order.

Partai Amanat Nasional (National Mandate Party, PAN) PAN is the political vehicle of Amien Rais, one of the nation's most strident proponents of reform. He was one of the first to call for Soeharto's resignation, and he offered himself as an alternative at a time when this was risky. Until August 1998, when he resigned to devote full time to politics, Rais chaired Muhammadiyah, a 28-million member Islamic social organization that favors a more assertive role for Islam in society. Rais is playing this down now in what seems to be a successful effort to appeal to the national electorate as a liberal and pluralist candidate. He has put together a good group of young staff members, which includes Muslims, Christians, and Chinese, and his party seems to be gaining ground despite the risk that his current pluralist views may alienate some of his more traditional Muhammadiyah followers.

Rais, who holds a Ph.D. in political science from the University of Chicago, has been a strong economic nationalist and close to those pushing for a much stronger role for Islam in Indonesian society and government. In October 1998 he said publicly, "I cannot understand why contracts of work (for mining concessions) can be majority-owned by foreigners." More recently he told a public forum in Washington, sponsored by the United States-Indonesia Society, that Indonesia needs a new economic policy but added that PAN does not endorse any "drastic or radical measures." He continued, "We believe in a market economy" and "we know that we desperately need to see foreign investment come again to Indonesia." In this respect Rais is one of the few major candidates who addresses economic issues or investment policy in any detail. Actually Rais himself is an entrepreneur. He and his wife own a food stall outside their home in Yogyakarta. He claims that it produces more income than did his previous post as dean of the law faculty at prestigious Gadjah Mada University. He now hedges on the role of Islam and says that his position is "as a nation, we believe in Pancasila as a state ideology."

Amien Rais is an effective campaigner and an excellent speaker who talks in down-to-earth terms that the electorate understands. He is a significant wild card in the elections, and his party is expected to do well in urban areas of Java, Sumatra, and some of the outer islands. He is likely to be considered when it comes to putting together a new government.

Partai Bulan Bintang (Crescent Star Party, PBB) This is one of the more interesting conservative Islamic parties. It claims to be the successor to the Masyumi Party, which was banned by President Sukarno. While asserting that the party does not favor creating an Islamic state, PBB calls for a state "based on Islamic principles." Its leader, Yusril Ihza Mahendra, was a former speech writer for current president Habibie and has ties to the most conservative Islamic group permitted during the Soeharto era, the Dewan Dakwah (Preachers' Council). Mahendra studied law and philosophy at the University of Indonesia and received a doctorate in Malaysia. In an interview with the Van Zorge Report in January party secretary-general M.S. Kaban said, "We want PBB to become a modern Islamic party that can coordinate all layers of Islamic society, both the traditionalists and the modernists. We have made Islam the source of inspiration; in our opinion Pancasila is a source of division." He went on to say, however, that PBB would work through the parliament if, for example, it wanted to create Islamic financial institutions. Kaban added that the party also strongly supports "the most extensive autonomy possible at the provincial level."

The party's appeal is likely to be to urban Muslim voters in the outer islands. PBB has opened offices throughout Indonesia and could emerge as a significant player among the smaller parties.

Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan (Indonesian Democracy Party-Struggle, PDI-P) PDI-P is the party of Megawati Sukarnoputri, daughter of Indonesia's first president, Sukarno. The only one of the Sukarno children with political ambitions, Megawati was chosen as leader of the Soeharto-era PDI in 1994. Realizing that this had been a mistake and that she was attracting national political support, Soeharto had her forcibly removed as party leader two years later. Megawati then formed the PDI-P, perjuangan symbolizing her struggle against the Soeharto establishment. PDI-P is probably the strongest single party today. Meanwhile, the old PDI has been marginalized and is now a bit player.

There is concern among some Indonesians that Megawati would revive the populist, economic nationalist views of her father's Indonesian Nationalist Party. She has, however, given no indication of such tendencies in her speeches. Megawati has also been criticized, even by some of her followers, for being too aloof and having no detailed views of where she would take the country. She may, however, be hitting stride in her campaign. According to press reports, she is drawing very large crowds in rallies throughout Java and is developing into an effective speaker and campaigner. Her party is strongly pluralist and stands for a secular state in keeping with Pancasila. Her popularity is evident from the massive PDI-P congress in Bali last October and the fact that over 100,000 turned out in Jakarta in February 1999 for the unveiling of the new party logo.

Longtime Megawati aide Laksamana Sukardi said, in a January 1999 public meeting in Washington sponsored by the United States-Indonesia Society, that the first priority of a Megawati government would be to restore confidence in the integrity of the government and its appointees. He listed other priorities of the first 100 days:

• create an independent judiciary system;
• install a means whereby parliament would scrutinize judicial appointments;
• empower democratic institutions and require officials to declare their wealth; and
• implement a market economy based on market principles rather than favoring any sector or group.

Sukardi said a Megawati administration would encourage small business enterprises without distorting the economy. He welcomed foreign investment and said that the PDI-P would honor all contracts made under the Soeharto government.

Megawati's party has branches in all 27 provinces and she is personally popular because of her lineage, her strong personal ethics, and her opposition to Soeharto. She will be a formidable candidate in the elections. Because of the appeal of her father's name, she will receive good support from Muslims on Java, and her secular stand (she is herself one-quarter Balinese) will bring support from minority religious groups, such as Balinese Hindus and some Christians and Buddhists, who will see her as the strongest force for secularism. Megawati enjoys good relations with the military, and her party is supported by a number of retired officers. She has praised Minister of Defense and Armed Forces Commander-in-Chief Wiranto in public speeches as a military leader who would keep the Indonesian armed forces (Angkatan Bersendjata Republik Indonesia, ABRI) out of politics. She will be opposed by more traditional Muslims for her secular views and--an argument that has been raised only recently--because a woman should not head a Muslim majority state if qualified men are available. This latter point has been raised by Gus Dur, most promient spokesman of the National Awakening Party, who had earlier called for an alliance between the two parties behind Megawati's candidacy for president. Gus Dur's more traditional followers seem to have slowed him down. Nonetheless, it would be a mistake at this point to rule her out of the presidential race.

Partai Golongan Karya (Functional Group Party, Golkar) Golkar, an association of functional groups, is the party that delivered large majorities every five years for Soeharto and his followers. Formed in 1964 by army officers dissatisfied with President Sukarno's leftward drift, it was taken over by Soeharto in the 1970s and converted into his personal political vehicle. With Soeharto's downfall in May 1998, the party faced a major image problem. At an emergency party congress in July 1998 Golkar removed Soeharto as head of the party's advisory board and ended his and his family's stranglehold on the party machine. The two contenders for party chairman were retired general Edi Sudradjat and current minister of state and state secretary Akbar Tanjung. Sudradjat, a former minister of defense, was a nationalist-secularist and friend of Megawati, and he was viewed as a threat by the Habibie administration. Habibie's supporters, with strong backing by Akbar Tanjung won by a vote of 16 to 11. Thereupon Sudradjat left Golkar to form his own party (see p. 18). Others have also defected from Golkar.

One of Habibie's and Golkar's problems now is how to distance themselves from previous efforts to court Muslims, for example, through the conservative Indonesian Association of Muslim Intellectuals (ICMI), which Habibie previously led, and attract support from voters and potential coalition partners from the secular-pluralist group. This could mean that Golkar would not endorse Habibie as its presidential candidate. (Recently Habibie's problems with Golkar have gotten worse--see discussion below of the row over ministers' participation in the election campaign, p. 22.)

In February 1999 Golkar took the unprecedented step of endorsing five potential presidential candidates: B.J. Habibie, Golkar chairman and cabinet member Akbar Tanjung, Minister of Defense and Armed Forces Commander-in-Chief Wiranto, Coordinating Minister for Economic Affairs Ginandjar Kartasasmita, and Sultan Hamengkubuwono X of Yogyakarta. Golkar officials say they will make the final choice before the June elections.

In a further effort to clean up their act, Akbar Tanjung issued Golkar's first apology in February, for "wrongdoings and mistakes in the past." Trying to project a more reformist image, the party also moved to the forefront such untainted party leaders as human rights activist Marzuki Darusman, now Golkar deputy chairman, who is mentioned by some as a dark horse presidential candidate. In general, Golkar has downgraded its sectarian group and moved closer to the secular-nationalist center. It could emerge as more moderate.

Golkar still carries a great deal of baggage from the Soeharto era, and the decision that civil servants can no longer belong to or campaign for a party will hurt. On the other hand, it has an organization reaching down to the village level, experience in running (and manipulating) elections, and significant funding. It cannot be ruled out as a major player. It will probably do poorly on Java, where the economic crisis has hit hardest and where there is strong resentment over the party's earlier excesses. The party is pinning its hopes on Sumatra and Sulawesi, where the economic problems are less severe. Estimates of its electoral performance range from 5 percent of the vote (its leading competitors) to 35-40 percent by Golkar itself. There are many unknowns at this point, but it is more likely to fall somewhere in the middle of this range.

Partai Keadilan (Justice Party, PK) The PK is an emerging force worth watching. Formed at the Al Azhar Mosque in Jakarta, it has attracted the support of thousands of well-educated young Muslims. With no well-known national leader, the party is headed by 37-year-old Nur Mahmud Isma'il, an American-trained food scientist better known for his work on agricultural products than politics.

Isma'il says, "We want Islam to become our identity," but he quickly adds that "the party is open to all." Its goal is to establish a civil society in which Muslims play a key role, but he denies that the PK favors an Islamic state. Started in 1983 as a forum for Indonesian students studying abroad, it now has a well-organized network of activists drawn largely from campus mosques and Islamic social welfare organizations and is able to turn out large numbers of activists at rallies. Some members met on the Internet religious chatline called "The Islamic Network."

With a strict social code, men and women members avoid physical contact, including handshakes. Some observers worry that PK is out to Islamize Indonesia by focusing on Islam rather than nationalism or Pancasila. Party leaders, on the other hand, say they want to protect the rights of Chinese and religious minorities. But they are ambiguous on the subject of Islamic law. The PK party leader says the party may "suggest changes" in Indonesian law if it is represented in the next parliament but does not seek to impose full Islamic law or an Islamic state.

The PK party platform condemns the "materialistic hurricane that has given birth to hedonism," and the party seems to have reservations about capitalism. "Capitalism," it says, "in a certain sense is good. But without morals or ethics, it will be dangerous." The PK plans to set up a series of "justice posts" throughout Indonesia that will dispense legal advice, health care, and educational programs. The party counts especially on young women for support. Under Soeharto, women were marginalized in politics. The PK offers special leadership training courses for women members. It has spread to all provinces except in some eastern Indonesia where there are large numbers of Christians.

Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan (Justice and Unity Party, PKP) After Edi Sudradjat lost the Golkar election in July 1998, he and a number of like-minded Golkar members, including former vice president Try Sutrisno, left the party to form PKP. General Sudradjat is chairman of the party, and former minister of youth and sports Hayono Isman is secretary-general. Try Sutrisno does not have a formal party position, but he would presumably be the party's presidential nominee. The PKP includes some high-powered politicians and retired military officers from Golkar's past. It symbolizes the trend of disaffected Golkar members abandoning the party and starting new ones or joining others. A strength of the PKP is support by the influential Union of Retired Military Personnel (Pepabri), which Try Sutrisno chairs. Seventeen of Indonesia's 27 governors are Pepabri members. To the extent that they support PKP, this will strengthen the party and weaken Golkar.

On March 1, 1999, Hayono publicly announced the formation of a coalition linking PKP with Megawati's PDI-P and Gus Dur's PKB. A former cabinet minister and Golkar official himself, Hayono said the objective of the alliance was to present a unified front against Golkar, prevent cancellation or delay in the elections, and prevent clashes among the three parties' supporters. The secretary-general of the PDI-P attended Hayono's function, but representatives of the PKB did not. The next day PKB Chairman Mathori Abdul Djalili denied that his party had entered the coalition. He noted that PKB would cooperate with the other two parties to monitor the elections and prevent fraud, but that a formal coalition might imply that the PKB endorses Megawati as president, a move he said conservative Muslims would oppose.

The PKP could attract significant support among retired military and civil servants as well as establishment figures disillusioned with Golkar. With strength in managerial expertise and government service, it could be an attractive coalition partner for parties lacking these attributes.

Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (National Awakening Party, PKB) According to the March 25 Wall Street Journal, Gus Dur (Abdurrahman Wahid) says that he is eager to become Indonesia's fourth president. The vehicle for this moderate, 59-year-old leader, one of Indonesia's strongest voices for interreligious tolerance, is the PKB. "If my party gains power," he says "we will calm Indonesia."

Although he is the leader of the nation's largest Muslim social organization, the 30-million-member, rural-based NU, an organization that is particularly strong in East Java, he bases his election campaign on the call for a government free of religious leanings. He also differs with many other Muslim leaders in seeing the Chinese minority as an essential element in the Indonesian economy. He rejects allegations from Malaysian prime minister Mahathir Mohammad and others that the Asian financial crisis was some sort of Zionist conspiracy and is willing to talk and get along with anyone. Some Indonesians, in fact, find him too moderate, and since the fall of Soeharto there have been renewed calls for Islam to play a greater role in Indonesia's law and government. Gus Dur disagrees. He argues that once Islam is institutionalized, the minorities will be marginalized and the threat of national disintegration will increase.

Gus Dur has recently met several times with Soeharto, despite opposition to such meetings, to focus on what he calls the threat of civil war. In his view Soeharto is a large part of the present problem but is also part of the solution. He recently mentioned that these controversial meetings have been discontinued because Soeharto "is not following my advice." Some NU members, including close family members, disagree with some of Gus Dur's positions and charge that he acts "recklessly" and "confuses his followers." But Gus Dur has Gandhi-like appeal and remains immensely popular.

Gus Dur's prospects are limited by poor health. He is nearly blind and has suffered two strokes within the past two years. He has said that he is willing to stand down as a candidate for president in favor of another person, such as the Sultan of Yogyakarta, if his health makes this necessary. It is also not impossible that he might turn to General Wiranto, with whom he is cooperating to stop the violence in various parts of Indonesia. A previous supporter of Megawati for president, he now says that having a woman as president would be divisive among conservative Muslims and that she should be content to be vice president or head of the parliament. He has also ruled out an alliance with Amien Rais on the basis that Rais changes his stands too frequently.

The PKB, as the largest political vehicle for the massive NU, is likely to win big on Java. Gus Dur is likely to play an important role in the outcome of the elections, as a potential candidate for president himself if his health permits or as a strong behind-the-scenes influence if it does not.

Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (United Development Party, PPP) One of the two officially sanctioned opposition parties during the Soeharto era, the PPP is a union of four diverse Islamic parties patched together in 1973. The party made a strong showing in the 1997 parliamentary elections, partly by picking up votes lost by the PDI after Megawati was forced out as chairman. PPP is now a key reformist group in the parliament, and this has earned it additional popularity. This plus name recognition and a substantial operational structure are likely to make it a significant player in the 1999 elections, although it will probably run behind the PKB and PAN.

Hamzah Haz, twice head of the PPP faction in the parliament, was elected party chairman at the November 30, 1998, congress. Haz is more moderate on Islamic issues than some other Muslim leaders, but under his leadership the PPP can nonetheless be expected to be strongly pro-Islam. In an interview in January 1999, Haz said, "We can work with anyone. We are not fanatics." He went on, however, to note that government policies should "be in line with Islamic principles" and said this would include economics, education, laws, and social programs. As an example, he cited Government Regulation No. 10, which bans civil servants from having more than one wife. "This," he said, "is against Islamic law. This has to be changed." In the economic field, he said the government needs to give more benefits to the people. Asked about foreign investors, he said "they have no need to be afraid. We favor economic democracy, which is the same as the people's economy." Foreign investors should ponder this carefully.

Haz, now Habibie's minister for investment and himself a member of the NU, hopes to reinvent his party, distance it from its previous subservience to the government, and align with political reformers in the parliament on issues such as military reserved seats in that body. As an NU member he hopes to break into Gus Dur's support within that organization and also to compete with the PBB and PAN for the outer island Muslim vote. The PPP will be one of the larger parties in the new parliament. Some observers speculate that it might ally with Golkar to form a government if Golkar itself does better than expected.

Managing the Elections

The 1999 election law provides that the KPU will be responsible for carrying out the June 7 elections. Among its tasks are to appoint members of the Indonesian Election Commission (PPI), the next lower level of the election bureaucracy; establish procedures to be used in the polling; coordinate election monitors; allocate the number of seats assigned to each province; count votes and announce final results; and determine which "social functional groups" are eligible to nominate people to fill the 65 appointed seats in the MPR.

Given the broad powers of the KPU and the voting system within the commission, the membership is of critical importance. The election law provides that the commission will be composed of one representative from each party contesting the elections and five members appointed by the government. The two groups--party representatives and government members--have equal voting rights; that is, the 48 party members will have 50 percent of the vote, and the five government appointees will have an equal percentage.

In mid-February a list purporting to be the home ministry's nominees for the five government slots was leaked to the press. Three of the five were highly controversial; two were senior home ministry officials, and the third was an active-duty general. Great agitation ensued, and the ministry missed three deadlines for announcing the nominees. It is reported that the delay was caused by the military's insistence that one of its members be included. Finally, on March 10, Minister of Home Affairs Syarwan Hamid announced the government's selections. All were credible and uncontroversial, and it appears that Habibie and the home minister knuckled under to popular pressure. Two of the government's candidates are ardent reformers--lawyer and human rights activist Adnan Buyung Nasution and Andi Mallarangeng, who was a member of the Team of Seven. In exchange for appointing reformers to the KPU, the government apparently insisted that retired general Rudini be the commission chairman. According to the election law, the chairman is to be elected democratically by the members, but Buyung Nasution, who received the highest number of votes, yielded to political reality and stepped aside in favor of runner-up Rudini.

In actual fact, Rudini is not a bad choice. A former army chief-of-staff and home minister, he is trusted by the military and the government, and he is also accepted by the opposition. Known for his integrity, Rudini opposed Soeharto's rule in his latter years. His performance as chairman so far supports the view that he will be impartial. Rudini is a member of the Mutual Self-Help and Familial Deliberation Party (Partai Musyawarah Kekeluargaan Gotong Royong, MKGR), a Golkar splinter group. The two KPU vice chairmen are Buyung Nasution and Harun Alrasyid, professor of constitutional law at the University of Indonesia and an advocate of sweeping constitutional reform. So far the KPU has ranked the political parties on the ballot by random draw, drafted a code of conduct for the elections to minimize violence, and appointed good members to the next-lower tier that will operate at the local level.

While the KPU is off to a very good start, there are several potential problems. Given the critical position of the KPU, these are worth noting:

• The KPU, which replaced the old General Election Institute (LPU), has new leadership at the top but relies on LPU personnel at the lower levels. It remains to be seen whether they are unbiased and effective.
• The KPU machinery at the national level is replicated through several layers of bureaucracy down to the local level. This is a complicated, perhaps unmanageable, system.
• The KPU does not have full control over the appeals process but must "coordinate" with the judicial system. The judicial committees with which the KPU must work are composed of government employees, who may be biased.
• From the national to the village level, each KPU is assigned a secretariat. The election law gives the KPU the authority to "manage" the elections but empowers the secretariat with "implementation." The secretariat itself has split lines of authority. It reports to the KPU on "operational matters" but to the Ministry of Home Affairs on "administrative matters." The two terms are not defined.
• The election law also provides that overseer committees (panitia pengawas) be established at national and local levels by the Supreme Court, provincial, and district courts to "oversee all phases of the conduct of the elections," settle disputes that arise in the conduct of the elections," and "follow up findings and disputes that cannot be resolved by reporting to proper authorities." Details of the arrangements between these committees and the KPU will be "further regulated by the Supreme Court in consultation with the KPU."

These ambiguities and what seem like overlapping responsibilities highlight the importance of good leadership and solid government appointees on the KPU and an enlightened minister of home affairs. So far Syarwan Hamid has done well by appointing good people to the Team of Eleven, which screened the parties for eligibility, and after a glitch somewhere in the government, picking good government representatives on the KPU. He also reportedly supported reform efforts by favoring civil service neutrality in the elections.

All that can be said at present is this is a complex system that has been created to oversee the elections, most of the people are inexperienced in this field, and the legislation seems to provide built-in bureaucratic conflicts. Already a major problem has arisen over the role, if any, of cabinet ministers in the campaign. On March 23 the KPU issued an internal ruling allowing its own members to campaign for their parties and also be included as candidates. The KPU leaders argued that they could not get good party members to serve on the commission if thereby they forfeited the right to serve their parties. Two days later, influenced by the fact that most present cabinet members support one party--Golkar--the KPU voted to ban government officials, including cabinet members, from participating in the campaign. Chairman Rudini and 8 other members of the 53-member commission were not present for the vote. This action put the KPU at loggerheads with President Habibie, who had said he would allow all but five ministers to campaign if they did not use government facilities. The five excluded were the Attorney General Andi Ghalib, Coordinating Minister for Development Supervision and Administrative Reform Hartarto, General Wiranto, Minister of Justice Muladi, and Syarwan Hamid.

On March 29 the Supreme Court issued a legal opinion to the effect that the KPU had no right to rule on actions and roles of the cabinet ministers and that the KPU, while independent, in the final analysis answers to the president. Marzuki Darusman, deputy chairman of the Central Managing Board of Golkar, said publicly that if Habibie changed his decision and went along with the KPU "we must review Golkar's political position toward the Habibie cabinet." Although it has been criticized for having a double standard--treating cabinet members differently from its own members--the KPU has stood its ground and insisted that its action was clearly within its terms of reference. All parties except Golkar support the KPU.

This confrontation has put President Habibie in a very difficult position. If he rules that ministers cannot campaign, Golkar may not nominate him as their presidential candidate. If he decides otherwise, the opposition parties will be angry. Finding a way out of this will test Habibie's political and diplomatic skills.

Strengths and Weaknesses of the New System

The system created by the January 1999 election laws, as supplemented by actions of the KPU, represent a vast improvement over the old system. Although important details remain to be worked out by the KPU and other bodies, the new arrangements are basically in place and seem to provide a valid basis for the elections. Most importantly, the system has been accepted by the major parties and players as the basis for the elections. The proof will come when we see their reaction to the results.

The following are some of the strengths and possible weaknesses of the new system:

Positive Aspects

• The elections, like others recently, are based on universal suffrage for all Indonesians over the age of 17 (married people under 17 may also vote).
• For the first time, members of the civil service and armed forces have been banned from playing an active role in the campaign. In previous elections it was widely known that government employees and their families were expected to, and did, vote for and in many cases worked on behalf of Golkar. The new arrangement is that civil servants who wish to campaign must first obtain the permission of their supervisors. If permission is granted, they must resign from the bureaucracy with one year's basic salary as compensation. Under certain circumstances, this can be extended to five years. Armed forces personnel joining political parties are also expected to resign from active duty.
• For the first time campaign contributions are limited. The ceiling is set at 15 million rupiah (about $1,600 at the present exchange rate) for individuals and 150 million rupiah for business firms. In addition, previous sources of automatic funding for Golkar are curtailed. Civil servants are no longer automatically members of and thus liable to pay monthly dues to Golkar, and state firms and private enterprises winning government contracts are barred from making contributions to any party. If they are enforced, these regulations are an important step in creating a more level playing field for all parties.
• The president and vice president are limited to a maximum of two five-year terms.
• Elections in 1999 will for the first time be held on a holiday to avoid workplace pressure and the possibility, as has happened in the past, that supervisors will know how their employees voted and take punitive action against them.
• The KPU, which was appointed on March 10, has broad authority to set the rules for, organize, and oversee the elections. Despite the problems mentioned earlier in this report, it is off to a good start. However, the outcome of the current hassle over the role of ministers in the campaign will signal whether there are political limits on the KPU's authority.

Problem Areas

• The armed forces, whose members are not entitled to vote, have 38 appointed seats (down from 75) in the parliament and 10 percent of the seats in provincial and district legislatures (down from 20 percent). The 38 seats in the national parliament will carry over to the MPR. These seats represent the equivalent of nine to ten million votes and constitute a possible swing vote of 7.6 percent in the parliament. At present the armed forces also have about half the nation's governors and some 40 percent of the district heads. By retaining seats in the provincial and local legislatures, they will be able to continue to influence the appointments of these local officials. This continued "dual function" of the armed forces is one of the main obstacles to the introduction of true democracy in Indonesia. There are plans to end military representation in civilian bodies, but no timetable has been set.
• The new laws provide for the appointment of 200 members of the 700-member MPR that elects the president and vice president. Combined with the 38 appointed military members, this means that 34 percent of the MPR membership is not elected directly by the people. Under these conditions, the outcome of the presidential election could be considerably different from that of the parliamentary election.
• The provision that parties must have representation in nine provinces means that regional or local parties have virtually no chance. The laws thus favor Java-based national parties. On the other hand, this provision may reduce the chances that separatist or disruptive communal parties might gain strength in local areas.
• The parliamentary elections are scheduled for early June. Under the present timetable, the president will not be selected by the MPR for another five or six months. This is a long time to have a lame duck administration. Major moves to tackle the economic crisis or to attract foreign investment are not likely until a new government is in place.
• Indonesia's election laws may also be deficient in how they deal with the appeals process. Fair and prompt handling of complaints will be critical to the credibility of the elections, but the law fails to give the KPU control over the appeal system. "Coordinating" with the judiciary may cause problems, given the well-known inefficiencies in that side of the government.
• The administrative challenges of managing these elections are formidable with an electorate of 125 million and more than 300,000 polling places spread throughout a vast archipelago. All that can be said at this time is this election not only requires the best efforts of Indonesia but also that of its foreign friends. The United States is supporting the election process and will also be involved in monitoring the polling. Our continued engagement and financial assistance are urgently needed.
• A final problem centers on voting for the president. The constitution provides that the MPR will choose the president based on suara terbanyak, which is translated as "the most votes." It is not clear whether this means that a candidate can win with a mere plurality or whether a clear majority is required. The latter would be preferable in order to give the new president a strong mandate. Of course with the fragmented party system, a majority might be difficult to achieve, and there could be a deadlock. There are no precedents in Indonesia's history on how to handle such matters.

The Indonesian armed forces (ABRI) are the most important power group in Indonesia and will continue to have significant influence on all aspects of Indonesian society. The military's 38 seats in the parliament could give ABRI an important role in legislation as well as in the MPR presidential elections, and its "dual function," in which military officers serve in civilian capacities at all levels of government, has until now given the military an important role in civil administration.

As far as the elections are concerned, ABRI has announced that it will maintain a neutral position, will not support any party, and will accept the wishes of the people as reflected by the outcome. The military became highly politicized during Soeharto's later years, but presidential intervention in personnel assignments and other military matters is now much reduced, and the present ABRI leadership seems more willing than its predecessors to support gradual moves toward a democratic system under civilian leadership. The present military commander, General Wiranto, played an important role in the transfer of power in May 1998 by insisting that change must take place in full compliance with the constitution, and he publicly pledged his support to the new president immediately after he took the oath of office.

In a December 1998 interview with the Van Zorge Report Lieutenant General Bambang Yudhoyono, chief-of-staff for territorial affairs and a comer within the military, said, "We are trying to develop a new definition of ABRI's role in security and defense and in nation-building." He went on to stress that the military will "protect the individual's right to practice his or her worship" and will reject any "sectarian domination or hegemony." He noted also that in the future military officers assigned to what are essentially civilian positions must resign from active duty and said that at some point ABRI will have no reserved seats in the parliament.

Under Wiranto the military's main priorities are to maintain order, a difficult task at present, and preserve national unity. This includes adherence to secularism and the defense of minority rights. It is interesting to note that in recent personnel shifts Christian officers are again being promoted to top-level positions in contrast to the situation during the later years of the Soeharto presidency.

The military has in the past had a historical tie to Golkar. That is likely to weaken in the 1999 campaign. Presumably in line with new ABRI policies, there will be no active support for the party by active-duty personnel, and a number of retired officers have already joined forces with Megawati or the new Golkar breakaway, PKP, in which several former military commanders are active.

Wiranto himself is regarded as a possible dark horse presidential or vice presidential candidate, particularly if the parties should deadlock. There are unconfirmed reports that he has already been approached by the leader of one of the major parties. Wiranto has given no indication that he is available or shown any open interest in politics, but close associates say he is ambitious, and he has shown considerable political skill during the 1998 transfer of presidential power and in consolidating his own position within ABRI. He has promoted good officers to top-level positions and has come down strongly against sectarianism or extremism within the military. For reasons that are not clear at this time, however, he has not made significant progress in investigating the killing of civilians and anti-Chinese riots in 1998. He is handicapped by the generally low esteem in which the military is now held, but he should not be ruled out as a contender for one of the top two jobs, especially if a turbulent election campaign increases the public desire for stability.

One other point should be made. If law and order should totally break down to the extent that the unity of the nation was seriously threatened, then the military could be expected, perhaps in cooperation with one or more civilian groups, to assume control over the government. Even then there would probably be an effort to maintain at least a facade of acting in accordance with the constitution.

Conclusions

The Indonesian economy remains in dire condition. Investment is at a standstill, privatization is stymied by politics, most of corporate Indonesia is paralyzed, the huge corporate debt has not been rescheduled, and bank restructuring is off to a very slow start. Further capital flight and a decline in the value of the rupiah are likely if civil disorder continues and perhaps intensifies during the election campaign. Most experts expect negative growth of the economy in 1999 of 1-3 percent following on the heels of a 1998 decline of nearly 14 percent. Inflation, which reached 77 percent last year, is expected to range between 10-20 percent in 1999. In other words, even under the best of circumstances Indonesia is in for several more difficult years before significant economic growth resumes. When and how rapidly the economy turns around will depend on Indonesia's ability to get its political house in order. In this connection the June parliamentary and the fall presidential elections are of critical importance. Political stability, legitimacy, and credibility are essential prerequisites for major progress on the economy, the return of flight capital, and resumption of investment.

The election laws and more recent actions by the KPU have created a credible system for polling that is accepted by the key players, and the Habibie government seems committed to free and open elections. It seems almost certain that the elections will proceed on schedule, unless there should be a massive breakdown in law and order. Any postponement or delay in the polling would be likely to bring the students back into the streets and spark major demonstrations.

While some observers estimate that 18 of the 48 parties that will participate in the elections are allied to some degree with Islam and would increase Islamic influence in society and government, it is encouraging that four of the five major parties--those that are likely to dominate the next government--are pluralist and secular. ABRI's constructive attitude toward religious and ethnic minorities is also a good sign. There has been an increased awareness of and interest in Islam in Indonesia in recent years, and that is likely to continue. At present, however, the odds are strong that Indonesia will come out of these elections with a pluralist government and a continued commitment to preserve ethnic and religious diversity.

Interest in the elections is high. A nationwide public opinion survey sponsored by the Asia Foundation and conducted from late December to late January showed that 96 percent of those eligible to vote intended to do so. Asked about their major concerns, 70 percent of those polled cited the economic crisis, which