Logging
in Cambodia: Politics and Plunder
Kirk Talbott
Introduction
Cambodia's forests are a critical national asset for the country's
political, social, and economic development. They provide
tens of millions of dollars worth of annual revenue from logging,
a wealth of biodiversity, and a range of ecological services.
Cambodia's "Great Lake," the Tonle Sap, and the
Mekong River, which are both central to the Cambodian economy
and to the welfare of millions of Cambodians, are dependent
upon surrounding forest cover.
In spite of the best efforts of many well-intentioned government
officials, international and national nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs), and thousands of citizens from local communities,
Cambodia's forests today are under threat as never before.
And, in many respects, the political and economic future of
the country is held in the fragile balance between natural
resource management and destructive plunder.
While accurate information about the current state of forests
in Cambodia is exceedingly difficult to obtain, most estimates
of forest cover in the country range from 30 to 40 percent,
approximately one-half of what existed 40 years ago. Although
some of Cambodia's forests are cleared by farmers obtaining
household fuel and practicing shifting agriculture, deforestation
is predominantly caused by commercial logging, much of it
either illegal or uncontrolled. Cambodia already has one of
the world's highest rates of deforestation and this is likely
to accelerate, with 24 logging concessions covering almost
7 million hectares, approximately 40 percent country's area.
The list of ecological and socioeconomic problems associated
with excessive logging and deforestation in Cambodia is long.
Landslides are increasingly common along many sections of
riverbanks, often causing the loss of dwellings and occasionally
life. As rivers and lakes in the Mekong basin become shallower
from siltation, heavy rains cause flooding in areas not ordinarily
inundated. Conversely the shallowness of these same rivers
and lakes causes them to dry up more quickly since water recedes
more rapidly without the forest to act as an absorbent. There
have been increasing reports of previously unknown storms
in interior areas of the country where forests no longer act
as natural barriers against strong winds.
Recent forest cutting around the Tonle Sap and the Mekong
River has led to a disturbing reduction of fisheries. During
the rainy season the inundated forest normally provides a
system of root structures that shelter the myriad of fish
species as well as abundant food. Absent these trees fish
populations in both lakes and rivers are decreasing. This
trend has serious consequences for the future of Cambodia
because fish is the main source of protein for its citizens.
Deforestation is also causing serious water shortages in many
parts of the country. These shortages are a threat to the
welfare of Cambodia's rice farmers in particular and to the
productivity of the agricultural sector in general.
The money that has been made from legal and illegal logging
and the political influence that it represents is staggering.
The official figure for revenue from timber sales between
January 1996 and April 1997 was less than $15 million. However,
the estimated value for logs and sawed timber exported or
illegally sold within Cambodia is well over $100 million for
the same period.1 When the value of cut wood
waiting in stockpiles along many rural Cambodian roads is
included, the figure rises by nearly $30 million.
The plunder of Cambodia's forest is viewed by many as close
to spiraling out of control. The resulting damage to the country's
natural resource base is huge, as is the loss of revenue to
its government. And less tangible, but also important, is
the concomitant loss of the government's credibility as the
protector of the common good. As a result how Cambodia deals
with logging is vital to the country's economic and political
future. This chapter will look at the ecological and economic
importance of Cambodia's forests, outline the political dimensions
of logging since 1989, and provide scenarios for sustaining
this critical national resource.
Cambodia's Forests: A Critical National Asset
Cambodia has been blessed with an immense and rich forest
cover. As recently as the early 1970s primary tropical forests
covered much of the entire country. According to the World
Bank, until the mid-20th century, forests totaled over 13
million hectares, or approximately 75 percent of the country's
entire land area.2 A report prepared by the
UN Development Program (UNDP) and the World Wildlife Fund
for the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro indicates that
73 percent of the country was forested as recently as 1965.3
These figures suggest that Cambodia was one of the best-endowed
countries in the world in terms of forest cover and the myriad
of benefits this represented.
Cambodia's tropical forests have provided a wide range of
important and beneficial ecological functions. They protect
rich tropical soils, stabilize watersheds, and regulate water
flows and local weather systems. They help prevent both flooding
and drought--scourges of many tropical countries. The 1992
Earth Summit report for Cambodia described the country's "exceptional
qualifications to develop as a ‘green lung' of Southeast Asia."
Cambodia is particularly dependent on its forest systems given
its hydrological makeup. The Tonle Sap, in the middle of the
country, and the lower Mekong River represent a unique water
system that plays a critical role in the country's and the
region's economy and ecology. The lake is the largest freshwater
body in all of Southeast Asia, with a surface area of 2,700
square kilometers in the dry season. For three months a year,
starting in June, the increase in the volume of water in the
Mekong River causes a reversal of the flow of the Tonle Sap
River. During this time the lake acts as balancing reservoir
for the flooding Mekong. This wet-season phenomenon is a fundamental
cause of the immense flooded forest system around the Tonle
Sap. It is an important contributing factor to the unique
biodiversity of the ecosystem. The merging of freshwater and
organic matter creates a richly productive biological milieu.
By virtue of this complex and unique system, the Tonle Sap
provides a rich aquatic resource for fish production and rice
farming, and, together with the Mekong, offers crucial hydrological
functions to surrounding forest and agricultural areas. The
system also harbors a great diversity and quantity of flora
and fauna. Of great importance are the fish populations harbored
in the Tonle Sap. Fish represents approximately 60 percent
of the protein source for the people of Cambodia.
The forests surrounding the Tonle Sap, in turn, are essential
to the effective functioning of the ecosystem. They protect
the lake from siltation and eutrophication and play a predominant
role in regulating the hydrology and water tables in the heart
of Cambodia. Without the forests ringing the Tonle Sap, the
fish population, the water level, and many other important
natural features of the lake would be undermined to the detriment
of the entire country.
Forests in Cambodia have perennially offered millions of Khmer
villagers a vast array of local economic benefits. This is
no small matter in a country ravaged by war, undermined by
grinding poverty, and, until recently, long isolated from
international assistance. In many provinces of the country,
particularly in the heavily forested provinces of Ratanikiri,
Mondonikir, Siem Reap, Preah Vihear, and Battambang, the forests
provide many essential livelihood benefits, including materials
for home construction, medicines, market goods, and a range
of agricultural products and services.
Moreover many of the forests' benefits are difficult to quantify
in tangible, economic terms. They are of profound historical
and cultural importance to the Khmer people. Cambodian Buddhism
places great value on the forest as part of the natural order
of existence. Among Cambodia's many tribal peoples, especially
in the northeast, local forests are central to world view
and livelihood. They are seen as a source of both spiritual
and material sustenance and are widely recognized as critical
to protecting the soils, wildlife, and building materials
of traditional societies.
At the same time forests are viewed as one of this impoverished
country's most valuable economic assets, as well as an important
source of revenue for the government. In purely economic terms
the potential value of timber that can be utilized on a sustainable
basis has been estimated by the World Bank and other groups
to be at least $100 million a year. Given current patterns
of rampant and illegal logging and the concomitant demise
of forest resources, however, how much longer forests remain
a Cambodian treasure is in doubt.
The Political Economy of Plunder: 1989-97
The fate of Cambodia's forests has been determined largely
by the political situation within the country, as timber plays
a critical role in determining the fortunes of the country's
competing political and military leaders. Cambodia's timber
stocks have been and continue to be exploited to finance the
political and military rivalries that continue to plague the
country.
Not surprisingly the political economy of logging in a poor,
vulnerable, and conflict-torn country like Cambodia is largely
shaped by the interests of domestic and foreign timber barons,
influential politicians and government officials, and powerful
military commanders. Time and again logging--or the ability
to grant or withhold the opportunity to engage in logging--has
been used to build personal fortunes, finance political activities,
buy the loyalty of officials, and finance personal armies
and the Khmer Rouge. Shadow economies based on illegal logging
(as well as mining and narcotics trafficking) have proliferated
across the country.
The Domestic Dimension
Reliable data is scarce, but many experts on forestry in Cambodia
feel that the advent of the Lon Nol regime in 1970 triggered
the country's first significant increase in deforestation.
The political and economic corruption during this period (1970-75)
set a precedent for resource extraction patterns without consideration
of sustainability. Even less is known about logging during
and immediately following the Khmer Rouge era (1975-79), but
it may be that the rate of deforestation slowed owing to the
combination of internal upheaval and international isolation.
It is clear that the pace of forest exploitation began to
accelerate greatly in the late 1980s. The Hun Sen government,
the Khmer Rouge and Thai military officers, and businessmen
all engaged in the unsustainable cutting and export of Cambodian
timber. In the rush to cash in on these forests, ideology
and nationality were put aside and a complex set of rules
of trade and finance developed around the cutting and sale
of valuable species of tropical hardwood.
By 1992 there were reports of widespread and rampant logging
throughout Cambodia. In June 1992 the Far Eastern Economic
Review cited a UNDP estimate that 1.2 million cubic meters
of logs--four times the amount of the year before--might be
cut that year. According to the Review, "Past ravages
may pale alongside the full-fledged attack on the forests
now planned by the country's four once-warring factions….
[E]ach needs funds to prepare for next May's election of a
national government, and the forests provide an easy answer."4
This situation was further exacerbated by the decision of
the interim Supreme National Council in September 1992 to
impose a moratorium on log exports. The moratorium was set
to begin on January 1, 1993, at which time only processed
wood could be exported from Cambodia. In anticipation of the
moratorium logging intensified. The situation in late 1992
was aptly described by a knowledgeable Thai businessman who
observed, "They are chopping away like mad."5 And in early 1993 the Washington Post
reported a burgeoning trade in logs between the opposing factions.
"We're talking serious commerce," a well-informed
diplomat said about cooperation between the central government
and the Khmer Rouge. "This is not ideology. This is money
in the pocket. They've got cooperative arrangements."6
Given the isolation and dangerous conditions that existed
at that time in much of the countryside, particularly in remote
forest areas, it was nearly impossible to document the players
and arrangements involved in this plunder. Clearly, however,
all three of the major political forces vying for control
of Cambodia--Hun Sen's Cambodia Peoples' Party (CPP), the
royalist FUNCINPEC party, and the Khmer Rouge--were deeply
involved in logging in the areas they controlled. The Khmer
Rouge, who ended up not participating in the 1993 elections,
were estimated to be making between $10 million and $20 million
a month on logging in areas they controlled. Only since the
defection of Ieng Sary and the disintegration of the Khmer
Rouge as a military force have the guerrillas been forced
to relinquish their control over much of the timber and logging
in northwestern Cambodia. It is important to note, however,
that as of late 1997 large areas along the Thai border rich
in timber and gems remained under the effective control of
the remnant factions of the Khmer Rouge.
The International Dimension
There were other groups reaping even larger profits from Cambodia's
vulnerable forests. The web of arrangements among the various
Cambodian factions has entailed the complicity of many individuals
and groups from Thailand, Vietnam, and other Asian countries.
In the period between the signing of the Paris Accords in
October 1991 and the holding of elections in May 1993 the
rampant exploitation of Cambodia's valuable and vulnerable
forests in a trade with neighboring countries began in earnest.
With the end of Cambodia's isolation after almost two decades,
businesses in neighboring and other countries began to take
great interest in its forests and other exploitable resources,
particularly minerals and gems.7
The economic stakes in this timber trade are high indeed.
According to some reports, foreign companies have paid as
little as $40 per cubic meter to the Cambodian government
for valuable tropical species. The World Bank has determined
the minimum fair economic rent for Cambodian timber--that
is, what the RGC should charge concessionaires--to be $75
per cubic meter. This wood can be worth several hundred to
a few thousand dollars per cubic meter on the world market.
At these prices the estimates of standing stocks of timber
ready for harvest and logs awaiting transport from stations
are in the hundreds of millions of dollars.
Thailand, once a famed exporter of teak and other tropical
hardwoods, has played a major role in extracting timber from
its mainland Southeast Asian neighbors since the early 1980s.
Thailand's rapid economic growth caused it to suffer some
of the world's highest deforestation rates during the 1970s
and 1980s. Since the early 1980s Thailand has had to import
increasing amounts of timber to satisfy its rapidly growing
domestic demand for construction materials and furniture production.
In 1989, after flooding and landslides caused by deforestation
led to hundreds of deaths, the Thai government imposed a belated
logging ban. To make up for their deficit in timber supplies,
Thai businesses, with the backing of their government, have
increasingly sourced timber from Cambodia, Laos, and Burma.8
Yunnan Province and the rest of southern China also play an
important role in determining the demand for Cambodia's timber.
China's population and the recent rise in the economic status
of its citizens creates an enormous demand for Southeast Asia's
forests and other natural resources. Cambodia does not border
China as do Burma, Laos, and Vietnam. However, the close relations
between the two countries, the many ethnic Chinese businessmen
who live in Cambodia, and the vulnerability of Cambodia to
its larger neighbors make for a strong Chinese influence on
logging and other economic enterprises.
In the two years following the 1993 elections 11 foreign firms
were given logging concessions totaling approximately 2.4
million hectares. The most prominent of the international
logging companies gaining access to Cambodia's forests were
the giant Samling Corporation of Malaysia and the Indonesian
Panin Group. In August 1994 Samling was granted an 800,000-hectare
concession, approximately 4.5 percent of the entire area of
Cambodia. In summer 1995 the Samling deal was dwarfed by the
Panin Group concession of 1.5 million hectares. At the end
of 1997 just under 7 million hectares had been allocated as
concessions.
International involvement in the logging of Cambodia's forests
has not been limited to the Thais, Chinese, Malaysians, and
Indonesians. There have been repeated reports of Japanese,
Taiwanese, French, Korean, and U.S. companies becoming involved
in logging ventures. Vietnam and Laos share long and porous
borders with Cambodia, and their military forces, in particular,
have been involved in a number of logging deals. Global Witness
estimates that a minimum of 260,000 cubic meters of logs,
worth $130 million were illegally imported to Vietnam in 1997
and early 1998. According to Global Witness, all of those
exports took place with the complicity of senior Cambodian
officials and the Vietnamese military. Reports in 1997 suggest
that Laos is taking effective action to arrest the flow of
illegal logs crossing its far southern border.
Domestic and International Responses
Mok Mareth, the minister of environment, has been a principled
and vocal critic of the country's deforestation "catastrophe,"
predicting the demise of Cambodia's forest resources within
years. The last three and a half years have witnessed a near
frenzy of political pronouncements from the Royal Government
of Cambodia (RGC), logging bans, and sanctions against illegal
logging. At the same time, however, logging deals and deforestation
have proceeded at an equally feverish rate.
Particularly controversial was the government's decision in
June 1994 to give control of timber exports to the Ministry
of National Defense. This grant was part of an ill-conceived
strategy to use timber revenues to finance the Royal Cambodian
Army's campaign against the Khmer Rouge. An official of the
newly formed Environmental Secretariat (which was to become
the Ministry of Environment) warned that "this move is
dangerous for democracy and the government's stability."9
Some elements within the newly constituted government took
a stand against the continued plundering of Cambodia's forests.
In October 1994 the Ministry of Finance sent a confidential
memorandum to King Sihanouk in response to "new procedures"
authorized by the two co-prime ministers to grant exceptions
to the logging ban of 1993. The memorandum states:
These new procedures gave exclusive authority to the two prime
ministers to approve any export license at the request of
the Ministry of National Defense. The subsequent decisions
of the prime ministers have shown a high degree of irresponsibility
and inconsistency leading to considerable confusion and bringing
about a huge loss of revenue to the state and very serious
damage to the environment.
The minister of finance, Sam Rainsy, eventually resigned from
his position in the government, in part in protest over the
illegal logging and the siphoning of tens of millions of dollars
in logging revenues from state coffers.
The government's unwillingness or inability to control logging
became an issue for the international donor community for
financial as well as ecological reasons. After the 1993 elections
the international community made sizable commitments of financial
and technical assistance to Cambodia. Nearly half the 1994
government budget, or about $170 million, was funded with
foreign assistance. When the donor community became aware
of the magnitude of logging revenues being diverted from the
national government--and the pervasiveness of the corruption
that made this possible--it began to express concern. The
International Monetary Fund (IMF) was the first international
organization to respond to the diversion of logging revenues
from the Ministry of Finance to the Ministry of National Defense.
In November 1995 the IMF postponed making a $20 million loan
to Cambodia, citing inadequate forest management and protection
and the government's failure to channel official logging fees
to the central budget.
Reports by the British environmental NGO, Global Witness,
and stories in the Phnom Penh Post and the Far Eastern Economic
Review underscored the scope and seriousness of Cambodia's
corrupt logging practices. Global Witness, which has played
a leading role in mobilizing the international community to
take action, joined with other groups to successfully persuade
the U.S. Congress to toughen the U.S. stance on the Khmer
Rouge and force Thailand to tighten its border controls. In
February 1996 Global Witness exposed "documents signed
by Cambodia's co-prime ministers permitting 18 Thai companies
to export 1.1 million cubic meters of felled timber, mostly
from Khmer Rouge territory."10 This
was an extraordinary event, since the potential revenue of
this deal represented approximately $380 million, more than
50 percent of the entire Cambodian national budget.
This exposé led to a freezing in May 1996 of the $20
million IMF loan that had been postponed in November 1995.
A June 1997 Global Witness report described the situation
in Cambodia as
at a crisis point with illegal logging escalating at an alarming
rate. Legal concessionaires are illegally cutting both inside
and outside of the country; timber is flowing into Vietnam
and is being exported by sea; and vast revenues are being
diverted into a parallel budget. Most of these activities
are carried out with the active support of the co-prime ministers.11
At the July 1996 meeting of the international donors engaged
in Cambodia, a number of the 21 delegations pressed the Cambodian
government to address the logging crisis. Some called for
a ban on log exports and a review of logging concessions.
The World Bank initiated a series of detailed studies of forest
management in Cambodia. The Cambodian government promised
action. But absent a change in the political environment or
a genuine commitment to curb corruption, there was little
cause for optimism.
On December 31, 1996, in response to growing international
pressure, the co-prime ministers promulgated a decree banning
the export of all logs. However, this was and remains a decree--not
an act of legislation--and there is little evidence that it
has slowed the flood of illegal exports. The decree was followed
by RGC Decision No. 17 in April 1997, which continued the
ban on the export of round logs but legalized the export of
rough cut logs if they were from legal concessions in licensed
cutting areas and exported through exit points designated
by the RGC. According to Global Witness, the co-prime ministers
continue to authorize "virtually every concession and
illegal timber export" and the Royal Cambodian Armed
Forces conduct logging operations anywhere they choose, "including
legal concessions, national parks, and forests devoted to
community use." Moreover, the Department of Forestry
is denied access to many concession areas, making forest management
impossible.12
The Current Logging Drama: Challenges and Opportunities
With the elections scheduled for July 1998 looming large on
the political horizon, Cambodia's forests continue to play
a pivotal role in financing political and military outcomes.
Not much has apparently changed in terms of ongoing and, in
many areas, unchecked logging throughout substantial areas
of Cambodia. If anything, given the halving of Cambodia's
forest stocks in recent years, those areas of valuable timber
still standing are more valuable than ever, and the pressure
to cut and sell mounts. A Cambodian official recently noted
that the demand for timber in Kompong Cham was so great that
illegal loggers had begun to cut down trees in the rubber
plantations.13 At the same time, although the logging
problems in Cambodia may appear overwhelming, especially in
terms of recent trends, there are abundant resources and a
growing reservoir of experience, interest, and good will to
draw on to turn the current situation around.
Positive Developments
There continues to be an opportunity for identifying and perhaps
addressing the root causes of rampant and destructive logging
in Cambodia. To begin with information is power. In Cambodia
the power of the press--particularly the foreign press--remains
considerable though tenuous. The Phnom Penh Post and the Far
Eastern Economic Review have provided in-depth coverage of
the political and economic dealings related to logging Cambodia's
forests. Their stories have exposed logging deals, scandals,
and environmental degradation in Cambodia. They have been
joined by other foreign media, particularly Thai English-language
newspapers, such as the Bangkok Post and The Nation. Thailand's
own recent experience with environmental degradation and consequent
flooding and localized drought has made deforestation a hot
topic.
Another positive development is that the logging situation
in Cambodia has taken on an overtly political veneer since
Sam Rainsy quit his post in 1994. He has formed his own political
party, the Khmer Nation Party (KNP) and made the issue of
the country's deforestation an important plank of his party
and his campaign. Whether the 1998 elections will include
the issue of logging will depend, in large part, on the success
of Sam Rainsy's campaign and if his commitment to sustain
Cambodia's forests is adopted by other political leaders.
Sam Rainsy was nearly assassinated on March 30, 1997, during
a peaceful demonstration on the steps of the National Assembly
in Phnom Penh, by a grenade attack that killed 20 of his supporters
and injured 150. Evidence collected by the FBI is said to
implicate elements in the CPP and military.
Mok Mareth also has continued to take an active and sometimes
bold stance on trying to arrest illegal logging in Cambodia.
Although his ministry is relatively weak compared to others,
he has been able to effectively draw attention to the problem
and take limited action. For example, the U.S. ambassador
joined him in flying over areas of illegal logging inside
of one of Cambodia's new national parks. The minister appealed
successfully to the highest levels of government to have the
logging operations shut down. With support from USAID and
other bilateral donors, NGOs, such as the WWF, the UNDP, and
other international agencies, the Ministry of Environment
has matured rapidly and is in the process of developing some
significant institutional and technical capacities in forest
monitoring, park planning, and environmental education, among
others.
There is a nascent National Committee on Cambodia's Forestry
Policy that provides an institutional base for interagency
collaboration in forestry, although it remains to be seen
how effective or politically viable the committee will be--particularly
since the July 1997 coup. The Royal Government of Cambodia,
with encouragement from the World Bank, among others, is pursuing
a program with four major assistance assignments: management
of forest concessions, development of forest-policy process,
legal review of forest utilization contracts, and log monitoring
and verification. Each area is key to Cambodia's developing
an operational, effective, and sustainable forest-management
system.
The situation in the provinces remains tenuous, and control
is often out of the hands of the central government. But there
have been important recent steps in the right direction. For
example, the Asian Development Bank, UNESCO, international
environmental NGOs, and some community groups are joining
with the Ministry of Environment to improve natural resource
management and planning for the Tonle Sap.
The experiences of other Southeast Asian countries and regions
of the world have shown that community-based resource-management
systems are successful in protecting forests from uncontrolled
logging and agricultural conversion. Granted tenurial rights
as an incentive to responsibly manage local natural resources
and assets, residents of forested areas often prove to be
the most effective stewards and enforcers of sustainable forest
management. While there are very few, if any, indigenous,
forestry-focused Cambodian NGOs, a small but effective group
of international NGOs has introduced community-based forest
management in Cambodia. The Mennonites, for example, have
worked for several years on building community-based forestry
initiatives with some on-the-ground success in forest regeneration.
A growing number of individuals and communities are taking
a stand to protect their local forest resources. However,
they face a long, uphill battle against powerful businessmen,
government officials, and military officers who are prepared
to use any means to gain and exploit forest concessions and
discourage community-based activism.
Finally there is a trend toward a more aware and aggressive
stance on environmental issues by many of the donor countries
that comprise the International Consultative Group on Cambodia
(CGC). In the 1996 and 1997 meetings of the CGC, representatives
of the donor countries were outspoken in tabling their concerns.
Moreover some groups are campaigning with some effect to use
more leverage in the CGC process to drive reforms in the logging
sector. Global Witness has asserted that "the economic
leverage currently possessed by the international community
is possibly the only factor that can influence the RGC's future
approaches … to the logging crisis."14 They may well be correct given Cambodia's
recent history, current tensions, and the nascent nature of
the government's structure and the rule of law.
A Logging Ban?
A key debate concerning forest management in Cambodia revolves
around the question of whether or not the RGC should impose
a national logging ban. Global Witness advocates the enactment
and enforcement of an immediate logging ban as the first goal
for Cambodia's forest policy. According to this argument the
current situation in Cambodia is altogether unacceptable in
terms of protecting the country's forests for future generations,
and a stopgap measure is required. In a June 1997 report,
Global Witness unreservedly recommended that the RGC immediately
suspend all concession activity and halt all exports of logs
and processed timber until the World Bank-funded technical
assistance projects are put in place and completed.15
The World Bank takes the stand that a logging ban is not the
answer to Cambodia's unsustainable logging travails. Instead
it advocates a policy framework for sustainable-forest management
to be put in place with the requisite enforcement capacities
and mandate. Realistic or not in a country as volatile as
Cambodia today, the approach presented in the bank's 1996
Cambodia Forest Policy Assessment is based on extensive international
experience and careful in-country financial and policy analysis.
The assessment proposes policy initiatives and specific technical
and financial interventions that can ameliorate the current
economic conditions driving excessive logging. It offers several
strategic actions backed by the assurance of financial and
institutional support given government commitment.16
These include:
- legal
advice on existing concession contracts to resolve many
outstanding financial and forest-management problems;
- technical
assistance to improve criteria for evaluation of concession
master plans drafted to ensure compliance on implementation
features of forest concessions; and
- the
preparation of detailed terms of reference for a concession
and log-export control policy to help realize the enormous
fiscal benefits estimated to be available from revising
concession policies and controlling log exports.
While these and other multilateral organizations' prescriptions
are highly technical in nature, they are broad-based and potentially
significant in implication. For example the bank's forest
policy assessment represents a large-scale collaboration among
the government of Cambodia and the World Bank, the UNDP, and
the Food and Agriculture Organization--if nothing else a promising
sign for Cambodia given its recent history of isolation. The
assessment represents not only the beginnings of political
will, albeit on the part of only a few key government leaders,
but also the financial resources to support in full the recommendations
offered in the document. But the World Bank and other international
organizations are constrained by the limitations of the UN
system and the requirements of working with government agents
whose intentions might not be legitimate.
An international forestry expert, Gerry Hawkes, provides a
counterpoint to the World Bank's prescription for the current
challenge of addressing logging in Cambodia:
To put it bluntly, suggestions for improved concession management
and harvesting are virtually pointless given the widespread
corruption, civil unrest, and the vested interests in escalating
illegal timber harvesting. Given an ideal political situation,
there are many management and harvesting techniques which
can be introduced to minimize resource damage and maximize
societal benefits from timber exploitation, but none are truly
sustainable at the levels of exploitation demanded by modern
economies, particularly in countries plagued by the historical
and political dilemmas of a country like Cambodia.17
Many people familiar with the challenge to sustainable-forest
management of overcoming political and commercial constraints
would agree with Hawkes' analysis and recommendations. He
is joined by many others in advocating the transformation
of many forested areas in Cambodia into community-based resource-management
areas. Only after the functioning rudiments of civil society
and commerce are in place can Cambodia responsibly open up
to foreign concession arrangements.
Conclusion: Future Scenarios
Cambodia is at a critical moment. Enough of its original forest
cover is intact that, given appropriate policies and actions
now, its forests could be logged for decades to come while
providing tens of millions of dollars in revenue to the nation's
government and citizens. Crucial ecological functions provided
by biologically diverse forest cover and necessary for sustainable
development can still be maintained. Much progress has been
made in developing the political awareness (if not political
will) and technical and financial assistance (if not capacity)
to manage this precious national resource. International pressure
has had a substantial impact on the situation along the Thai
border, the demise of the Khmer Rouge is promising, and the
World Bank, Global Witness, and other international organizations
continue to work constructively and effectively on these issues.
In 1997, however, the shattering of the fragile political
coalition and the resulting damage to the Cambodian economy
do not bode well for the transparent management of Cambodia's
forest resources. According to a June 1997 World Bank report,
there is
a continued granting of forest concessions, annual harvesting
licenses and authorizations for collection of logs outside
concession areas. These awards are not market-based, transparent,
or based on satisfactory technical, environmental, or other
assessments. This is clearly inconsistent with the RGC's adoption
of the strategy recommended in the Forest Policy Assessment
and should therefore cease.
The next couple of years may well be critical to determining
the fate of Cambodia's forests. While one cannot predict the
future--especially during this particularly uncertain time
in Cambodia--the following three scenarios are directions
the country could take in terms of logging and forest management.
Scenario 1: The Worst Case
This scenario assumes that either Cambodia descends into civil
war or essentially authoritarian elements remain in control
of the government. This would likely result in a serious decline
in foreign investment and economic assistance. In this crisis
environment the value of Cambodia's timber would increase
and the domestic and international constraints on plunder
would be reduced. Rampant logging would accelerate in some
areas. (When the IMF threatened to withdraw its $20 million
loan in 1996 Hun Sen threatened to simply sell off Cambodia's
remaining forests.) A few protected areas and parks would
be showcased to the international community; however, the
country would be effectively cleared of its remaining forest
areas leaving less than 10 percent forested within 10 years.
Severe ecological damage would ensue, including the collapse
of fisheries in the Tonle Sap and much of the Mekong and its
tributary system. Desertification could begin in significant
swaths of the country, and rice and other key agricultural
product levels would plummet. Poverty, inequity, and civil
unrest would be exacerbated. Cambodia would be reduced to
a beggar state despite billions of dollars worth of multilateral
and bilateral foreign assistance.
Scenario 2: The Mixed Case
In this scenario it is assumed that credible elections are
held in Cambodia, a new government is formed (perhaps another
shaky coalition), and there continues to be a degree of political
pluralism and openness. This would result in increased political
stability and renewed foreign investment and aid flows. An
improvement in the economy would reduce the need to engage
in logging. But as long as Cambodia's political leadership
feels compelled to keep their bank accounts and war chests
well stocked--and can do so with impunity--Cambodia's forests
will be vulnerable. The boundaries between legal and illegal
forest extraction would continue to be blurred. Various rogue
factions and the more mainstream political and military forces
would continue to control different logging areas and operations.
There would be some success in slowing the illegal, rampant
logging that has taken place along so much of the Thai border
area, particularly during the last decade. Over the next decade
the remaining forest area would decline to 10 to 20 percent
of the country, from the current 35 to 40 percent. As a result
there still would be severe ecological and socioeconomic implications.
The people hurt most would be the country's predominant population
of villagers and farmers.
Scenario 3: The Best Case
This scenario assumes the emergence of a coalition of political
forces committed to democracy, good governance, and sustainable
natural resource management. Existing logging concessions
would be reviewed and canceled or changed based on sound management
practices and the rule of law. A new set of logging concessions
would be implemented along the legal, financial, and operational
lines suggested in the World Bank's Forest Policy Assessment.
Illegal logging would be largely stamped out by the new government
in concert with local communities. Thousands of communities
across the provinces would act as stewards of their local
forest resources with support from a variety of government
ministries and agencies. Cambodia's bloated armed forces would
be reduced, and many of these soldiers would be retrained
to monitor and protect the country's forest resources.
The Cambodian and international press would provide a steady
stream of accurate information regarding natural resource
use in Cambodia and the regional dimension to resource extraction
and trade. This reporting, coupled with the reports of domestic
and international NGOs, would foster the increased involvement
of the international community. International donors would
coordinate to support legitimate forest management policies
and practices. Foreign assistance would include substantial
equipment, training, and capacity building for forest management.
Significant income would be generated for national government
coffers as well as for local communities.
Many individuals and organizations inside and outside of Cambodia
are trying to move the country in the direction of the third
scenario. The roles played by Cambodia's neighbors and the
international community are key to the future of Cambodia.
It is hard to imagine how Cambodia's forests can be saved
for future generations without the implicit or at least partial
support of Thailand, Vietnam, Laos, and Malaysia as well as
Japan, China, and the United States. The Cambodian diaspora
in America, Europe, Australia, and elsewhere is an important
constituency in this regard.
The many constructive contributions of Cambodia's citizenry,
well-intentioned government officers, and representatives
of the international community promise at least the possibility
of an improved forestry situation. The stronger the political
elite's adherence to the rule of law, the more vital Cambodia's
civil society becomes, and the healthier its economy, the
better the human and institutional environment becomes for
forest management and logging that is neither rapacious nor
destructive.
Notes
1. "Just Deserts for Cambodia: Deforestation
and the Co-Prime Ministers' Legacy to the Country," (London:
Global Witness, June 1997), p. 3.
2. World Bank, 1996 Cambodia Forest Policy
Assessment (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1996), p.3.
3. John V. Dennis and Gregory Woodsworth,
Report to the UN Conference on Environment and Development:
Environmental Priorities and Strategies for Strengthening
Capacity for Sustainable Development in Cambodia (Washington,
DC: World Wildlife Fund, April 1992), p. ii.
4. "Cambodian Assault," Far Eastern
Economic Review, June 4, 1992, p. 64.
5. "Thais Blamed Most for Rape of Forests,"
Bangkok Post, November 15, 1992, p. 1.
6. "Phnom Penh Said to Undercut UN Effort
to Save Forests," Washington Post, February 3, 1993,
p. 11.
7. For several specific examples of foreign
concessionaires, RGC officials, Khmer Rouge cadres, and Thai
military officers involved in a series of timber cutting and
exporting ventures, see "Forests, Famine, and War--The
Key to Cambodia's Future" (London: Global Witness, March
9, 1995).
8. Burma offers one of the most compelling
parallels to Cambodia in terms of the political and economic
underpinnings to logging patterns and rates. Burma holds almost
50 percent of the remaining forest cover in Southeast Asia.
In recent years, however, its forests have been threatened,
primarily by the intensive regional demand for its teak and
other valuable hardwoods. Between 1989 and 1993 over 30 concessions
were granted by the military regime to Thai businesses. By
the time that these concessions were canceled, much of the
county's southeastern forests had been largely degraded. In
the last several years logging has tripled along the Chinese
border, and there are reports of accelerating cutting along
the vast Indian border and the southern border with Bangladesh.
Deforestation rates nationwide have doubled, with most of
the timber being exported illegally. As is reported to be
the case in Cambodia, heroin is often exported on logging
trucks. Burma holds approximately 70 percent of the world's
teak and dominates the heroin export business, providing some
60 percent of the world's supply.
9. Phnom Penh Post, July 29-August 11, 1994,
p. 3.
10. "Activists at Loggerheads with Timber
Traders," Asian Business, April 1996, p. 11.
11. "Just Deserts for Cambodia: Deforestation
and the Co-Prime Ministers' Legacy to the Country" (London:
Global Witness, June 1997), p. 30.
12. "Going Places … Cambodia's Future
on the Move" (London: Global Witness, March 1998), p.
3.
13. "To Control Cambodia, Rivals Are
Stripping It Bare," New York Times, December 22, 1996,
p. 3.
14. RGC Forest Policy and Practice and the
Case for Positive Conditionality (London: Global Witness,
May 1996), p. 4.
15. "Just Deserts for Cambodia: Deforestation
and the Co-Prime Ministers' Legacy to the Country," (London:
Global Witness, June 1997), p. 1.
16. World Bank, 1996 Cambodia Forest Policy
Assessment (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1996), pp. 39-41.
17. Gerry Hawkes, personal correspondence,
January 10, 1997.
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