Cambodia
and the International Community:
The Road Ahead
Kao Kim
Hourn
History
To appreciate the important role played by the international
community in Cambodia today, one must first understand the
country's tortured history. Upon gaining its independence
from France in 1953 Cambodia began the process of nation building
with sizable investments devoted to education, health, and
infrastructural improvements. GDP began to grow and agricultural
production increased during this period, making Cambodia one
of the world's largest rice exporters. In 1967 Cambodia exported
some 500,000 tons of rice, whereas in the immediate aftermath
of the Pol Pot regime (1979) it was forced to import between
200,000-300,000 tons of rice. The international climate of
the early 1970s, particularly the bombings of the country
in Nixon's secret war during 1969-72 as a "sideshow"
to the Vietnam conflict, led to the rapid reversal of these
modest achievements and ultimately helped create one of the
darkest periods in Cambodian history, commencing in 1975 when
the Khmer Rouge came to power.1
The Khmer Rouge dismantled all existing state institutions
and implemented a bizarrely misguided utopian experiment based
on forced labor and total autarky, a brutal system without
money, economic markets, private property, or human rights.
An enormous loss of human capital followed. An extermination
campaign was waged against the professional class, intellectuals,
and skilled individuals, which drained Cambodia of its human
resource capacity. This reign of terror lasted until 1979,
but the misery and suffering as well as the legacy of this
vicious experiment continues.
In the aftermath of the Khmer Rouge's depredations and the
1978 Vietnamese invasion and occupation of Cambodia, the international
community responded with an outpouring of humanitarian aid
amounting to $700 million from 1979 to 1981, one of the largest
international aid efforts of its kind. Most of this aid was
channeled toward emergency refugee relief through multilateral
organizations, such as the United Nations High Commission
for Refugees, the International Red Cross, and other organizations
assisting many refugees in Thailand and on the Thai-Cambodian
border. Virtually no aid was dedicated to rebuilding Cambodia's
shattered physical and human infrastructure.
International opposition to the Vietnamese-supported regime
(initially the People's Republic of Kampuchea and later the
State of Cambodia) resulted in the declaration of an economic
embargo by most Western countries. The political dynamics
of the cold war during this period meant that the plight of
Cambodians was virtually forgotten. The Soviet Union and the
Eastern Bloc states provided some support from 1982 until
1989; financial and technical assistance from socialist countries
amounted to about $100 million per year.2
But the rest of the world remained indifferent to the desperate
needs of Cambodians during this period. As one observer noted,
"even the UN turned a deaf ear."3
After years of indifference the international community, prompted
by the withdrawal of the Vietnamese military from Cambodia
and the vacuum left by the collapse of the Soviet Union in
1989, unleashed a barrage of nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs) and bilateral aid to assist Cambodia in its reconstruction
efforts. Cambodia was once again on the international agenda
occupying a large space on the world stage. Interest in Cambodia
was further stimulated by the Agreements on a Comprehensive
Political Settlement of the Cambodian Conflict (Paris Accords)
of 1991, which ultimately led to UN-supervised elections in
May 1993. A total of $2 billion was allocated for the United
Nations Transition Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), which primarily
supported peacekeeping operations prior to the elections.
Bilateral and multilateral organizations promised an additional
$2.3 billion in assistance for development from 1992 to 1995.4 For a small country like Cambodia, with
a population of just 10 million, this international commitment
can only be described as generous.
If the international commitment was great, so too were the
problems. The challenges facing any new government of a "failed
state" are difficult. These challenges were multiplied
several times over in the Cambodian context of a depleted
human capital, devastated physical infrastructure, underproductive
agricultural sector, and fragmented political system. It was
as if someone had picked up the whole of Cambodian society,
shaken it violently, and then watched the pieces come down.
This is the reality that faced the Royal Government of Cambodia
when it took office in October 1993 after the adoption of
the new constitution.
One of the first priorities was to jump start socioeconomic
recovery and growth in Cambodia by simultaneously stimulating
different economic sectors. The international community played
a critical role in this initiative, providing assistance for
basic infrastructure and training. It also provided breathing
space for the government to enhance its political legitimacy
by delivering basic goods and services to its citizens. The
initial assistance was provided by bilateral and multilateral
donors responding to the government's identified priorities.
Most of the efforts toward the renewal and reconstruction
of Cambodia were coordinated through the International Committee
on the Reconstruction of Cambodia (ICORC). ICORC is made up
of a variety of donor countries and international organizations.
The principal donors are Japan, the United States, France,
Sweden, and Australia. International organizations include
the United Nations, the World Bank, and the International
Monetary Fund (IMF).
The royal government also benefited from external assistance
in the form of balance of payment supports from institutions
such as the IMF through the Enhanced Structural Adjustment
Facility (ESAF) and from the World Bank, plus some bilateral
partners, in order to meet necessary budgetary requirements.
In addition various bilateral and multilateral partners, including
the Asian Development Bank, the UN Development Program, and
a host of NGOs, also provided support for strengthening macroeconomic
management and development. These efforts were significant
to the achievement of relative economic stability in Cambodia
during the 1994-96 period.
Today's Problems
Political stability has continued to be elusive. Cambodia's
precarious political situation in the wake of the 1993 elections
required that national reconciliation take a position of prime
importance in the government's agenda. The coalition government
attempted, with only modest success, to focus on political
reconciliation and consensus building. The international community
played an important role in supporting Cambodia's evolving
democracy through awareness campaigns and diplomatic efforts
and attempted, with mixed success, to serve as a watchdog
over human rights. The events of July 1997 in which First
Prime Minister Prince Norodom Ranariddh was removed from the
leadership of FUNCINPEC has made this task more complicated,
at least in the short term.
By 1996 a sentiment was emerging that Cambodia had already
been given enough support by the international community,
which would be well advised to scale down its financial involvement.
Critics argued that other countries were more deserving and
capable of using this aid more effectively. This sentiment
has no doubt been given momentum by the unsettling events
of July 1997. While one cannot deny that needs are great elsewhere
in the world, a decision to "move on" would, at
this point, be a grave error on the part of the international
community. Such a decision would jeopardize the significant
achievements accomplished over the last few years in Cambodia.
Despite recent events Cambodia is on the road to progress
and development, and it still needs support from the international
community. The government seems willing to "take the
training wheels off its bicycle" but it must have the
reassurance that the international community will be nearby.
We live in a world of rapid technological change and split-second
communications, but nation building does not occur overnight.
It is a long, time-consuming process, particularly for a country
with such a tragic past. Ultimately Cambodians are responsible
for their own development and prosperity, but the international
community also has an interest and a stake in seeing the nation
succeed. As Cambodia is still among the poorest countries
in the world, there is a certain degree of altruism in the
international community that would tend to support its continued
commitment. The international community has already made a
significant investment in Cambodia; if it wants to protect
this investment and ensure that Cambodia does not slide back
into chaos, it should continue to participate in the process
of building a sound economy as the foundation of a stable
society. The reemergence of crime and political instability
in Cambodia would be especially costly for Thailand, Vietnam,
and Malaysia and should compel them to take an active interest
in their neighbor's progress. This will become even more relevant
with Cambodia's eventual membership in ASEAN.
The ASEAN countries have made clear their desire for a secure
and prosperous Cambodia as an important part of the plan to
develop a united Southeast Asia. In particular, while nonintervention
remains the cardinal principle for conduct among ASEAN states,
the concept of "constructive engagement" is now
being floated by such people as Malaysia's deputy prime minister
Anwar Ibrahim, who had the following to say in 1996 at the
Second International Forum on Toward One Southeast Asia in
the 21st Century:
[ASEAN] should not tolerate the existence of two regions,
one prosperous and developed centered around the older members
of ASEAN who had a head start, and the other poor and technologically
handicapped, made up of the new ASEAN states. … [ASEAN] cannot
be oblivious to the problems of underdevelopment of the other
members.5
Consequently we may see greater involvement in Cambodia by
its regional cousins in part as a result of the July events.
Thus far most of the involvement in Cambodia from ASEAN states
has been in the area of foreign direct investment. Serious
questions remain: What will be ASEAN's economic development
obligations once Cambodia formally joins the regional organization?
And to what extent should ASEAN assist in rebuilding the sense
of political viability that was damaged by the July events?
The larger international community through the United Nations
also has obligations to which it committed itself in the 1991
Paris Peace Accords. These include guarantees to assist and
monitor the peace-building process, which is more than just
the supervision of democratic elections. William Shawcross
makes the case that the continued assistance of the international
community is essential in ensuring social and political peace,
which will then give rise to development and economic prosperity:
Determination
by Cambodia's rulers will have to be matched by continued
interest from the international community. There is a danger
that the international attention that was so vital in helping
Cambodia address its problems in recent years has now turned
away in the belief that those problems are solved. They
are not. Indeed, it should be clear from the Cambodian example
that a peacekeeping mission needs follow-through and sustained
commitment if, in the long run, it is to change a society.
If the success of UNTAC is to be built upon, continued international
interest, pressure, and assistance are vital.6
Successes and Failures
As with virtually every experience with international assistance
in developing countries, there have been both successes and
failures in Cambodia. The lesson learned from these experiences
will help us better understand how future assistance from
the international community can be improved. The term "international
community" here refers to the United Nations and its
various branches (e.g., UNDP, UNESCO, UNICEF, WHO, FAO, etc.),
international organizations, and nongovernmental organizations,
individually or collectively. International assistance has
been effective in many ways in helping Cambodia emerge from
a "failed state to a democratic one."7
It has made contributions in the following areas:
Peace, Political Stability, and Security
Without considerable international assistance Cambodia could
not have achieved even the very limited degree of political
stability and security it has today. Building peace is a long-term
process that requires much national and international effort
in order to succeed. Fortunately for Cambodia, the international
community has provided both moral and financial support. Its
active interest will continue to be critical as Cambodia edges
toward its second national elections in 1998.
Democracy
Given the recent political tensions and violence, the suggestion
that Cambodia's democracy has been strengthened through the
efforts of the international community may be shocking. However,
Cambodia's democracy is only four years old and has made some
clear advances during that time. Of particular note is the
high level of consciousness among ordinary Cambodians of their
democratic rights and liberties in the new society, even if
there is little evidence of praxis. Democracy is not yet rooted
in the country, but support from outside may be helpful in
making it a reality. The role of the international community
is not yet clear, but it is likely that foreign observers
will help monitor the 1998 election, albeit with a smaller
presence than in 1993. In the meantime the support for civil
society through nongovernmental organizations continues through
internationally supported training and awareness activities.
Stable Macroeconomics
As Cambodia moves from a centrally planned to a market-oriented
economy, it is critical that it create a stable economic climate.
International financial institutions such as the IMF and the
World Bank have played an important role in supporting macroeconomic
stability through various economic strategies and the implementation
of structural adjustment policies. This type of support generates
a favorable investment climate for investors, thus encouraging
foreign investment and eventually enabling the private sector
to become the engine of growth and development.
Land Mines
Cambodia is one of the most heavily mined countries in the
world, and the international community has been very supportive
in responding to Cambodia's needs with respect to training,
research, mine removal, and advocacy. The international community's
ability to mount an international advocacy campaign to ban
land mines has been particularly noteworthy and would not
have materialized without its input. This campaign may result
in a universal ban on land mines.
Integration
International assistance has helped Cambodia to move toward
regional and global integration. Cambodia was looking forward
to becoming a full member of ASEAN in July 1997. Although
admission has been delayed, Cambodia will eventually join.
Successful and sustainable integration activities will involve
high costs, increased human resource training, and greater
exposure to the outside world after two decades of isolation.
While the benefits from aid have been notable, there are several
areas where aid has failed or can be improved.
Dependency
To a degree, nongovernmental organizations, indeed the government
itself, are still stuck in the emergency relief mode and have
failed to make the transition to the idea of fostering development.
Many organizations working in Cambodia since the crisis of
the 1980s have not adequately addressed the shift in focus
between relief and development. As a result dependency has
been created among the beneficiaries. Cambodians have become
familiar with the culture of international development and
know what funders want to hear. They also have become too
willing to allow different organizations do things for them.
Cambodians must become more involved in their own development
projects and take greater responsibility for their future.
The issue of dependency is often difficult to address and
must be dealt with on a case-by-case basis. However, in some
circumstances the international community must be firm with
the potential beneficiaries and ready to pull out of a project
if an increase in dependency is seen. There are, of course,
no scales to measure dependency, which makes the task of the
international community even more difficult. However, as Cambodia
matures the community should be aware of the potential hazards
this may create.
Nonsustainable Projects
The goal of all development assistance should be to make the
particular project sustainable after outside funding has ended.
Unfortunately this is often not the case. One of the problems
is the human resource deficit and lack of educated Cambodians,
whose wages are high owing to the demand for skilled people.
While international agencies often can afford to hire these
individuals, local organizations find it difficult to employ
them because of their high salaries. Another problem is the
poaching of staff members. Unfortunately it is common for
international organizations to hire Cambodians already working
for another development organization by simply offering a
higher wage. While the general motivation behind such moves
is understandable, this practice should be discouraged; in
countries like Cambodia with a limited pool of talent, no
organization will be willing to invest in training its employees
if all staff placements are subject to such poaching.
Project Survival
More thought has to be given to long-term project survival.
Beneficiaries must be involved from the very beginning, and
there should be a long-term plan that would allow the funding
organization eventually to phase out its involvement. More
organizations must be willing to hand over responsibility
to local groups and people and allow them to make mistakes
and learn.
Urban Bias
For various reasons, including security threats, the urban
area of Phnom Penh has received a disproportionate amount
of attention over the rural areas. This is a potentially damaging
situation, especially as more than 80 percent of the population
currently resides in rural areas. While Phnom Penh's economy
is relatively well off, the rural areas are often neglected.
The average monthly income is four times higher in Phnom Penh
than in the provinces. Spending on education is twice as high
in the city. What is perhaps more worrying is that the disparity
between the urban and rural areas is increasing at an alarming
rate. As one report states:
Rural development is on everybody's lips in Cambodia and most
actors recognize both the lack of rural development and the
need for it. In spite of this, the pattern of heavy concentration
of economic growth around the Phnom Penh area has not been
broken. No matter how many studies point to the need for rural
investment, this is, consciously or unconsciously, largely
ignored by donors (whose agents mainly live in Phnom Penh).8
The same report revealed the concern of some officials within
the Australian Foreign Ministry who worried that the economic
unbalance may result in the repetition of the history of the
1970s. If development is to be sustainable it must address
all parts of Cambodia, not just the areas most accessible
to international officials, investors, and government officers.
Some development organizations are doing a remarkable job
in this area--but expanded efforts are necessary.
Communication and Coordination: Too Many Drivers
Communication and coordination among the various governments,
international organizations, and smaller nongovernmental organizations
can be improved substantially. Efforts are already under way
to address some of these concerns and improve communication
links and increase dialogue, and these must continue. At its
annual meetings the ICORC had the potential to coordinate
assistance among the international donors and the government,
but this was never realized. Now as the ICORC is replaced
by the World Bank-sponsored Consultative Group Meetings (CGM),
it is hoped that aid coordination will be a higher priority.
Regardless of the outcome the international community must
adopt an active communications policy both internally and
externally, with a view to promoting mutual learning and cooperation.
This also could include greater involvement in development
policy debates at the national level and more structured links
with other agencies and institutions. The royal government
also has responsibilities to help coordinate international
assistance by developing a clear set of priorities and needs.
Naturally, it has taken time to elaborate the goals and prioritize
the actions, resource requirements, and strategies initially
presented in the National Program to Rehabilitate and Develop
Cambodia. Nevertheless, the publication of Cambodia's First
Socioeconomic Plan (FSEP) for 1996-2000 makes significant
moves toward better defining the government's priorities.
In the absence of a clearly defined development policy and
plan, projects and programs have evolved in an ad hoc manner.
Consequently the opportunity to develop comprehensive and
cogent approaches has been lost. This lack of a defined vision
at the national level has led to the absence of a clear policy
framework in several areas. The establishment of a coordination
mechanism within the Council for Development of Cambodia (CDC)
may be able to assure that Official Development Assistance
(ODA) and investment flows are supportive of nationally determined
priorities. The lack of coordination among donors has resulted
in some duplicated poor aid management, particularly with
respect to the technical assistance provision.
Thus far the government has welcomed development assistance
from all categories of donor agency. This "open door"
policy has meant that donors could operate in an environment
where priorities have not always been clear and coordination
of different activities to achieve common objectives has been
less than successful. The almost total dependence on external
funding for development expenditure has created a situation
wherein international agencies working in Cambodia have often
felt free to conduct themselves as they please with little
or no coordination with the government or other agencies.
Undoubtedly many of their initiatives may prove to be valuable,
but even well-meaning assistance must respect the sovereignty
of a democratically elected Cambodian government. Efforts
to bypass the state only reinforce the weakness of the state
and promote a lack of respect for the rule of law and the
democratic process.
Some officials of international agencies often feel that they
know better than the government or that they somehow have
privileged access to the concerns of ordinary Cambodians.
This may or may not be the case--the important thing is that
information is shared among all parties and these programming
decisions are made as inclusive as possible. The concept of
sustainable development is in vogue with the international
community at the moment, and it should therefore be well understood
that along with environmental and economic sustainability
the international community must also promote political sustainability.
Once the international agencies have gone it will be Cambodians,
both governmental and private, who are left to pick up the
pieces.
Different Strokes
Finally, on the issue of aid coordination, different stakeholders
have different motivations for providing assistance. Aid organizations
often compete against each other in what has been termed "the
dynamic of the aid market."9 Often competition for aid contracts has
meant that different organizations involved in development
seek to establish their specialized niches, vigorously defending
their area of specialization and sharing very little information
with others. It is simple to predict that coordination will
break down rapidly in such an environment. Various agencies
have their own institutional survival to think about, which
may force them to compete with other agencies. But some sort
of conflict-resolution mechanism is needed to put the welfare
of the Cambodian people ahead of these interinstitutional
concerns.
Challenges Ahead
Cambodia has benefited immensely from the support of the international
community as it travels down the road of development. The
amount of assistance is significant, but then so was the crisis.
Indeed the majority of funds have gone toward emergency relief
and reconstruction rather than development per se. Similarly
UNTAC's funds were directed primarily toward resettlement,
repatriation, and peacekeeping.
An important shift in emphasis concerning external assistance
took place in 1995 when international donors decided to pursue
development instead of the previous reconstruction rehabilitation
phase. The progression from emergency relief to development
is an important one. It is not necessarily an easy transition
because it involves a change in both outlook and philosophy.
Unquestionably the emergency and rehabilitation efforts that
were such an integral part of the initial international response
were at least partially responsible for creating an environment
of dependency among Cambodians. Nonetheless, it is important
that we now move beyond this initial rehabilitation and reconstruction
mentality to a more sustainable development approach. Both
the Cambodian government and the international community must
understand the significance of this shift in emphasis and
come to realize the effect that this should have on their
policies and programming.
Approximately 45 percent of the government's budget is derived
from foreign aid. Most of this is directed to the public sector.
While there is a plan to reduce the number of government employees,
nobody quite knows how to achieve this, especially given the
rather tense political situation. Such reform is vital if
Cambodia is to develop a core group of qualified public sector
employees for the effective governance of the country. Current
public service employees are often poorly skilled, poorly
paid, and therefore poorly motivated.
This desperate situation in public service has given rise
to many dubious operational practices that are self-defeating
in the long term. Moreover some of these practices seem to
be encouraged by donors and condoned by the government. They
include the provision of incentive payments to public sector
employees to top-up their meager government salaries in exchange
for being an "adviser" to a particular project.
Although it may help the donor get things done, it does little
to tackle public sector inefficiencies and has no sustainable
impact except to skew salary structures.
Even if expenditures are controlled, the government will have
to find an alternative revenue arrangement from the current
one wherein 60-70 percent of tax revenue is derived from custom
duties. As Cambodia prepares to enter ASEAN it will be forced
to drop these tariffs and replace them with other means of
raising revenue. Once again the emphasis must be on sustainable
development; otherwise Cambodians are mortgaging the future
of the younger generation.
"Sustainable development" does not only mean sustainable
economic development but also sustainable political development.
Cambodia is a particularly weak state and needs the international
community to work with the government as partners, advisors,
and friends. There is a tendency for the international community
to focus primarily on economic stability with an assumption
that as long as governments can deliver the goods (such as
an annual 7 percent growth rate) they will enjoy political
legitimacy. The Cambodian political situation is much too
fragile to make this assumption. Domestic imperatives suggest
that political stability is the key to development. Without
peace and stability there can be no development. It is sad
but undeniable that the events of July 1997 have complicated
the achievement of internal stability, at least in the short
term.
Sustainable political development can be supported from the
international community through diplomacy and careful action
encouraging democracy, human rights, and a free and independent
judiciary in Cambodia. Local participation in decision making,
especially in the rural areas feeling increasingly left out
of the development process, must be encouraged. An excellent
example of this is the UNDP's rural development initiative
CARERE II, which uses a two-pronged approach that supports
state capacity development while simultaneously promoting
local participatory decision making. Currently there are no
elected officials below the national level (commune elections
have not yet been held) so there is little political legitimacy
(democratic) at the provincial, district, commune, or village
levels. The CARERE II program sets up a chain of elected committees
from the village level on up. At the same time the project
supplies the provinces with independent budget support from
which they can fund "worthy projects" suggested
by the villages and communes. This bottom-up approach empowers
local community members while building up the capacity of
the provincial government and giving legitimacy to the formal
organs of the state. While mistakes will certainly be made,
the project will be much more sustainable in the long term
than a project implemented by an NGO that undermines the authority
of the state.10
While foreign involvement in the political sphere can be difficult
in terms of respecting the legitimacy of a sovereign state,
there are still many areas in which they may participate,
particularly in a supportive role working with other Cambodians.
An important area that could be strengthened is the support
foreigners could give to local NGOs to grow and prosper. The
capacity of local NGOs in Cambodia must be strengthened--the
creation of a meaningful civil society depends upon it. Once
again this emphasizes the sustainable aspects of development,
one that endures after the international NGOs have gone home.
It is not enough to simply employ Cambodians in existing international
NGOs (although this is useful). Endogenous development will
occur only if local NGOs are formed that are managed by Cambodians
for Cambodians. The creation of a civil society in Cambodia
depends upon it.
In terms of support for human rights outsiders must recognize
that the people of developing countries, their organizations,
and their governments play the central role and hold prime
responsibility for achieving progress. The fundamental principles
of human rights are universal, but each society and each region
crafts its own approach, drawing on its culture, history,
and political economic traditions. The international community
plays a critical but supporting role drawing on its own experiences.
It should not attempt to export particular institutions or
practices but rather seek to work carefully and sensitively
with those in developing countries who are best placed to
achieve positive change. At times this may mean working with
the government rather than against it.
A question often raised in connection with international assistance
is the issue of conditionality. Whether we Cambodians like
it or not, conditionality of aid or loans will always be used
to pursue the foreign policies of various countries or organizations
in one form or another. This is the prerogative of the donor
country or organization involved. However, these donors must
be realistic with their demands and not impose conditionality
in a reckless manner. This involves identifying feasible options
as well as outlining responsible conditions for countries
like Cambodia that must struggle daily with the realities
of underdevelopment. The recent decision of the IMF to withdraw
assistance from Cambodia because of the continuation of illegal
logging in the provinces seemed a fair decision. However,
the IMF should be clearer in its motives and avoid playing
the role of environmental hero on this issue. The IMF does
not so much care that logging continues in these areas; its
concern is that revenues from these felled trees are poured
into the National Treasury.
Conclusion
Cambodia has been the recipient of billions of dollars in
assistance from the international community. While the amount
of assistance may seem enormous to most international observers,
most of the money spent over the years has been applied to
emergency relief, not to development. While the process of
rehabilitation, reconstruction, and development has been initiated,
it will need to be sustained for at least a decade to come.
Does the international community have the patience to endure
another decade of international assistance to Cambodia? Some
observers suggest that aid is an anomaly from a bygone era,
while others have called for a rethinking of the entire concept.
Most share the idea that current development cooperation must
be reformed in order to ensure long-term goals. International
development in Cambodia has matured to a degree that it is
possible to discuss long-term goals with confidence. The task
before us is therefore to commit to these long-term objectives
in a cooperative and sustainable fashion so that Cambodia
can rebuild itself and become a respectable member of the
world community.
Notes
1. See William Shawcross, Sideshow: Kissinger,
Nixon, and the Destruction of Cambodia (New York: Simon and
Schuster, 1979).
2. John P. McAndrew, Aid Infusions, Aid Illusions,
Working Paper No. 2 (Phnom Penh: Cambodian Development Resource
Institute, January 1996).
3. François Ponchaud, Cambodia: Year
Zero, trans. Nancy Amphoix (London: Allen Lane/Penguin Books,
1977), p. 215.
4. Actual disbursements of international aid
during 1992-95 totaled only $1.3 billion--approximately $1
billion short of target. McAndrew, Aid Infusions, Aid Illusions.
5. Kao Kim Hourn, "Cambodia-ASEAN Partnership
for Regional Peace," in Peace and Cooperation: Alternative
Paradigms, ed. Kao Kim Hourn and D. Merican (Phnom Penh: Cambodian
Institute for Cooperation and Peace, 1997), p. 169.
6. William Shawcross, Cambodia's New Deal
(Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
1994), p. 1.
7. Statement by Madeleine Albright at 1993
Press Conference at Pochentong Airport, Phnom Penh.
8. Jan Ovesen et al., When Every Household
Is an Island: Social Organization and Power Structures in
Rural Cambodia (Phnom Penh: Swedish International Development
Authority, 1995), p. 25.
9. B. Bernander et al., Facing a Complex Emergency:
An Evaluation of Swedish Support to Emergency Aid in Cambodia
(Stockholm: Swedish International Development Authority, 1995).
10. See Michael W. Doyle, Peacebuilding in
Cambodia, IPA Policy Briefing Series (New York: International
Peace Academy, 1996), p. 17.
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