|
|
Building
Democracy in Cambodia:
Problems and Prospects
Lao Mong
Hay
Introduction: Cambodia's Unstable Democracy
Democracy was born in Cambodia in 1947 when the country adopted
its first constitution, which transformed the age-old absolute
monarchy into a constitutional monarchy with multiparty democracy.
Democracy started at a promising level in 1947 and remained
there until 1955. In that year King Norodom Sihanouk, who
had just succeeded in his crusade for Cambodia's independence
from France, abdicated and formed a movement called Sangkum
Reatr Nyum (People's Socialist Community), which, under the
banner of "guided democracy," subsumed all political
parties. The prospects for democracy began to decline when
no other political parties were allowed to operate, press
freedom was curbed, and genuine, competitive elections ceased
to be held. Democratization continued to decline for a decade,
as Sihanouk exercised autocratic power. The situation changed
sharply in 1966, when Sihanouk no longer hand-picked parliamentary
candidates, and all Cambodians were free to stand for the
general elections. Power then shifted away from Sihanouk for
several years, and hopes for a stable democracy remained high
until Sihanouk succeeded in wresting back power.
In 1970 it appeared that Cambodia's democracy would reemerge
when General Lon Nol toppled Sihanouk, and leading intellectuals
seemed to have persuaded the new ruler to embrace multiparty
democracy. But then Lon Nol became a dictator. In 1975 democracy's
prospects bottomed out when the Khmer Rouge defeated the Lon
Nol regime, assumed power, and brutally imposed their brand
of radical agrarian communism. Hopes remained flattened following
the ousting of the Khmer Rouge by the Vietnamese troops and
during the People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) and the State
of Cambodia (SOC).
Cambodian democracy began to revive in 1991, when the Paris
Peace Accords gave it a new lease on life. In 1993 the Cambodian
people bravely participated in free and fair elections organized
by the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC).
The ascent of democracy was buttressed by the adoption of
a new constitution that enshrined liberalism, pluralism, human
rights, and the rule of law. Cambodian democratization remained
at that level for a couple of years, then began to dip yet
again when conflict intensified between the two major political
parties, FUNCINPEC and the Cambodian People's Party (CPP).
It fell almost flat, beginning on July 5, 1997, when Second
Prime Minister Hun Sen used force to settle the contest and
ousted the democratically elected first prime minister, Prince
Norodom Ranariddh. Hun Sen has since become the de facto paramount
leader of Cambodia.
This chapter examines the problems of and prospects for building
democracy in Cambodia. It is written at a time at which democracy
has been dealt a severe blow by the July 1997 coup. But it
is also a time at which the prospects for national elections
(scheduled for July 1998) hold the possibility, though not
the promise, of a return to democratic politics and governance.
The chapter takes a short- to medium-term perspective and
suggests a number of ways the international community can
help restore democracy in Cambodia.
The Immediate Challenge: Restoring Democracy Through Competitive
Elections
Many Cambodians have been adversely affected by the events
of July 1997. The direct victims include Cambodians who were
killed or wounded, arrested or intimidated, or had their property
stolen or damaged. Indirect victims have seen their livelihoods
affected and now feel less secure because of the use of violence
and the abuse of human rights. Factories and shops in the
fighting areas were badly damaged. Thousands of jobs were
lost overnight. Many foreign residents have left the country,
and there are virtually no new investors coming in. Business
enterprises have seen a decline in their activities, slowed
their operations, and laid off employees. A wait-and-see attitude
has prevailed in this climate of uncertainty. Tourists have
not come; as a result, thousands of jobs in the tourist industry
have disappeared.
Since the July coup the government and National Assembly no
longer reflect the will, wishes, and aspirations of the Cambodian
people as expressed in the 1993 elections. The state organs
are almost completely under the control of Hun Sen and the
CPP, the losers in the last elections. FUNCINPEC, the winner
of the 1993 elections, has disintegrated and some of its members
have allied themselves with the CPP. Ung Huot, the unconstitutionally
appointed first prime minister in replacement of Ranariddh,
has no independence from Hun Sen. To many he is Hun Sen's
puppet.
Despite the ouster of Prince Ranariddh and the evisceration
of FUNCINPEC, Hun Sen and the CPP have not been completely
successful in their grab for power. King Sihanouk has acceded
to, but not approved, their takeover. Ranariddh and the other
political leaders who fled Cambodia have mounted an international
campaign to isolate the Hun Sen government. The international
community has not condoned Hun Sen's use of violence to overturn
the outcome of the 1993 elections. The Hun Sen government
was unable to occupy Cambodia's seat at the UN. ASEAN has
postponed Cambodia's admittance into the regional grouping
until after the elections. The IMF and the World Bank have
suspended their lending programs, and some countries have
reduced or suspended their bilateral aid to Cambodia.
Diplomatic efforts have been made to ensure the safe return
of the opposition politicians who fled the country in July
as well as their freedom to carry out political activities.
The UN has sent a small group of monitors to help in this
effort. Sam Rainsy, the leader of the Khmer National Party,
returned first and commenced straight-away to mobilize crowds
to support him. An advance team of the Union of Cambodian
Democrats (UCD), a loose coalition of opposition politicians
who fled in July, returned to Cambodia in December 1997 to
"test the waters." Prince Ranariddh returned in
March 1998.
The focus now is on the upcoming elections. Before July 1997
these elections had been thought of as the way to resolve
the escalating conflict between FUNCINPEC and the CPP; now
they are seen as the means to restore democracy in Cambodia
and as the solution to the present political and economic
crisis. Preparations for them have been under way for over
two years, and special efforts are being made to finalize
them. The National Assembly has finally passed political party
and electoral laws and a National Election Commission has
been established. Technical and logistical preparations also
are under way.
There have been positive developments with the return of opposition
politicians and some degree of humility and flexibility on
the part of Hun Sen after his government's failure to occupy
Cambodia's seat at the UN. Hun Sen has yielded to pressure
to strengthen the independence of the National Election Commission
and to return to FUNCINPEC the control of its radio and TV
stations seized during and after the July event. So far the
returning opposition politicians have been safe and able to
work without hindrance.
But a number of important issues remain unresolved. Fighting
continues between forces loyal to Ranariddh and government
troops loyal to Hun Sen. The Khmer Rouge continue their armed
struggle and are reported to be allied with the Ranariddh
forces. The CPP has virtually complete control over the state
administrative apparatus and all security forces, which suggests
that the elections will not be administered impartially and
free of intimidation. The opposition parties do not have enough
time to organize and prepare themselves for the elections.
Doubts have been raised about whether Hun Sen and the CPP
would be willing to relinquish power should they lose the
elections--despite their reassurances of respect for the results.
The Long-Term Challenge: Building a Democratic Culture
in Cambodia
The events of 1997 show that perhaps the greatest obstacle
to democracy in Cambodia is the anti-democratic behavior of
the nation's political elite. However, history, culture, and
a low level of socioeconomic development are also obstacles--though
not insurmountable--to building a democratic political culture.
Over the last century Cambodians have been ruled by a centralized
and authoritarian French colonial administration, by an even
more centralized and authoritarian communist system, and by
a sometimes autocratic monarch. Until the end of the Second
World War Cambodian rulers used the chakrawatti system to
rule their country. This system was characterized by the concentration
of power in the hands of one absolute ruler who tolerated
no opinions different from his own. All viceroys and other
officials had to submit unquestionably to his rule and serve
as his servants or instruments. These viceroys and other officials
were, in turn, potentates in their respective domains. The
Cambodian people were subjects of the king and serfs of the
local potentates.
This dictatorial system could not fight off encroachments
by Cambodia's neighbors or Western colonialists, and in 1863
Cambodia fell under French colonial rule. The French ruled
Cambodia as despots; no Cambodians dared to challenge them.
But the French did not remove or reduce the king's power over
his subjects--even though in 1789 the French themselves had
participated in an epoch-making revolution to overthrow royal
absolutism. Thus Cambodia was under two layers of dictatorial
rule: Cambodian royal absolutism overlaid with French colonial
rule.
After the shock of World War II the French began to loosen
their grip on their colonies, including Cambodia, by allowing
them some degree of autonomy within the French Union. At the
same time Cambodian elites who had been trained in France
began to appreciate democratic ideas and some--in particular
Prince Sisowath Youtevong--introduced them to Cambodian society
when they returned home after their studies.
In 1946 King Sihanouk granted his people several democratic
rights, including the right of association, the right of assembly,
and the right to free speech. Political parties were formed,
and elections were held for a constituent assembly. The Democratic
Party headed by Prince Youtevong won and drafted the country's
constitution. The 1947 constitution transformed the absolute
monarchy into a constitutional monarchy and contained a chapter
guaranteeing and protecting the fundamental rights of all
Cambodians. Though still under French rule, Cambodia began
to have liberal democracy.
However, soon after the county's independence from France
in 1955, King Sihanouk began to curtail Cambodia's fledgling
liberal democracy, and from 1955 to 1970 it was replaced by
a guided democracy characterized by a one-party system of
government. An attempt was made to restore liberal democracy
in the early 1970s, but Cambodia's political leadership and
government were so defective, and the strength of the Communist
forces so overwhelming, that democracy was nipped in the bud.
As a result a new layer of dictatorial rule, this time much
more oppressive, brutal, and pervasive--that is, totalitarianism--took
hold with all its savagery on Cambodia, claiming over a million
lives and destroying or damaging all aspects of Cambodian
society.
This history of autocracy explains--but does not justify--the
rigid, uncompromising, and dictatorial attitude of many of
the current political elite. While these leaders may have
compassion (in the form of pity felt by a person in a superior
position for a person in an inferior position) for the Cambodian
people, they have little or no tolerance for any views or
ideas that differ from their own or might challenge their
position of authority. Given the absence of a tradition of
tolerance, for the ruling elite the notion of "national
reconciliation" means submission to their rule rather
than compromise.
This problem with Cambodia's ruling elite is compounded by
the fact that virtually an entire generation of Cambodians--those
under the age of 35--has been deprived of an education and
cut off from the outside world. And for the few who were able
to attend school prior to 1993, their schooling was more indoctrination
than education. As a result almost all of the nation's moral
and ethical values have perished or been damaged. Now the
focus of education, even at the primary school level, is on
human resource development, which emphasizes developing Cambodians
as economic resources rather than as thinking human beings
and citizens. (There is a painful irony here in that under
the Khmer Rouge, individually and collectively Cambodians
became "labor units" to be used ruthlessly by those
murderers.) Fortunately a small number of educated and skilled
Cambodians survived the Khmer Rouge massacre, and many more
have been trained since their downfall. But pervasive poverty,
the persistence of traditional approaches to education, and
the limited resources available for civic education have made
it difficult to educate the majority of Cambodians about their
rights and responsibilities as citizens. Until this happens
the Cambodian elite will not be held accountable to the Cambodian
people and democracy will remain vulnerable.
Finally it is often argued that the low level of Cambodia's
socioeconomic development, particularly its low levels of
income and literacy, make the country ill-suited for democracy.
However, poverty is not an insurmountable hindrance to democracy
in Cambodia, any more than it is in India or the Philippines.
The main obstacle and danger to Cambodia's democracy is not
the poor; rather it is the current ruling elite that undermines
democracy and uses its wealth and power (and guns) to protect
and enhance its position. This group is not keen to establish
the system of checks and balances enshrined in the country's
constitution. It breaks the law with impunity. One only need
ask who in July 1997 resorted to the use of force to resolve
a political conflict, causing the brutal deaths of over 40
Cambodians and severe damage to the livelihood of many others?
It was not the Cambodian people who used force, violated others'
human rights, and dispensed with democratic procedures.
Despite these obstacles and setbacks, there has been progress
in building a democratic culture in Cambodia--especially when
compared to the situation that existed before the UNTAC period.
Not long after the adoption of the 1993 constitution, there
were charges that democracy and human rights were Western
values and could not fit in Cambodian culture. There were
claims that democracy could only be achieved after economic
development, raising the controversy whether efforts should
be devoted to building democracy or economic development first.
These two questions have now been largely resolved. It is
acknowledged by most of the country's leaders that democratic
values have Cambodian origins, in Buddhism, Cambodian literature,
and even folk stories, and that democracy and development
go hand in hand.
There is also a breakdown--though only partial to be sure--of
the culture of silence inherited from the police states of
the past. The print and electronic media have proliferated.
Some newspapers are very critical of the government and its
leaders. Cambodians can and do make representations on public
issues (and personal problems) to government officials and
members of parliament. Nongovernmental organizations have
access to the state-owned radio and television stations to
broadcast their educational programs, including debates on
public issues. Some of these debates are critical of government
policies. Finally there are also some signs of democratization
at the local level. Democratic elections are being used to
establish village development committees under the aegis of
the Rural Development Ministry. And increasingly associations
and nongovernmental organizations, including those at the
grassroots level, are using democratic elections to choose
officers and make decisions.
The Continuing Struggle to Enshrine Human Rights and the
Rule of Law
Given Cambodia's history, it should not come as a surprise
that reestablishing and strengthening the commitment of Cambodia's
political leaders to human rights and the rule of law is a
long-term struggle. Respect for human rights was officially
stipulated in Cambodia's 1947 constitution, before the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights of 1948. But over the last 50
years human rights in Cambodia have been routinely violated.
During the Khmer Rouge era Cambodians inflicted upon their
fellow countrymen some of the worst human rights abuses to
have occurred during the twentieth century. The Vietnamese
invasion and subsequent communist government ended the autogenocide,
but human rights (as defined by the Universal Declaration)
were viewed by the government as a hindrance to the country's
much-needed national reconstruction at best and as a threat
to the regime's power and the communist political system at
worst.
The first substantial efforts to revive respect for human
rights were made mainly by noncommunist anti-Vietnamese resistance
forces. At a conference in Australia in January 1989 three
of the four warring factions (except the Khmer Rouge) unofficially
agreed to adopt the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
In the end human rights were accepted by all of the factions,
and respect and observance of them were incorporated into
the 1991 Paris Peace Accords.
Under the Paris Accords Cambodia was to respect human rights
as enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
and other international instruments on human rights. The agreements
state, inter alia, that "Cambodia's tragic recent history
requires special measures to assure the protection of human
rights and the nonreturn to the policies and practices of
the recent past." An annex to the agreements fixed the
principles to be included in Cambodia's constitution. According
to the annex, the constitution will
contain
a declaration of fundamental rights, including the rights
to life, personal liberty, security, freedom of movement,
freedom of religion, assembly and association, including
political parties and trade unions, due process and equality
before the law, protection from arbitrary deprivation of
property or deprivation of private property without just
compensation, and freedom from racial, ethnic, religious,
or sexual discrimination.… This declaration will be consistent
with the provision of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and other relevant international instruments. Aggrieved
individuals will be entitled to have the courts adjudicate
and enforce these rights.
The annex also stated that Cambodia will
follow
a system of liberal democracy, on the basis of pluralism.
It will provide for periodic and genuine elections. It will
provide for the right to vote and to be elected by universal
and equal suffrage. It will provide for voting by secret
ballot, with a requirement that electoral procedures provide
a full and fair opportunity to organize and participate
in the electoral process.
All of these obligations were incorporated into the constitution
adopted in September 1993. Like the 1947 constitution the
1993 constitution has an entire chapter devoted to human rights.
But unlike the 1947 constitution the 1993 constitution recognizes
that the disregard for human rights in Cambodia had resulted
in the country's holocaust. Pluralistic liberal democracy
is now enshrined in the constitution, and this provision on
the political system cannot be amended.
Unfinished Institution Building
In Cambodia power tends to concentrate in the hands of one
powerful man or a group of powerful men (politicians, generals,
and businessmen). This concentration of power is an obstacle
to the separation of powers and the workings of the system
of checks and balances. Based on past experiences of Cambodia
and a number of other developing countries, overreaching power
is an enemy of political and economic development.
Cambodia's 1993 constitution mandates the establishment of
a number of institutions, which, if they work properly, should
provide ample checks and balances. These include the executive,
the National Assembly, the judiciary, the Supreme Council
of the Magistracy, the Constitutional Council, the king, and
the National Congress. However, in practice there has not
been an effective institutional separation of powers and to
date the Supreme Council of Magistracy, the Constitutional
Council and the National Congress are not operational or do
not exist.
Many see the National Assembly, as it currently functions,
as the rubber stamp for the executive. With very few exceptions
members of parliament or the ruling parties have been coerced
to toe the party line dictated by the party leaders. Very
few have the courage to dissent. There is no order of importance
and priority of laws in this new society in the making. Influential
special-interest groups see laws that meet their demands enacted,
while core laws to ensure law and order and regulate relations
among citizens, such as criminal and civil laws, or laws determining
the functioning of the constitutional institutions, have been
relegated or neglected altogether. As a result there is almost
complete anarchy in making and enforcing laws. The government
and judges still apply old laws whether they are constitutional
or not. As a result there are "a number of gaps, inconsistencies,
and contradictions."1
King Sihanouk, as constitutional monarch, is expected to "reign
but not rule." However, rather than being overly interventionist,
as might have been expected, the aging and infirm king has
been unwilling or unable to exercise many of his constitutional
duties. For example, he has been unable to protect the rights
and freedoms of his citizens or to ensure the independence
of the judiciary, all of which are his constitutional responsibilities.
More recently Hun Sen bypassed him altogether with the appointment
of Ung Huot as first prime minister.
The delay in establishing the Constitutional Council and the
Supreme Council of the Magistracy has undermined democracy
and the rule of law in Cambodia. The Constitution delegates
to the Constitutional Council the authority to interpret the
Constitution, ensure the constitutionality of laws enacted
by the National Assembly, and adjudicate electoral conflicts.
Without the council there has been no mechanism for challenging
the constitutionality of the actions of the Cambodian government
or reviewing that of existing laws or new legislation. The
Constitutional Council is supposed to be composed of nine
members: three appointed by the king, three by the National
Assembly, and three by the Supreme Council of the Magistracy.
The Supreme Council of the Magistracy is a judicial body responsible
for ensuring the independence and quality of the judiciary.
Chaired by the king, the Supreme Council has the authority
to appoint and discipline judges. But more than a year after
a law was passed establishing it, this body still has not
been formed. In its absence there has been a lot of criticism
of the judiciary, especially of the judges themselves, for
their lack of expertise and impartiality. All of Cambodia's
sitting judges have been appointed by the communist regime;
only some have formal legal training, mostly in the communist
legal system. Moreover the failure to constitute the Supreme
Council means that there are no members to serve on the Constitutional
Council, as required by the constitution. With both Councils
existing only on paper many seemingly unconstitutional laws
and regulations remain in effect and few people have confidence
in the independence of the judiciary.
Finally the National Congress is supposed to be a channel
for the Cambodian people to voice their concerns over public
issues and express their wishes and aspirations to public
authorities, including their leaders. It could check the power
of the government to some extent and make leaders more responsible
to the public and accountable for their actions. But the political
leadership has done little to establish the National Congress,
and few Cambodians are aware that it is mandated by their
constitution.
Political Parties and Democratic Competition
Another serious challenge to democracy in Cambodia has been
the ongoing, recently bloody, contest for power between the
CPP and FUNCINPEC, the two largest political groupings in
Cambodia. Although nominally partners in the ruling coalition
since 1993, these two political parties have continued to
view politics as a "zero sum" game, wherein if one
gains the other loses. Because of this they have remained
fierce rivals, and each has sought advantage over the other
rather than cooperation and compromise. Moreover both parties
are highly personalized and factionalized, and few of the
leaders of either have demonstrated a commitment to democratic
decision making.
The rivalries between the two main parties have contributed
directly to one of the major problems facing the nation: the
bloated and corrupt government sector. Party-driven patronage
and rivalry have contributed to the swelling of the bureaucracy
to some 150,000 people and the maintenance of an army of more
than 100,000 soldiers. (Programs intended to demobilize soldiers
and reform the civil service, conceived at the beginning of
the coalition government, have not been implemented.) This
is far in excess of what is needed or can be financed. As
a result civil servants and soldiers are paid subsurvival
salaries, which leads to moonlighting, corruption, and worse
still, extortion and other criminal activities. Equally important,
moral and ethical values, a sense of duty, and loyalty to
the government have largely disappeared from government service.
Still worse for the country has been the politicization and
polarization of the civil service. Prior to the July coup
most civil servants were loyal to their respective parties.
Some superiors made decisions that served their party's rather
than the national interest. Down the chain of command civil
servants tended to obey and implement orders and decisions
from superiors of the same party. This was prevalent from
the national to the grassroots levels. Cambodia seemed to
have three governments and administrations. Two were party
governments, and the third was the Royal Government of Cambodia,
in which both parties agreed on policies and implemented decisions
together.
The 1998 elections are crucial to ensuring a multiparty system,
a genuinely democratic National Assembly, and an effective
government. Many Cambodians have enjoyed the new democratic
system and want to continue along that road. While civil society
groups are working to create a political climate and environment
conducive to free and fair elections, the leaders and members
of political parties need to do their part. Over the past
five years politicians and political parties have laid bare
their colors and spots. Some have lapsed into their old dictatorial
ways, including the use of force, while others have been making
efforts to prevent the return to serfdom.
With free and fair elections, the proportional representation
system, and the participation of all opposition politicians,
including Ranariddh, it will be very hard for a single party,
however united and well endowed, to lawfully dominate Cambodian
politics. The Constitution requires the support of two-thirds
of those elected to parliament to form a government, and the
quorum for meetings of the National Assembly is a high 70
percent of its members. As a result a party that may be dominant
but short of the two-thirds in the National Assembly needs
to mobilize the support of as many parties as possible to
muster that requirement. A coalition may need to be hammered
out, and even small parties with relatively few seats in the
National Assembly may have bargaining power. However, the
effective functioning of a coalition government and a multiparty
parliament depends on the neutrality of the civil service
and the security and military forces. It also depends on the
independence of the judiciary, which can be brought about
only by the activation of the Constitutional Council and the
Supreme Council of the Magistracy. Democratic political competition
will not survive for long in Cambodia if one side can use
the power and resources of the state against its rivals.
The Role of Civil Society
Although still young and vulnerable, Cambodia's civil society--consisting
of a variety of nongovernmental organizations, unions and
professional associations, and the media--so far has shown
some significant achievements. Cambodians, especially those
at the grass roots, have appreciated the major contributions
Cambodian and international nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs) have made to socioeconomic reconstruction and development.
Given the inability or failure of the government to provide
basic social services, many Cambodians owe their survival
or improved standard of living to these NGOs.
A number of Cambodian and international NGOs are also working
to strengthen human rights and democracy in Cambodia. Many
Cambodians were unaware of their human and political rights
before 1992, when UNTAC started training and information programs
to disseminate these values. Since 1993 Cambodian and international
NGOs have built on these programs by carrying out activities
designed to strengthen human rights, the rule of law, and
democracy. They have included judicial, legal, and human rights
training, disseminating information about human rights, the
rule of law and democracy, and advocating and monitoring human
rights.
Human rights training and information dissemination has been
conducted through a variety of channels, including television
and radio programs. It has been targeted at all sections of
the population: the masses, civilian officials, the military
and police, teachers and students, and even prisoners. As
a result many Cambodians have come to know and understand
the meaning of human rights and other democratic values and
have asserted their rights through NGOs.
Throughout the country Cambodians are talking about the elections
scheduled for 1998 and justifiably asking whether they can
be held and be free and fair. Without some knowledge of democratic
values, they would not be able to talk about elections in
this way. Many of the NGOs concerned with human rights have
joined forces in order to participate in the administration
and monitoring of the 1998 elections. Two NGO coalitions have
formed: the Coalition for Free and Fair Elections (COFFEL)
and the Committee for Free and Fair Elections (COMFREL). Both
groups are cooperating in their efforts to provide voter education
and poll monitoring. They are busy making preparations to
provide such services to help ensure free and fair elections.
But both need technical and financial assistance and support
to do their work effectively.
Many Cambodian NGOs have continued to work hard to uphold
the integrity of the pluralistic liberal democratic order
that the international community helped establish in Cambodia--even
in the difficult political environment following the July
coup. With the suspension of some bilateral and multilateral
economic assistance to the government following the coup,
channeling humanitarian assistance to the Cambodian people
through NGOs has proved an effective way to avoid punishing
the poor. (These people and Cambodians in general are able
to identify clearly who the international community "punished"
for misconduct and deviation from that liberal order.) The
role of civil society can be enhanced further by channeling
more assistance to the Cambodian people through NGOs. These
NGOs cannot undertake major economic and social infrastructure
projects, but they are more effective and efficient than the
bureaucratic machinery of the government, and they are capable
of managing smaller projects that directly benefit the Cambodian
people at the grassroots level. With more resources NGOs could
undertake more projects to contribute to socioeconomic development
and to the democratization process.
The Role of the International Community
The Cambodian people have benefited greatly from the sizable
economic and technical assistance provided by the international
community. Moreover the presence and support of international
organizations, such as the UN Center for Human Rights and
human rights and development NGOs, have helped to constrain
the behavior of those in Cambodia inclined to disregard human
and political rights. The actions taken by the international
community during and immediately following the July coup--protection
of threatened political figures, suspension of aid, and diplomatic
interventions--helped to curb the violence and save lives.
Without such prompt action the violence would have continued
and there would have been more bloodshed and destruction.
The actions subsequently taken by some countries--the imposition
of economic sanctions, the postponement of Cambodia's ASEAN
membership, the decision to leave vacant Cambodia's seat at
the UN, and continued diplomatic pressure--all have yielded
positive results in the form of a degree of relaxation of
control over the population, the openness to opposition politicians,
and more liberal electoral and political party laws. These
encouraging developments need to be nurtured and expanded
upon in order to get Cambodia back on the track of full-fledged
pluralistic liberal democracy.
The principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of
sovereign states cannot and should not be applied strictly
to Cambodia. Cambodia and the international community are
bound together by the country's tragic history and the obligations
inherent in the 1991 Paris Peace Accords and the 1993 UN-administered
elections. Cambodia is at risk of slipping back to the autocracy
and corruption that has characterized much of its past. The
international community has both the right and the responsibility
to keep this from happening. The international community can
and should take action in the following areas to restore and
strengthen democracy in Cambodia.
In the short run, ensure free and fair elections in 1998.
The international community can and should play a major role
in ensuring that the elections scheduled for 1998 are free
and fair. To accomplish this the international community should
take an active role, including using aid conditionality, as
follows:
- Help
create a less confrontational political environment by encouraging
peace talks between the rival parties. Free and fair elections
cannot be held in an environment characterized by violence
and intimidation. The king should be encouraged to convene
such a meeting between rival parties.
- Require
and ensure that all opposition politicians, including Prince
Ranariddh, are able to return to Cambodia to participate
in the elections in safety, free of violence, intimidation,
and discrimination. Require and ensure that all contesting
political parties can campaign throughout the country free
of obstacles and with equal access to the media.
- Require
that the newly formed National Election Commission is independent,
impartial, and has the financial autonomy and power to recruit
electoral officers, determine its own rules and regulations,
and give orders to all forces during the electoral period.
The international community should set up a donor-steering
committee to work alongside the National Election Commission
to ensure the enforcement of electoral laws, rules, and
regulations. This body should second at least two officials,
a program officer and a finance officer, to the National
Election Commission to help address technical problems and
ensure the enforcement of a program of actions, rules and
regulations, and sound financial management.
- Require
that the government guarantee the rights, freedom, and security
of domestic and international election monitors and provide
financial support and technical assistance to domestic and
international monitoring efforts. International monitors
should be posted in all provinces and districts (around
200) to oversee the entire electoral process from the registration
of voters to the taking of office by the winners. They should
be assisted by local monitors provided by Cambodian NGOs.
Donors also should appoint special monitors to ensure the
enforcement of laws on the neutrality of the armed forces
and of civil servants.
- In
exchange for financial assistance require all competing
parties to publicly pledge to respect the outcome of the
election.
- Maintain
the status quo with regard to Cambodia's ASEAN membership
and Cambodia's seat at the UN until the elections are proven
free and fair and the outcome is respected.
In
the long run, assist the development of democracy. As
the experience of 1993 shows, elections are a critical first
step in the process of democratization, but elections by themselves
do not ensure that democracy will take root. It is therefore
essential that the international community look beyond the
elections and continue to support Cambodian democracy in the
following ways:
- Help
to strengthen human rights in Cambodia by insisting on the
trial of those responsible for the deaths caused by the
March 30, 1997, grenade attack and the events during and
after the July 5-6, 1997, coup. Those responsible could
strike again and have an incentive to uphold the existing
system that allows impunity.
- Help
promote an independent judiciary and the rule of law by
insisting upon the activation of the Supreme Council of
the Magistracy and the Constitutional Council. Support the
development of these bodies, an effective judicial system,
and governmental and nongovernmental mechanisms to monitor
and protect human rights.
- Encourage
the Cambodian government to abolish the national army and
simply maintain a professional police force to ensure law
and order. The national army has a very dismal record. It
has drained the country's meager resources, yet it has failed
to defend the country or defeat the Khmer Rouge. Its soldiers
and officers are among the worst violators of human rights.
A Cambodia unarmed can protect itself better; a Cambodia
armed is simply its own enemy. Improved relations with neighboring
countries and the development of border regions are better
defense of the country. The signatories to the Paris Peace
Accords of 1991 should fulfill their obligations to guarantee
Cambodia's territorial integrity.
- Help
Cambodia to demobilize its soldiers and reduce the number
of its civil servants. Help to find ways to increase the
pay of those who remain and retrain them in order to have
an honest, effective, and neutral civil service. Entrenched
civil servants could be redeployed through decentralization
and the creation of regional development boards, which would
shift the focus of economic development from the capital
and other major urban areas to the rural areas where the
majority of Cambodians live.
- Support
the development of civil society by channeling more assistance
to NGOs in order to disperse powers from the center and
away from one individual or group.
Conclusion
In the wake of the July 1997 coup the prospects for pluralistic
liberal democracy in Cambodia look bleak. But one needs to
bear in mind that Cambodia has tried a variety of regime types
and political systems: Sihanouk's absolute monarchy, constitutional
monarchy with multiparty democracy, Lon Nol's republic with
dictatorship, and Pol Pot's and Heng Samrin's republic with
communist dictatorship. Sihanouk's constitutional monarchy
with multiparty democracy ensured peace, security, and some
prosperity for Cambodians; all the republics with dictatorship
led Cambodians to war and disaster.
Many Cambodians are speaking up against the deterioration
of democracy in their country and are working to uphold the
pluralistic liberal democratic order established by the 1991
Paris Peace Accords and the 1993 constitution. They are putting
pressure on their leaders to honor what they had themselves
agreed upon when they signed the Accords and adopted the country's
constitution. They are mobilizing like-minded Cambodians to
join in these efforts.
However, with leaders who are willing to use force and manipulation
to stay in power, the intervention of the international community
is still needed to convince Cambodia's leaders to respect
the rule of law and embrace pluralistic liberal democracy.
Absent sustained international assistance and pressure, it
will be very difficult, and perhaps impossible, to return
Cambodia's democratization to the upward path envisioned in
the Paris Accords and desired by the majority of the Cambodian
people.
Note
1. World Bank, Cambodia: From Recovery to
Sustained Development (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1996),
p. 23.
 Back to top | Contents
|
|
